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Abstract 
 
 
How do we make decisions when we are uncertain? In more real-world settings 
there is often a vast array of information available to guide the decision, from an 
understanding of the social situation, to prior beliefs and experience, to information 
available in the current environment. Yet much of the research into uncertain 
decision-making has typically studied the process by isolating it from this rich source 
of information that decision-makers usually have available to them. This thesis takes a 
different approach. 
To explore how decisions are made under uncertainty in more real-world 
settings, this thesis considers how raters decide if someone is lying or telling the truth. 
Because people are skilled liars, there is little information available to make a 
definitive decision. How do raters negotiate the ambiguous environment to reach a 
decision? 
Raters show a truth bias, which is to say they judge statements as truthful more 
often than they are so. Recent research has begun to consider dual process theories, 
suggesting there are two routes for processing information. They claim the truth bias 
results from an error-prone processing route, but that a more effortful and analytical 
processing route may overcome it. 
I will generate a set of testable hypotheses that arise from the dual process 
position and show that the theory does not stand up to the test. The truth bias can be 
better explained as resulting from a single process that attempts to make the most 
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informed guess despite being uncertain. To make the informed guess, raters come to 
rely on context-relevant information when the behaviour of the speaker is not 
sufficiently diagnostic. 
An adaptive decision maker position is advocated. I propose the truth bias is an 
emergent property of making the best guess. That is, in a different context where 
speakers may be expected to lie, a bias towards disbelieving should be seen. I argue 
context-dependency is key to understanding decision-making under uncertainty. 
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Summary of Experiments 
 
 
A brief summary the aims and outcomes of each experiment conducted is presented 
here for reference. 
 
Chapter 4: Testing the Dual Process Theory: The Multi-Response Interview 
 
Experiment 1: The Behavioural Account. The truth bias was shown to have an 
independent cognitive component. However, processing duration available to 
the rater could not predict the decline in the proportion of truth judgments 
(PTJ), failing to support two classes of heuristic-analytic models (HAMs). 
 
Experiment 2: Channel Effects. A third class of HAMs was examined, which 
proposes the cues available in the environment determine whether a heuristic or 
analytical process is used. No support for this account was found, showing a 
decrease in the PTJ across multiple judgments regardless of channel availability. 
In addition, the amount of processing time available was not able to predict the 
decrease in bias. 
 
Experiment 3: Thin-Slicing. The amount of processing time available was 
manipulated experimentally. However, there was no support for the suggestion 
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that processing time determines the extent of the decreased bias, failing to 
support HAMs. 
 
Experiment 4: The Consistency Heuristic. An alternative account was sought: 
raters may be making use of consistency information. This finding was 
supported. Interestingly, this cue proved to be diagnostic, suggesting raters are 
attending to useful information. However, that raters did not generally become 
more accurate over time suggests there may have been use of other information 
in the belief forming process. 
 
Chapter 5: The Adaptive Decision Maker 
 
Experiment 5: A Cartesian Mind – Online Comprehension. The Spinozan mind 
account proposes that, in order to understand, it is necessary to first 
automatically accept all information to be true. I suggest that this initial bias 
towards believing actually reflects the use of prior knowledge when uncertain 
but forced into judgment. This experiment replicates the Spinozan effect of an 
early truth bias when forced to judge, but there is no evidence of an early bias 
when able to withhold judgment and indicate uncertainty. 
 
Experiment 6: Most People Tell the Truth – The Availability Heuristic. When 
forced into judgment, what information is being used to guide the judgment? It 
is suggested that situation-relevant context knowledge can be used. In the case 
of lie detection, base rate information from prior experience can be brought to 
the judgment: people usually tell the truth. This experiment shows that, when 
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forced into judgment, early on in the decision process the base rate information 
is taken into account. 
 
Experiment 7: A Cartesian Mind – Post Comprehension. Informed Cartesian 
raters are thought to make use of context information under uncertainty. This 
experiment aimed to test this account at the point of the final judgment. 
Surprisingly, and in direct contrast to Experiment 5, the truth bias was greatest 
when participants were not forced to judge. Exploration of the data suggested 
that the unforced condition did not show an increase in truth responding, but 
rather a decrease in lie responding in favour of indicating uncertainty. This 
experiment led to a distinction being made between internal uncertainty, 
resulting from an inability to form a decision in spite of the evidence, and 
external uncertainty, resulting from a lack of information available in the 
environment. In the absence of information (external uncertainty), it is proposed 
raters make use of prior knowledge and contextually relevant information. 
When information is available but uncertainty remains, context-specific 
knowledge can again be employed: truths are typically more difficult to spot 
than lies, and so an inability to decide may be taken as an indication of 
deception. 
 
Experiment 8: The Cartesian Hopi Word Experiment. In an attempt to replicate 
the findings of Experiment 5 and to conduct a confirmatory study to replicate 
the findings of Experiment 7, the Gilbert, Krull and Malone (1990, Study 1) 
experimental setup was used. Whereas the Spinozan mind predicts an early bias 
towards believing, the adaptive decision-maker proposes uncertainty initially 
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and a truth bias later resulting from a shift away from lie responding towards 
unsure responding. That is, a crossover interaction was predicted. Whilst the 
data partially support the claim, it was found that the experimental design is not 
sufficiently placed to be able to test the claims of either the Spinozan mind or 
the adaptive decision-maker. Forgetting effects could better explain the results. 
 
Chapter 6: Social Orientation Theory 
 
Experiment 9: Socialisation Practices. The reduction in lie responses at the point of 
final judgment may not reflect true uncertainty but rather a strategy that aims to 
avoid the socially aggressive act of labelling another without voluntarily making 
an incorrect judgment – it may act as an ‘out’. The ostrich effect and the 
accusatory reluctance account both claim at their core that the social practices 
we engage with make us reluctant to label another a liar. By removing the 
implied social presence, a reduction in the truth bias was predicted under this 
account. It was found that whether the speaker was considered a social or non-
social agent did not influence the degree of bias. 
 
Experiment 10: Social Relatedness as a Heuristic. It was noted that the findings of 
Experiment 9 appear to contradict prior research showing that we are more 
inclined to believe those to who we feel closer. This experiment sought to 
determine whether social relatedness information, in isolation of other 
information that tends to accompany it (e.g. familiarity), can itself be used as a 
guide to aid the decision process. Although the truth bias cannot be accounted 
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for as an accusatory reluctance (Experiment 9), social information can 
nonetheless be incorporated into the judgment. 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
 
 
You are looking to buy a lottery ticket. In the lottery, five numbers are drawn at 
random, each with equal likelihood of being drawn. A friend gives you the option of 
buying one of two tickets: either a ticket with (a) 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 selected, or with (b) 
4, 19, 6, 32, and 12 selected. Each ticket is equally likely to win, and so it may be 
expected that you would equally choose one ticket as the other. In studies similar to 
this setup, that is not what happens. Instead, across a variety of tasks people show a 
systematic bias towards choosing one option over the other (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Plott & Smith, 2008). 
This thesis explores the underlying processes involved in biased responding. To 
date, much of the decision-making research has confined itself to low-level laboratory 
conditions in an attempt to isolate the processes from social, contextual and even 
memory influences. But consider the lottery example. There is typically a bias 
towards choosing numbers that show less systematicity and ordering, a variation on 
the gambler’s fallacy (Beach & Swensson, 1967; Jarvick, 1951; Witte, 1964). 
Although the lottery has no memory, you do. One account suggests the bias or fallacy 
may be a reflection of habits learned from life outside the laboratory that raters 
brought with them to the task (Ayton, Hunt & Wright, 1989; Estes, 1964; Lopes & 
Oden, 1987). 
The overarching aim of my thesis is to understand how raters make decisions 
when there is little information available in more naturalistic environments. The real 
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world is a rich source of information, and from it we may learn not only habits, but 
also the dynamics of and the rule that govern social interactions, the outcomes from 
past decisions, and expectations for future, similar decisions. This thesis will consider 
a decision-making task that makes these sources of information relevant and 
potentially useful for incorporating into the judgment. I will end by concluding that 
raters attempt to make the best guess possible given the lack of reliable information 
by relying on context-relevant information, and that these best guesses are the cause 
of biased responding in high-level socially oriented tasks. My research highlights the 
need to consider decision-making in context. 
To explore uncertain decision making in situ, I will make use of a real-world 
decision that people make: deciding whether others are lying or telling the truth. Lie 
detection is an inherently difficult decision when people are such good liars. The cues 
available are minimal at best (see Levine, 2010 for the suggestion that most liars are 
undetectable). For that reason, lie detection offers a perfect test bed for exploring 
natural decision-making under uncertainty. Despite the uncertainty in the 
environment, raters do not responding randomly: they show a truth bias. The truth 
bias has been reported across various studies and meta-analyses (e.g., Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Fiedler & Walka, 1993; Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999; Masip, 
Garrido & Herrero, 2006, 2009; Stiff, Kim & Ramesh, 1992; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman, 
DeFrank, Hall, Larrance & Rosenthal, 1979). It is defined operationally as making 
truth judgments more often than truthful statements are presented (c.f. Fiedler & 
Walka, 1993). 
I will explore the cognitive processes underlying the truth bias in this thesis. 
Rarely has the lie detection field considered the cognitive processes underlying the 
judgment, but one account that has recently received some support is the dual process 
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model, outlined below. Although findings have been consistent with the dual process 
model, lie detection researchers have yet to provide a true test of its explanatory 
power. I will present a series of challenges against the dual process model that it must 
meet if it is to account for the truth bias. I will show that the model fails to meet any 
of the challenges issued. Instead, I will show how the lie-truth judgment can be better 
thought of as being implemented by a single process rather than by two distinct 
processing streams. The major conclusion of this thesis is that we are adaptive 
decision makers: I suggest the truth bias is not an inherent component of the cognitive 
system but rather is a response bias that emerges from an integration of the cues in the 
environment with context-relevant knowledge to make informed guesses when 
unsure. 
A dual-process model has the advantage of explaining not only how the 
decision is formed but why it is biased, i.e. because one of the processing routes 
makes fast but error-prone decisions. If it is shown that we are single-process decision 
makers, which my research suggests, then we lose an understanding of why the 
system is biased. Why should a single process model show bias? 
There are at least three general conceptualisations of the truth bias. It may arise 
from an error in the system, just as a dual process account would also claim, it may 
reflect a useful aid to help navigate the social world, or it may be a way of making 
informed, accurate decisions based on an integration of context-relevant knowledge 
with currently available information. The three possibilities I am suggesting are 
considered in more detail in the next section, and will be empirically tested in 
Chapters 4 and 5. I will conclude that the last of these conceptualisations best explains 
the nature of the truth bias. I will show this by demonstrating that the other two 
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accounts fail to stand up to empirical testing and that the adaptive use of context-
relevant knowledge has a causal effect on the truth bias. 
In short, I will argue for a single-process account of the lie-truth judgment and 
suggest that the truth bias emerges from an integration of context-relevant knowledge 
and behavioural information from the speaker in order to form a satisfactorily 
accurate judgment. This conclusion contributes to both the decision-making and lie 
detection literatures. For the former, I argue that context-relevant information is 
brought to bear on real-world complex decisions, where cues are available not only 
from the immediate environment, but also from prior knowledge and from an 
understanding of the social environment. This thesis contributes to the lie detection 
literature by borrowing from decision-making research a new theoretical perspective, 
the adaptive decision-maker account (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993), considered 
in more detail in Chapter 2.  
 
 
Conceptualising the Truth Bias 
 
There is a substantial body of evidence demonstrating the existence and the 
pervasiveness of the truth bias (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008; DePaulo, Charlton, 
Cooper, Lindsay & Muhlenbruck, 1997; Levine et al., 1999; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman et 
al., 1979; Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981). At least three conceptions of the 
truth bias have been made: (i) as an error in the system that directly causes a decrease 
in accuracy (see Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010), (ii) as a result of socialisation 
practices that, as a by-product, causes a decrease in accuracy (O'Sullivan, 2003), and 
(iii) as an adaptive strategy that makes use of contextual knowledge and the available 
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behaviour of the speaker to make as good a judgment as possible given the constraints 
of the limited cognitive resources and the limited information in the world (Payne et 
al., 1993; Simon, 1990). 
First, it has been thought of by some as an aberration in the system (see Vrij, 
2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010), in much the same way as a bias in a weighing 
scale can be thought to be an unwanted but systematic problem with an otherwise 
useful device. Raters are thought to have an overgeneralised bias towards believing 
because of the lack of appropriate knowledge (Fiedler & Walka, 1993), for example, 
or because raters neglect some of the available information (Ask & Granhag, 2007; 
see also Vrij, 2008) and tend to anchor to that information in spite of contradictory 
evidence (Elaad, 2000; Fan, Wagner & Manstead, 1995; Zuckerman, Koestner, 
Colella & Alton, 1984; see also Gilbert, 1991). An important part of improving 
accuracy is to overcome the truth bias, from this perspective. 
In contrast, others have considered the truth bias not as a fault or defect, but as a 
useful aid in a social world. Accusing others of being a liar is a socially aggressive act 
(O'Sullivan, 2003). And it may come with potentially aggressive repercussions, from 
a short-lived argument to long-term breakdown of relationships (Bell & DePaulo, 
1996; Clark & Lemay, 2010; Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Guthrie & Kunkel, 
2013; Miller, Mongeau & Sleight, 1986). It may be in a rater’s interest to sacrifice 
accurate lie detection to maintain social cohesion. The truth bias is not an inherent 
part of the system but is rather an ‘optional extra’ that we bring to the task. 
A third way has also been suggested: the truth bias is useful, but need not 
decrease accuracy. In fact, it is present precisely because raters are trying to improve 
their accuracy. People tell the truth far more often than they lie (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996), so it would make sense (in terms of increasing 
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accuracy) to hedge on the side of believing others (O'Sullivan, Ekman & Friesen, 
1988). In this sense, the truth bias is more of an adaptive and flexible response that 
emerges from a strategy of incorporating prior knowledge into the decision. Police 
interviewers, for example, show a bias towards disbelieving others (Kassin, Meissner 
& Norwick, 2005), which may reflect their tendency to expect their interviewees to lie 
to them (Kassin, 2005; Masip, Alonso, Garrido & Antón, 2005). Such a lie bias is also 
seen when the speaker is believed to be generally untrustworthy (see DePaulo & 
DePaulo, 1989). 
Thus the truth bias can be thought of in at least three different ways: either as an 
aberration in the system, a willing sacrifice of accuracy to abide by social 
conventions, or an adaptive strategy that incorporates prior knowledge and 
expectations. This thesis will consider which of these three conceptualisations can 
best describe the truth bias. It will be argued that the first two are untenable. The truth 
bias appears to be a flexible response in that biased responding adapts to situational 
information and thereby improves performance. How these different 
conceptualisations will be addressed is discussed further below and in greater detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
Whether the truth bias is considered an aberration, a social convention, or an 
adaptive strategy addresses what Marr (1982) called the computational level of 
analysis. It gives an insight into the function of the system. But answering this 
question tells us nothing of the algorithmic level – how the system carries out its 
operations to perform these functions. 
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Process Accounts of the Truth Bias 
 
Given the applicability of lie detection research, it has been primarily geared 
toward finding new methods to improve accuracy. As a result, there have been few 
attempts to understand the underlying cognitive processes involved (see Miller & 
Stiff, 1993; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2012). 
Attempts to understand the processes are only beginning to be considered. A 
number of researchers have begun to show support for a dual process theory of the 
truth bias (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990; Masip et al., 2006; Masip, 
Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip, Garrido & Herrero, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 
2010). Dual process theory has had success in explaining a wide range of social-
cognitive phenomena, and has had some preliminary support in being able to account 
for lie-truth judgments (Brocas & Carrillo, in press; Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 
1989; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Fiori, 2009; 
Gawronski, Sherman & Trope, in press; Gilbert, 1991; Granhag, 2006; Masip et al., 
2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010; Petty & Wegener, 1999; 
Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; 
Ulatowska, 2013). I will empirically test the claims made by one prominent dual 
process theory, the heuristic-analytical model (HAM), and determine whether it can 
account for the truth bias. 
The HAM makes a distinction between a fast, effortless but error-prone 
heuristic processing stream and a slower, more evaluative but effortful analytic 
processing stream. It is thought that the truth bias arises from the more effortless 
heuristic processing route. Three general classes of HAMs have been identified 
(Evans, 2007). Two of these, the default-interventionist and the parallel-competition 
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models, propose that with a short amount of processing time the heuristic route will 
be used, but that with longer durations a more analytical processing style can be used. 
Accounts of the truth bias have taken this tack (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; 
Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993; Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; 
Masip et al., 2010). The third class of models, pre-emptive conflict resolution models, 
have been applied to questions concerning accuracy rather than bias (Reinhard & 
Sporer, 2008, 2010). These models propose either heuristic or analytical processing is 
chosen at the outset of the judgment, rather than switching between them after time 
has elapsed. The types of information in the environment may necessitate the 
selection of analytical processing, although internal motivations can also be used to 
make the initial selection of heuristic or analytical processing, according to this class 
of model. 
These three classes of model are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. The 
distinction between them is important for the current purposes because it allows for 
testable predictions to be generated from what is a broad and general theoretical 
framework (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). A number of challenges will be brought to 
bear on the HAM, briefly outlined below and in more detail in Chapter 2. I will show 
that there is no support for a dual-process HAM in accounting for the bias. Instead, 
my research suggests the truth bias can better be accounted for by a single process 
that makes use of context-dependent information and available cues in the 
environment in order to form relatively simple judgments in an uncertain 
environment. I will argue we are single-process adaptive decision makers (Beach & 
Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd & The ABC Research 
Group, 1999; Payne et al., 1993; Platzer & Bröder, 2012; Simon, 1990) that in an 
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information-limited world with a resource-limited cognitive capacity make 
satisfactorily accurate judgments. 
In the next section I address how I intend to examine the underlying processes 
and the conceptual nature of the truth bias. 
 
 
Testing the Truth Bias: Process and Purpose 
 
Here I shall give an overview of the structure of this thesis. I will first give an 
account of the general argument I wish to make, and will then follow with an outline 
of how each study contributes to the narrative. 
This thesis will begin by considering whether the HAM can account for the 
truth bias. It has been shown that during the early moments of consideration raters are 
truth biased, but that over time the truth bias is attenuated (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert 
et al., 1993; Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). Over time the heuristic 
processing stream is thought to be interrupted by an analytical process, thereby 
reducing the bias (Masip et al., 2006, 2009, 2010). 
If the HAM can explain the presence (and absence) of the bias as a switch in 
processing modes, it must stand up to a number of challenges. First, it must be shown 
that the decrease in the truth bias is not simply the result of the speaker changing in 
their behaviour over time. 
Second, because two of the three classes of HAMs make claims based on 
processing durations, the decline in the truth bias must be predicted by the amount of 
processing time available. A switch between the heuristic and analytical processing 
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streams is thought to occur after a given amount of processing time, at least under two 
of the three general classes of HAM. 
This brings us to the third challenge. If processing time cannot predict the 
decline in bias, then only one class of the HAM remains. This class of models predicts 
a selection of heuristic or analytical processing from the outset. Speech requires 
attention to the narrative of the story and is considered to necessitate analytical 
processing (Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Reinhard & Sporer, 
2008, Study 2; Stiff et al., 1989). Visual cues are considered easier to process (Forrest 
& Feldman, 2000; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, Study 3; Stiff et al., 1989) and so should 
evoke heuristic processing. 
If none of the above challenges can be met, an alternative account that makes no 
claim to multiple processes may better explain the phenomenon. I explore the 
possibility that raters bring contextually relevant knowledge to bear on the decision 
given the difficulty with and uncertainty in making a lie-truth judgment. I will show 
that raters do so precisely because they are uncertain but nonetheless have to make 
some decision. They can rely on relatively simple rules that the current context 
allows. If multiple statements are available from the speaker, for example, 
comparisons between statements can be made, and a consistency heuristic 
(‘inconsistent statements are deceptive statements': Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) can 
be used. In the absence of multiple statements, raters can make use of other speaker-
specific information such as how likely a given person is to lie, how alike the speaker 
is to the rater, and so on. Raters use this information when they must make a judgment 
but are unsure and so have to guess. The central theme of this thesis is that raters do 
not flip a mental coin – they make use of the available information, in the form of the 
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speaker’s behaviour and from context-specific knowledge, to make an informed 
guess. 
 
Testing the claims 
A more detailed account of how I intend to empirically test the preceding 
argument can be found in Chapters 2 and 3. Here I will give a brief overview as to 
how I intend to empirically address the challenges I have posed above. 
The first three experiments of Chapter 4 will begin by determining whether the 
three classes of the HAM can account for a decline in the truth bias as a speaker 
delivers a number of statements (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). The 
first experiment sought to determine whether the truth bias could be explained as a 
simple behavioural shift on part of the speaker. Shifting around the order of the 
statements should not affect the declining truth bias phenomenon because it is 
assumed to be independent of the behaviours being judged. This was supported. 
However, the degree of truth bias was not dependent on the amount of processing 
time available, failing to support two of the three classes of HAMs. 
Experiment 2 addressed the third remaining class of models by manipulating the 
types of information available to the rater. This has previously been shown to 
determine whether heuristic or analytical processing is selected. If this account were 
to explain the truth bias, it would have to be the case that for the speaker’s first 
statement the rater made use of the visual information, thought to be processed 
heuristically, but over time changes to verbal information, thought to be processed 
analytically. However, regardless of the type of information presented (only audio or 
only video), the decline in the truth bias was observed, failing to support the final 
class of HAMs. In addition, the amount of processing time available was again unable 
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to predict the degree of truth bias, replicating Experiment 1. Experiment 3 explicitly 
manipulated the amount of processing time available, rather than relying on 
observational analyses. There was no effect of viewing time on the degree of bias. 
Having established that the HAM fails to meet the challenges issued, an 
alternative account was sought that does not rely on a distinction between processing 
modes: the use of a consistency heuristic (Experiment 4). It was shown that 
consistency was not only able to account for the decline in bias across my research, 
but also for the decline in bias found in the original research (Masip, Garrido, et al., 
2009). Thus the decline in bias can be explained by the use of a relatively simple 
heuristic. 
It is not possible to rule out time-based HAM accounts altogether, however. It 
may be argued that before the end of the first statement raters may have shifted from a 
heuristic to analytical process. Having found no support for a HAM account at the 
coarse time scale of minutes, in Chapter 5 a greater temporal resolution is explored, at 
the scale of seconds (Experiment 5). Others have reported an early truth bias during 
the act of comprehension (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). In Experiment 5 I 
replicate this effect. Based on the findings of Experiment 4, again it is considered 
whether raters are making use of a relatively simple heuristic. Although consistency 
between statements is not possible, raters can make use of other readily accessible and 
context-relevant information such as their prior experience with the world to make 
‘the best guess’ in the absence of any other differentiating behaviour from the 
speaker. Experiment 5 finds that when forced into judgment, raters show a truth bias 
during the early moments of processing. The early truth bias depends on how likely 
they believe the speaker is lying or telling the truth (Experiment 6). 
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The HAM failed to meet the challenges issued: the truth bias can better be 
accounted for in ways that do not rely on a dual process distinction. The HAM 
distinction could explain why there was a truth bias. Dropping this model leaves us 
without an explanation of why the truth bias exists. Does it arise from the single-
process cognitive structure in some way, does it reflect socialisation practices, or 
rather does the bias merely emerge as an adaptive response to the available 
information under uncertainty? The findings of Experiment 4, showing that it arises 
from a consistency heuristic when it is an available option, and the findings of 
Experiments 5 and 6, showing raters make use of base rate information when it is 
necessary to guess, suggest an adaptive role of the truth bias. For example, when 
raters expected speakers to lie, there was an early bias towards disbelieving the 
speaker. 
Experiment 7 particularly highlights the adaptive nature of the truth bias, albeit 
from a post-hoc position. The purpose of this study was to extend the findings of 
Experiment 5, which found an early truth bias during comprehension. Because a truth 
bias is observed after comprehension and at the point of judgment response, the aim 
was to show that the truth bias at the point of the final judgment was also a result of 
making the best guess. By removing the need to make a judgment, it was thought that 
the bias would be attenuated. However, the exact opposite was found: when raters no 
longer needed to make a judgment they showed a greater truth bias. Further 
exploration of the data soon revealed that those forced to make a judgment used their 
uncertainty in a rather strategic way. Uncertainty after the statement and behaviours 
had been comprehended is different in nature to uncertainty because of a lack of 
information. The former is uncertainty in light of the available evidence. This in itself 
can be a useful guide. Raters are better at spotting truths than lies, a phenomenon 
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known as the veracity effect (Levine et al., 1999). Perhaps unsurprisingly then they 
are more confident when making truth than when making lie ratings (Anderson, 
DePaulo & Ansfield, 2002; DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 1997; DePaulo et al., 
2003; Anderson, 1999, cited by DePaulo & Morris, 2004; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; see 
also Levine et al., 1999). If raters were still unsure after having evaluated the 
behaviour, this likely suggests the statement is not a truth. Thus the ‘best guess’ under 
uncertainty in this instance is not to guess truth, but rather to guess lie. This can be 
seen clearly in the behavioural data: raters forced to make a judgment rate speakers as 
truthful just as often as those not forced into judgment, but they do rate speakers as 
lying more often. Those not forced into judgment would explicitly indicate their 
uncertainty, whereas those forced into judgment were more likely to err on the side of 
disbelieving. The best guess is not always to guess the speaker is telling the truth: in 
some situations it is more adaptive to guess the speaker is lying. 
The findings thus far appear to align with an adaptive decision-making 
perspective. Yet it may be that a social account can better explain the truth bias. 
Consider that raters may not be guessing ‘truth’ because they are relying on their prior 
knowledge of the world but because of their understanding of the social rules: it is 
rude to call someone a liar. The aim of Chapter 6 was to determine whether implied 
social presence alone was sufficient to result in a truth bias. 
If the truth bias results from treating others favourably because of our 
understanding of the social situation, removing the social component of the situation 
should remove the bias. To test this, all audio and most of the video cues were 
removed from the stimulus, leaving only a wire frame outlining the movement of the 
speakers. Raters were led to believe these wire frames were either social or non-social 
beings. Specifically, they were either told the speakers were participants in a police 
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interview situation or were told that the wire frame outputs were the result of 
computer modelling of a collection of thousands of behaviours and that each video 
produced a set of behaviours typical of deception or truth-telling. Believing that the 
videos were of other human speakers was not sufficient to invoke a truth bias 
(Experiment 9). While no support was found in favour of such a role for social norms, 
it is suggested that social information can be utilised as a simple cue to help guide the 
judgment, as shown in Experiment 10.  
Chapter 7 and 8 conclude with a discussion of the work presented and its 
implications for the HAM and the adaptive decision-maker. I argue context-relevant 
information is important for making informed judgments. In natural environments 
outside of the laboratory context-relevant information can be available in the 
immediate environment but we can also draw on our prior experiences and our 
understanding of the social situation in help guide the decision. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Accounts of the Truth Bias 
 
 
Chapter 1 gave a brief overview of the aims and intentions of this thesis: to 
explore decision-making under uncertainty in a socially oriented task. In that chapter I 
showed how heuristic-analytic models (HAMs) have had some success in accounting 
for biased (Gilbert, 1991; Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009) and 
(in)accurate (Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010; see also Fiori, 2009; Ulatowska, 2013) 
lie-truth judgments. In this chapter I will consider in detail the predictions made by 
the dual-process HAM and flesh out how these predictions will be tested in the 
experiments described in Chapters 4 and 5. I will also consider in greater depth the 
position taken by the single-process adaptive decision-maker account, which is 
thought to use relatively simple heuristics to make informed decisions under 
uncertainty. 
The HAM is particularly prominent in the persuasion literature. It can explain 
when a person is more or less likely to be persuaded (i.e. when heuristically 
processing: Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & 
Wegener, 1999). The distinction between a fast and frugal process versus a slow and 
effortful process has long been considered in decision-making research (Evans, 2008; 
Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Surprisingly, it is only recently 
that HAMs been applied to understanding both biased and accurate lie-truth 
judgments (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993; Masip et al., 2006; 
Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010), 
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perhaps because of the lack of process-oriented research in the area (see Lane & 
Vieira, 2012; Miller & Stiff, 1993). This thesis will critically evaluate the utility of 
HAMs in explaining the truth bias by generating a set of testable predictions that any 
HAM must meet. These tests are made on two different but related phenomena, 
examined separately in Chapters 4 and 5. 
This chapter will give greater attention to the distinctions made between three 
classes of HAMs and highlight the predictions made by each. A set of challenges will 
be issued to test these models. These challenges are (1) the truth bias must at least in 
part arise from the cognitive operations of the rater, (2) the amount of processing time 
available must be able to predict the shift in biased responding (as predicted by two of 
the three classes of HAMs), and (3) if it cannot, then the types of information 
available in the environment should guide an early selection of either heuristic or 
analytical processing (as predicted by the third class of HAMs). It will be shown that 
the HAM fails to meet these challenges. A single process adaptive decision-maker 
account is a viable alternative account, one that makes use of simple heuristics. 
Note that a distinction is being made between heuristic processing, a claim of 
the HAM, and the use of heuristics, employed by both the heuristic-analytic and the 
adaptive decision-maker accounts. There is potential for confusion between heuristics 
and heuristic processing. This can be seen in the literature where the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably. The distinction is made explicit in the following 
section. 
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Definitions: Heuristics, Heuristic-Analytical Processing and The Adaptive 
Decision Maker 
 
Unfortunately, the term heuristic has been used in markedly different ways – 
and has even been used interchangeably with the term heuristic processing 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). In fact, the term heuristic has been so widely used 
that its meaning has become vague and blurred (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). As a 
result, heuristics are considered consistent with almost all research findings, but they 
make few testable predictions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). To overcome this, I 
will give a working definition of heuristics as tools built up from past experience in 
similar contexts. Both HAMs and the adaptive processing account make use of these 
experience-based heuristics, but they can also make use of other frugal strategies. The 
two accounts differ insofar as they make different assumptions about the number of 
processing routes and about the utility of heuristics as either error-prone or beneficial. 
 
Heuristic Tools 
Heuristics are defined as simple generalised rules of thumb built up through 
individual, evolutionary and/or social experience, and are used in forming a decision, 
particularly under uncertain conditions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gilovich et 
al., 2002; Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005; Simon, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). The identifying component of this definition is a history of interaction with the 
world (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kruglanski, 1989). The availability heuristic, 
for example, can be used to estimate how frequently an event or class of events occur 
by making use of how often instances of the class can be brought to mind from 
memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That instances of plane crashes from news 
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media reports can be brought to mind from easier than can instances of car crashes 
may lead to the (erroneous) inference that plane crashes are the more frequent. 
Heuristics through experience give rise to simple rules such as ‘librarians are quiet 
people’ and ‘older people are more likely to have heart attacks’. Heuristics like these 
can be thought of as a set of tools that can aid decision-making insofar as they offer a 
quick and ready solution to a given problem. But because they necessarily 
oversimplify the state of the world by generalising from past experience, heuristics 
can sometimes lead to erroneous inferences (see Gilovich et al., 2002). 
Note that where HAMs would propose a duality in processing styles, one of 
which is a heuristic processing stream, no such distinction is being made in the 
definition of a heuristic. Heuristics are the generalised rules of thumb that can be used 
by whatever cognitive processes are thought to be in use. 
 
Heuristic and Analytical Processing 
Heuristics are entirely independent of the heuristic-analytic processing 
distinction. Heuristic processing is one mode through which information is evaluated, 
characterised primarily by its ease and speed of processing. The process can make use 
of the heuristic tools described above, but it can also (or instead) use other means to 
arrive at a quick and relatively effortless judgment (Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999), such as one’s own moral code (Haidt, 2001), the types of information 
available in the environment (Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Forrest & 
Feldman, 2000; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Petty & Wegener, 1999; Reinhard & Sporer, 
2008; Stiff et al., 1989), whether one is guided by accuracy concerns or other goals 
like social group acceptance or self-affirmation (Bohner, Moskowitz & Chaiken, 
1995; Chen, Shechter & Chaiken, 1996; Wyer & Frey, 1983; see also Martin & 
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Hewstone, 2003), or other accessible attitudes relevant to the judgment (Houston & 
Fazio, 1989; see also Howard-Pitney, Borgida & Omoto, 1986). That is, readily 
accessible information, whether from the environment, past experience or self-
reflection, can be used to make relatively effortless decisions. 
As well as using readily accessible information, heuristic processing could take 
into account all the available information in the environment and from past 
experience, much as might be expected of a more analytical and deliberative form of 
processing, but could exert less effort in coming to a judgment (Ajzen & Sexton, 
1999; Chaiken, 1980; Griffin, Neuwirth, Geise & Dunwoody, 2002). Heuristic 
processing, then, is a relatively effortless way of gathering and manipulating 
information to arrive at a judgment. It can do so by making use of heuristic rules, but 
could also do so by other means, such as more shallow processing of the available 
information (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Chaiken, 1980) or relying on a select set of 
readily accessible cues in the environment (Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Trope, 
1999). 
Analytical processing is an alternative mode of processing under the HAM. It is 
more deliberative and evaluative than heuristic processing, meaning it processes data 
in more depth and with more effort, but it too can make use of heuristics (Bohner et 
al., 1995; Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Chaiken & Trope, 
1999; Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981; Wood, Kallgren & Preisler, 1985; Worth & 
Mackie, 1987). Heuristics, although coarse, are informed by prior experience with the 
world. For that reason they can be informative for more reasoned decisions (Chaiken 
et al., 1989). Thus whether heuristic rules are used or not does not define whether a 
process is said to be a heuristic process or an analytic process. Rather, it is the depth 
and the evaluative nature of the processing effort that distinguishes heuristic 
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processing from analytical processing (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Griffin et al., 2002; see 
also Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, Neuwirth & Giese, 2003). However, it is difficult to 
define precisely what is evaluative and what is not evaluative, or to draw a clear 
demarcation between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’, for example. This difficulty in clearly 
distinguishing between the modes of processing continues to be a source of debate 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski, Pierro, 
Mannetti, Erb & Chun, 2007; Osman, 2004; Thompson, 2013), and is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7. For now, deeper processing is taken to mean more cognitive 
effort is expended in evaluating the information. 
To summarise so far, heuristics are rules of thumb that are informed by past 
experience. They are just one of the set of tools that can be used to help judgment 
formation under conditions of uncertainty. They can be used whether using heuristic 
or analytical processing, although their effects tend to be less influential on the latter 
mode. Heuristic processing is a more shallow and less evaluative deliberation that 
makes use of readily accessible information (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Chaiken, 1980): 
sometimes, the most readily accessible information is a heuristic. This heuristic tool 
versus processing mode distinction should be borne in mind. 
 
The Adaptive Decision-Maker 
The adaptive decision maker is defined as one who makes functional links 
between the limited information that can be obtained, from both the environment and 
past experience (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Gigerenzer, Martignon, Hoffrage, Rieskamp & Czerlinski, 2008; Payne et al., 1993; 
Simon, 1990), with the limited cognitive resources available to the decision maker 
(Chase, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1998; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Shah & 
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Oppenheimer, 2008; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2005), such that, in general, decision 
outcomes will be successful (e.g., Marewski, Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer, 2010). This 
definition closely aligns with that of Payne et al. (1993). In the current context of lie 
detection, successful decisions are thought to be accurate ones. 
The adaptive decision maker has been considered in learning and decision-
making tasks, where raters can make use of multiple cues to inform their decision 
(e.g., Bröder, 2000, 2003; Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 
1999; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2008; Platzer & Bröder, 
2012). These studies find raters limit their attention to a select number of cues in order 
to form a satisfactorily accurate judgment. As yet, the adaptive decision maker has not 
been applied to more socially oriented tasks like the lie detection judgment, which too 
are multiple-cue decision tasks. 
To make successful decisions with ambiguous and limited information, 
cognitive attention is guided towards only a limited set of cues. Some research 
suggests the selection of limited cues is a deliberative decision rather than an 
automatic tendency (Bröder, 2003; Platzer & Bröder, 2012). The selection may be 
determined by the demands of the task (Payne et al., 1993; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 
1999), but when undetermined, the more accessible and salient information may be 
used (Newell & Shanks, 2003; Platzer & Bröder, 2012).  
The adaptive decision maker account (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2001; Payne et al., 1993; Platzer & Bröder, 2012; Simon, 1990), however, 
brings together aspects of both heuristics and heuristic processing. Briefly, it shares 
with the HAM that frugal strategies most effectively employ limited cognitive 
resources (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 2008) by using simplified 
strategies in complex, information-limited worlds (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Todd & 
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Gigerenzer, 2005). Unlike the HAM distinction, though, the adaptive thinker need not 
possess two processing streams, and the use of simplified rules is considered to be 
functional and effective rather than maladaptive and error-prone. 
In summary, as with heuristic processing, heuristics could be one of the tools 
found in the adaptive decision-maker’s toolbox, although other means of simplifying 
the decision process are also available (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). Unlike the 
dual-process HAMs though, the adaptive decision-maker account that I propose is a 
single process theory, making no claim to a second, qualitatively different style of 
processing (see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011 for a similar perspective that makes 
no link between the use simple rules with a distinct unconscious or associative 
processing mode). In addition, contrary to the view of the effortless and error-prone 
heuristic process in dual-process accounts, the adaptive decision-maker simplifies the 
uncertain environment in order to improve decision-making by making use of 
relatively simple rules and reducing cognitive attention to only a select portion of the 
information set available (Chase et al., 1998; Czerlinski, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1999; Gigerenzer, 2007; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2008; Simon, 1990). Where heuristic processing is 
considered to make oversimplifications of the available evidence, the adaptive 
decision-maker is considered to employ generally successful shortcuts in an 
information-limited world. 
 
Summary of Definitions 
I have drawn a distinction between heuristics, heuristic processing, and the 
adaptive decision-maker. Heuristics are generalised rules of thumb built up from 
experience, such as the availability heuristic. Heuristic processing makes use 
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heuristics and other available information to arrive at a relatively effortless and 
potentially erroneous decision, whilst analytical processing is a more deliberative 
form of information processing. The adaptive decision-maker account shares 
properties of both heuristics and heuristic processing: it makes use of simplified rules 
that, in an uncertain world, are generally successful. It can make use of whatever 
information is readily accessible, akin to a heuristic process, but differs inasmuch as 
(a) there is no claim to a second more effortful processing mode and (b) makes use of 
simplified rules because they can increase judgmental accuracy in an information-
limited environment, rather than because of a cognitive miserliness. 
This thesis will conclude that the heuristic-analytical dual-process model cannot 
account for the phenomena that, on the surface, appear to exhibit the patterns of a dual 
processing structure. Heuristics informed by prior experience appear to be used in 
some, but not all circumstances: readily accessible cues in the environment can also 
be used for fast and frugal decision-making. The adaptive decision-making account 
proposes a set of generally successful strategies that rely on limited amounts of 
information, either from prior experience or in the immediate environment, under 
conditions of uncertainty. I will argue the adaptive decision-making account best 
explains the findings of this thesis, and that even uncertainty itself can be used in an 
adaptive way to aid decision-making. First though, I will begin from the theoretical 
framework that has been applied to understanding the truth bias: the heuristic-analytic 
model. 
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A Dual Process: The Heuristic-Analytic Model (HAM) in Detail 
 
Dual process theories, as the name suggests, have in common the proposal that 
there are two modes or two stages of information processing that can lead to different 
judgment outcomes. A prominent model from the persuasion literature is the 
heuristic-analytic model (HAM, e.g. Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Evans, 2007). The HAM shares with other dual-process theories a claim to two 
processing streams. Heuristic processing results in fast, intuitive judgments (De Neys, 
2006; Evans, 2007; Sloman, 1996) and has the advantage of consuming little 
cognitive resources (Chaiken et al., 1989). Unfortunately it is prone to neglect the 
informative evidence available (Chaiken et al., 1989). But we are not confined to 
heuristic processing: a second analytical mode of processing is available for more 
analytical deliberation. Analytic processing is slower, requiring greater effort, 
cognitive resources and cognitive ability (e.g. Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986).  
Because these processing streams are different in the way they select and 
process information, an important concern for dual process theories is how to address 
the potential for conflicting outcomes of the two systems of thought. In a review of 
HAMs, Evans (2007) identified three main classes that dual process theories could be 
categorised into based on the way in which they deal with potential conflict: (1) pre-
emptive conflict resolution, (2) parallel-competition, and (3) default-interventionist 
models. This taxonomy is adopted here for two reasons. First, they identify a small set 
of essential features that make up HAMs in general. The predictions of each of these 
class of models can be empirically tested and allow for a more general conclusion 
regarding the applicability of HAMs to be drawn. Should no support be found for 
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these three classes of models, then inferences regarding HAMs in general can be 
made (although see Evans & Stanovich, 2013, for a claim that HAMs are not directly 
Popperian falsifiable but rather require a prolonged attack at the Kuhnian core of the 
theory). Secondly, and relatedly, they are sufficiently broad as to encapsulate the 
many theoretical approaches and psychological disciplines reviewed by Evans (2007). 
A lack of support for any one class of model will have implications for the many 
theories that adopt the principles of that class of model. With this in mind, the current 
thesis will examine each of these classes of model in an attempt to distinguish which, 
if any, class of model may best account for the truth bias. 
HAMs have seen some success in their application to understanding lie-truth 
judgments. Whilst questions about lie detection accuracy have been met with pre-
emptive competitive HAMs (Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010; Stiff et 
al., 1989), the issue of the truth bias has seen application of the default-interventionist 
class of model, if only implicitly (Fan et al., 1995; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; 
Gilbert et al., 1993; Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Zuckerman, 
Fischer, Osmun, Winkler & Wolfson, 1987; Zuckerman, Koestner, et al., 1984). In 
this section I will explore all three classes of model and consider whether there are 
alternative explanations of the reported phenomena that better account for the truth 
bias. Two accounts of the truth bias rest on the claim that heuristic processing is 
followed by analytical processing, a prediction consistent with both the parallel-
competition and default-interventionist models. As such, focus will be given to these 
models, although pre-emptive conflict resolution models will also be considered. 
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Three classes of HAMs 
(1) Pre-emptive conflict resolution models address potentially conflicting 
judgment outcomes by avoiding the possibility in the first place (Evans, 2007). Either 
heuristic or analytical processing is selected from the outset. This selection may be 
constrained by the information available in the environment. Analytical processing is 
engaged where more effortful processing will be required (Chaiken, 1980; Evans, 
2007; Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993). Speech, which requires the listener to 
comprehend and reconstruct the narrative, requires greater cognitive resources 
(Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, Study 2; 
Stiff et al., 1989) than do visual behaviours, which have been shown to be easier to 
process (Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, Study 3; Stiff et al., 
1989). When only verbal information is present, analytical processing is engaged 
(Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999). When only visual 
information is present, the heuristic system is chosen (Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 
Study 3; Stiff et al., 1989). 
The selection of heuristic or analytical processing need not be driven by the 
environment. For example, analytical processing has been shown to be the more likely 
processing route when motivation or task involvement is high (Chaiken, 1980; 
Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999; Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1986; Reinhard, 
2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010). In the absence of environmental cues that can 
deterministically lead to a selection of a processing route, internal factors can 
motivate the choice of a process. Whether determined by the external world or 
selected by internal motivations, pre-emptive conflict resolution models circumvent 
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the potential for conflict between the two processing modes at the earliest stage of 
forming a judgment, before it has begun. 
(2) Parallel-competition models propose heuristic and analytical processing 
routes run in unison (Evans, 2007). The mediator of conflict in this model is time. As 
noted previously, analytical processing is slower and more deliberative. The heuristic 
processing stream is quicker because it is less analytical and more global in its 
evaluation. The heuristic processing stream will thus finish before the slower 
analytical route. Where a quick decision is desired or required, the heuristic 
processing stream is de facto selected because the analytical processing stream has yet 
to produce an output. However, where more time is available for judgment the 
analytic process is favoured. Sloman’s (1996, 2002) associative-rule-based model 
captures this distinction well. 
(3) Default-interventionist models share this time property. This class of models 
also proposes heuristic processes will be the basis of judgment if a quick judgment is 
made. The model differs from the parallel competition model insofar as the former 
propose the heuristic system is the default mode of processing and that after some 
given period of time it is interrupted by analytical processing (Evans, 2006, 2007; 
Stanovich & West, 2000), rather than the two processing modes running 
simultaneously. Both default-interventionist and parallel-competition models receive 
support in various domains from research showing a response bias when quick 
judgments are made but a reduced bias when additional processing time is available, 
suggesting a primacy of heuristic processing (De Neys, 2006; Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993; Masip, Alonso, Garrido & 
Herrero, 2009; Masip et al., 2006; Roberts & Newton, 2001; Schroyens, Schaeken & 
Handley, 2003; Verschueren, Schaeken & d'Ydewalle, 2005). 
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For example, in one study, Gilbert and colleagues presented learners with a set 
of nonsense words and a supposed definition of that word (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 
1). The definition was indicated to be either true or false. If participants were given 
little time to encode the veracity of a definition, they more often believed the 
definition was accurate and true. On those occasions where they had longer to learn 
whether the definition was true or false, they were less likely to be biased. The 
authors interpreted this as evidence of an initial default processing stage that 
automatically encodes information as true in the first instance, but with sufficient time 
a second stage of processing was thought to be intervening and revising their belief 
(Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990). 
In summary, three classes of HAMs can be identified. Pre-emptive conflict 
resolution models select either heuristic or analytical processing at the outset. Parallel-
competition models propose the two run in tandem and that whether the analytical 
processing stream has had enough time to arrive at a judgment determines whether the 
heuristic or analytical processing outcome is used. Finally, the default-interventionist 
account similarly proposes time constraints on the use of heuristic and analytical 
processing, but claims the heuristic process is a default mode of encoding and that at 
later stages analytical processing can intervene upon. This distinction offers clear 
predictions that the HAM makes and allows us to empirically ask whether the more 
general HAM framework is a useful account of the truth bias. 
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Challenges for a Heuristic Processing Account of the Truth Bias 
 
Having given a detailed account of the three classes of HAMs, I will now begin 
to issue a set of challenges that they must meet in order to be able to account for the 
truth bias. 
 
The multi-response interview: A declining truth bias 
In a set of experiments, Masip and colleagues (2006, 2009, 2010) interviewed 
speakers about a mock crime they had just watched on video. The interview consisted 
of three questions that asked about the actions of each of the three characters in the 
mock crime. The three responses came together to form a single statement, in much 
the same way that police interviewees may be asked multiple questions about 
different aspects of a crime which would be taken as a single statement about the 
course of events. Speakers were instructed to either lie throughout their statement (i.e. 
across all three responses) or to tell the truth throughout. In one study, participants 
were presented with the recordings of each speaker’s three responses (Masip et al., 
2006). They were to make a lie-truth judgment at the end of the statement and to 
indicate whether they come to their decision by the first, second or third response. 
Raters were more inclined to believe the speaker if they reported making their 
decision earlier. In another study, raters gave a judgment after each response, thereby 
providing three judgments for each speaker (Masip et al., 2009) rather than a single 
response as before. Replicating the effect, raters showed a more marked truth bias 
after the initial response but that by the second and third response the truth bias had 
declined. It was also found raters became more accurate over time, as one might 
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expect if raters shifted from an error-prone heuristic process to a more analytical 
mode of thought. 
These studies are novel inasmuch as they accept lie-truth judgments can change 
over time as more information becomes available. The reported phenomenon, a 
decreasing truth bias, gives a window onto the changing nature of the truth bias and 
exposes the conditions under which a truth bias is more or less likely to be present, in 
this instance early or late in the judgment process, respectively. Thus it offers a 
promising place from which to start exploring the underlying cause of the bias. 
Although the authors acknowledged that their ‘results are open to alternative 
interpretations’ (Masip et al., 2010, p. 591), they strongly favoured a HAM 
interpretation. I will suggest and test two alternative accounts for these findings: the 
behavioural account and the single-cue account. These two explanations along with 
the HAM are addressed below. 
 
The behavioural account of the truth bias. Labelling excessive truth 
responding as a bias implies it is a simple rule-based tendency on part of the rater that 
is prone to error. Given this interpretation, perhaps it is unsurprising it has come to be 
thought of as an erroneous outcome of heuristic processing. Yet it might be the case 
that the truth ‘bias’ is not a cognitive bias at all, but instead an unbiased and valid 
inference guided by the behaviours available to the rater. Surprisingly, such an 
explanation has been little considered (although see Fan et al., 1995; Zuckerman et 
al., 1987; Zuckerman, Koestner, et al., 1984, for some discussion of this possibility). 
Both liars and truth-tellers deliver believable statements in an attempt to appear 
(rightly or wrongly) honest. That is, truth tellers expect to be believed by others 
(Gilovich, Savitsky & Medvec, 1998), whilst liars manipulate their behaviour to 
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appear as though they are speaking the truth (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al., 
2003). Whether lying or telling the truth, we might expect the speaker to exhibit or 
attempt to exhibit behaviours that suggest they are telling the truth. Raters’ judgments 
may reflect an astute consideration of the speaker’s apparently genuine behaviour 
(Fan et al., 1995; Zuckerman et al., 1987; Zuckerman, Koestner, et al., 1984), 
resulting in a high degree of truth responding. Lie responding may similarly be guided 
by the presented behaviour: when the speaker’s behaviour is unexpected and violates 
norms, they are more likely to judge the statement as deceptive (Bond et al., 1992; 
Burgoon & Walther, 1990). And as these behaviours change over time, so too do the 
ratings of that behaviour (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Chung & Fink, 2008; Weld & 
Danzig, 1940; see also Saykaly, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala & Kang, 2013). 
Consider that the truth bias has been shown to decline over the course of the 
statement and become more accurate in their judgments (Masip et al., 2006, 2009, 
2010). This may be an indication of, for example, liars becoming more nervous over 
time, or leaking cues to their deception in other ways that are picked up by the rater. 
Either more diagnostic behaviour or merely more deceptive behaviours displayed later 
in the statement would result in a decline in the observed truth bias. Truth-tellers on 
the other hand, generally confident in the belief that ‘the truth will out’ (Gilovich et 
al., 1998; Hartwig, Granhag & Strömwall, 2007; Kassin, 2005; Moston, Stephenson 
& Williamson, 1992), may not become more nervous over time and will not leak cues 
to deceit any more than would be expected by chance. In this way, as time progresses 
liars and truth-tellers will become more distinct from one another (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2002). Truth-tellers’ behaviours would be perceived as honest across their 
statement whereas liars would become increasingly unconvincing, mirroring the 
improved accuracy and reduced bias found in prior studies (Masip et al., 2006, 2009). 
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If a heuristic-analytic account is to receive any support, it is necessary to show 
that the decline in the truth bias over time results from the listener’s developing 
considerations independently of the specific behaviours that are being rated. That is, 
there must be evidence of an independent cognitive component that operates 
irrespective of the behaviour presented. In Chapter 4 I will begin by exploring 
whether there exists just such an independent cognitive effect. 
 
The truth bias as a decline across time, not across ratings. Prior studies have 
shown a decline in the truth bias between the first, second, and third response of the 
speaker (Masip et al., 2006, 2009). While this offers a nominal sense of progression, it 
is the case that some speakers would have provided particularly long responses 
whereas others were rather short. The difference in the duration of statements is 
attributable to the fact that the researchers collected spontaneously generated lies and 
truths. Because analytic processing intervenes after a given duration of processing 
time rather than after a given number of ratings (see Evans, 2007), it is important that 
the differences in viewing durations, which will differ depending on the length of the 
speaker’s statement, are not glossed over by considering them to have been sampled 
after the same amount of processing time. To support a HAM account, it is important 
to show the truth bias decreases as the cumulative duration of the speaker’s statement 
increases. This may seem like a trivial distinction. However, the act of making a 
rating is itself an influence on what judgment is reached (Granhag & Strömwall, 
2000b; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). This is considered further in the next section. 
In their work, Masip and colleagues (2006, 2009) considered the truth bias to 
be attributable to the default-interventionist class of HAMs. In order to more 
thoroughly test the applicability of the HAM to the truth bias, all three classes will be 
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considered here. Both the default-interventionist and the parallel-competition models 
make the same claim regarding processing duration: the analytical process will have a 
greater influence on the judgment outcome with longer processing durations. These 
accounts can thus be tested simultaneously. 
The third class of models supposes a selection between heuristic or analytical 
processing before the judgment process proceeds. That there is a demonstrable change 
in the judgment outcome over time has in the past been taken as evidence that 
weakens the pre-emptive conflict resolution model precisely because it makes no 
temporal predictions (Evans, 2007). These models instead predict that internal 
motivations or the cognitive effort required to process particular types of information 
in the environment allow for an early selection of processing mode. Because the 
environment can be more readily manipulated and has been argued to 
deterministically result in heuristic or analytical processing, this approach will be 
taken in Chapter 4 to test the claims of this class of models. 
 
The single-cue account of the truth bias. In the preceding section I briefly 
alluded to research showing how the act of making multiple judgments can itself be a 
causal force in the decision process (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000b, 2001a; Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). In order to understand this effect, it is worth considering how 
judgments are made when multiple responses are available. 
The act of rating after each new response provides not only additional 
processing time but also new affordances for judgment. When two or more responses 
have been provided, it is possible to make comparisons between them. When the 
opportunity for comparison arises, raters have been shown to make use of consistency 
in the statement more so than other available cues such as the amount of detail they 
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provided and even the plausibility of the statement (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 
2000b, 2001b; Strömwall & Granhag, 2005, 2007; see also Strömwall, Granhag & 
Jonsson, 2003). 
Unfortunately (for the rater), consistency appears to have low diagnostic utility 
in distinguishing adults’ lies from truths (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2001b, 2002; 
Strömwall et al., 2003; although see Strömwall & Granhag, 2007, for evidence of 
consistency as a predictive cue of children's lies). Surprisingly, there is no clear 
agreement between raters whether a given speaker appears consistent or inconsistent 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), although there is general agreement that inconsistency 
is a cue to deception (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2000a, 2001a). Because raters 
perceive inconsistencies even when they are not present, there could be a shift 
towards rating others as deceptive when the opportunity for comparison arises, i.e. 
after having viewed the second response. Having established inconsistency after the 
second response, there may be no additional effect of inconsistency by the third 
response: the lack of consistency may carry over from the second to the third 
response. In the prior studies it was found that the decline in truth bias was 
concentrated between the first and second response; there was no further decline by 
the third response. 
This account raises two empirical challenges for the HAM. First, it must be 
shown that the amount of processing time, independent of the number of judgments 
made, can predict the decline in truth bias. Second, the decline in truth bias must not 
be attributable to the consistency heuristic (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), but instead 
reflect a shift from a heuristic process to an analytical process. 
Because heuristic processes can make use of heuristics, it may be questioned 
whether this is really a challenge to the HAM. Strictly speaking, by itself it is not a 
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strong challenge to the HAM. However, the phenomenon of a reduced truth bias has 
been taken as evidence in favour of a HAM. If the phenomenon can be accounted for 
without reference to the HAM, in unison with other findings that directly challenges 
it, this finding further undermines the dual process account by suggesting a new 
interpretation of the phenomenon. These challenges will form the remainder of 
Chapter 4. 
 
Summary: Challenges for the HAM account. This thesis sets out to test the 
applicability of HAMs to the truth bias. One recently identified phenomenon aligns 
with the default-interventionist and parallel-competition class of HAMs: raters show a 
truth bias initially that, over the course of the statement, declines (Masip et al., 2006, 
2009, 2010). In this section I presented some challenges that the HAM account must 
overcome. First, it must be shown that the truth bias is not solely a direct reflection of 
the speakers’ behaviours. If the truth bias is a product of a more error-prone 
processing route then the rater is the cause of his or her own bias, regardless of the 
behaviours of the speaker. In this sense, it must be shown there is an ‘independent 
cognitive component’ to the truth bias and that it is not a veridical reflection of the 
behaviour the speaker portrays. It is important to note that focus is given to cognitive 
dual processing accounts over, say, emotion accounts (e.g., Fiori, 2009). The nature of 
this first challenge is to address whether the cause of the truth bias resides at least in 
part with the rater. Discussion of an ‘independent cognitive phenomenon’ serves as a 
useful shorthand through this thesis. However, it should be noted that if the evidence 
suggests this challenge can be met, this does not then entail evidence in favour of a 
cognitive mechanism over an emotional mechanism, for example.  
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Second, it must be shown that the declining bias is predicted by processing time 
and not simply by the number of judgments made. Because statements can be long or 
short, the number of ratings acts only as a proxy to viewing time, so it cannot directly 
address the predictions of HAMs. This second challenge assumes either a default-
interventionist account, as the authors suggested (Masip et al., 2006, 2009), or a 
parallel-competition account. If neither of these accounts receive empirical support, a 
third challenge must be met instead if HAMs are to have any explanatory power: it 
must be shown, in accordance with a pre-emptive conflict resolution model, that the 
nature of the information available to the rater will influence whether raters are truth 
biased or not. Verbal information, requiring greater cognitive processing, should 
reflect an analytical processing style and result in a reduced truth bias. Each of these 
challenges is addressed in the first empirical chapter, Chapter 4. 
If these challenges cannot be met, an alternative account of the phenomenon 
may shed light on the causal factors behind the truth bias. One possibility discussed in 
this section arises from the affordances arising from the task. By receiving multiple 
responses from the same speaker about characters involved in the same crime scene, it 
is possible to start making comparisons. Perceived inconsistencies in statement may 
result in a reduced truth responding. Such a finding would suggest judgmental 
heuristics are to account for the truth bias. This would be consistent with an adaptive 
decision-making account, where the decision outcome results from attention to a 
limited set of cues in the environment. 
 
Hope for the HAM: Processing at a finer time scale 
The truth bias has been discussed above with reference to the declining truth 
bias across multiple judgments of a speaker’s statement. I will argue with the use of 
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this phenomenon that a HAM cannot explain the truth bias. There are two major 
drawbacks of using this phenomenon to test HAMs. First, although it may be possible 
to explain the decline in the truth bias as a shift from heuristic to analytical 
processing, it is not immediately clear why heuristic processing shows this primacy. 
Second, although a failure to meet any of the challenges proposed earlier certainly 
weakens the HAM’s position, it is not quite possible to rule it out entirely. This is 
because of the unspecified time scales at which the heuristic and analytical processes 
are said to operate on the truth bias. Whilst the pre-emptive conflict resolution model 
is clear in this respect – the choice of processing mode occurs at the start of the 
judgment – the remaining two classes of model suggest no specific time frames at 
which the analytical process will be favoured over the heuristic process. Although 
HAMs may fail to account for the declining truth bias at the coarse time scale of 
minutes, accounts that predict more fine-grained smaller time scales of seconds are 
still tenable. 
 
A Spinozan mind: Believing in order to comprehend. One prominent account 
of this sort stems from the work of the Dutch philosopher Baruch de Spinoza 
(1677/1982). Drawing on his work, Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et 
al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993) proposed the truth bias is a necessary outcome given 
the structure of the mind. The ‘Spinozan mind’ hypothesis claims that in order to 
comprehend a statement, it is necessary to first believe the statement is true. This view 
continues to impact philosophy (Burge, 1993; Millikan, 1987) and other domains such 
as hypothetical reasoning (Fitzsimons & Shiv, 2001; Moore, Neal, Fitzsimons & Shiv, 
2012), text comprehension (Hasson, Simmons & Todorov, 2005; Prentice, Gerrig & 
Bailis, 1997; Schul, Mayo & Burnstein, 2004), persuasion (Green & Brock, 2000; 
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Prentice et al., 1997; Sperber et al., 2010) religious belief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, 
Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012), credibility assessment (Colwell et al., 2012; Levine et 
al., 1999; Millar & Millar, 1997), and other areas of research (Chen & Blanchard-
Fields, 2000; Knowles & Condon, 1999; Skurnik, Yoon, Park & Schwarz, 2005). 
According to the Spinozan mind hypothesis, it is only after the initial 
acceptance that we can consider rejecting the idea we initially assented to believe. 
Thus comprehension is considered a two-step process where the ‘unbelieving’ stage 
follows automatic acceptance in time (Gilbert et al., 1990). As such, it is a 
prototypical example of a default-interventionist model where a default belief stage is 
superseded by a more deliberative consideration, making it a suitable candidate for 
testing HAMs. Because comprehension is online, which is to say that we comprehend 
each new piece of information as and when it becomes available (e.g. Heuttig, 
Rommers & Meyer, 2011; Spivey, Grosjean & Knoblich, 2005; Spivey, 2007), the 
effects of initial belief due to comprehension and the subsequent revision of 
information are proposed to take place within the initial few seconds of receiving 
information (Gilbert et al., 1990). This allows us to tackle the issue that may be levied 
at the multiple-response interview paradigm discussed above, where it could be 
claimed the time scale of minutes is too coarse to detect the shift from heuristic to 
analytical processing. 
In favour of the Spinozan view that belief comes prior to disbelief is research 
showing that negated sentences, e.g. ‘the eagle was not in the sky’, are slower to 
process than affirmed sentences, e.g. ‘the eagle was in the sky’ (Carpenter & Just, 
1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Clark & Clark, 1977; Donders, 1969; Mayo, Schul & 
Burnstein, 2004; Trabasso, Rollins & Shaughnessy, 1971; Zwaan, Stanfield & 
Yaxley, 2002). It has been suggested that information is encoded initially as true and 
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that negation requires additional lexical ‘not’ tags to identify the statement as false 
(Clark & Chase, 1972; Clark & Clark, 1977; Gilbert, 1991; see also Johnson-Laird, 
1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), just as the Spinozan 
mind hypothesis predicts.  
However, recent research has started to show that it is the nature of the task, not 
the structure of the mind, that results in faster processing for affirmed statements. 
Stating that ‘the eagle was not in the sky’ leaves open various possibilities as to where 
the eagle was: in the nest, on the floor, on a dinner plate, and so on. Theories of 
comprehension such as mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991) or those that rely on embodiment theory (Zwaan et al., 2002) suggest a 
representational ‘image’ of the scene is constructed online. Thus where there is 
ambiguity, such as is the case in underspecified negated statements like ‘the eagle was 
not in the sky’, mental reconstruction of the scene requires a consideration of all the 
possible alternatives, which in turn will appear to slow the comprehension process. It 
has been shown that when the negated statements are not underspecified, they are 
processed equally as quickly as affirmed statements (Anderson, Huette, Matlock & 
Spivey, 2009, 2010; Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999; 
Wegner, Coulton & Wenzlaff, 1985; see also Deutsch, Kordst-Freudinger, Gawronski 
& Strack, 2009; Schul, Mayo & Burnstein, 2004. Also see Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980, 
and Skowronski & Carlston, 1989, for a similar account of impression formation). 
People seem to adapt to the structure of the task. 
The automatic encoding of information should also impact the way new 
information is sought, according to the Spinozan claim (Gilbert, 1991). It is suggested 
people test hypotheses about the world by seeking evidence that confirms their beliefs 
and hypotheses about the world. For example, given the hypothesis ‘Bob is 
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introverted’, it is claimed people seek out information that confirms this view rather 
than attempt to test it by looking for disconfirming evidence. Indeed, the confirmation 
bias is a well-documented phenomenon (see Snyder & Campbell, 1980; Snyder & 
Swann, 1978). Yet the hypotheses in these studies are of the form that would be 
employed if one already knew the hypothesis to be true, e.g. ‘Bob is introverted’. It 
would be normative to ask questions that confirm the statement because they can give 
us more detail about what is already known, such as how introverted Bob is (Gilbert, 
1991; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; see also Trope & Bassok, 1982).  
The disconfirmatory hypothesis, that Bob is an extravert, is usually only implicit 
and never directly given to participants. In their review of confirmation biases, 
Higgins and Bargh (1987) note that a number of studies show no preference for 
confirming evidence when the disconfirmatory hypothesis is explicitly presented to 
participants (‘Bob is extroverted’). As with the processing of negation, the preference 
for confirming one’s beliefs only exists when the confirmatory hypothesis has a single 
construal (e.g. ‘I am introverted’) and the alternative disconfirmatory hypothesis is 
underspecified, meaning there is a range of potential disconfirmatory hypotheses that 
could be explored (e.g. ‘Bob is extraverted in some situations’, ‘Bob is extraverted 
around certain people’, ‘Bob is only a little extraverted’). 
Upon examination, it becomes clear that prior research does not immediately 
lend itself towards favouring the Spinozan view, as Gilbert et al. (1993) have also 
noted. Gilbert and colleagues (1990, 1993) more directly address the empirical 
predictions of their Spinozan mind account. Because believing is said to be an initial 
default state, the claim can be tested from two angles. First, if belief precedes more 
evaluative processing, interrupting the judgment process early versus allowing 
additional time should result in a tendency towards believing, as indeed they showed 
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(Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 1). Second, if it is a default state, then mere 
comprehension should be sufficient to result in belief (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 3). 
Similarly, adding a secondary task should increase the cognitive load and lead to 
reliance on the default state (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 2; Gilbert et al., 1993). Thus 
they concluded there is strong support for a Spinozan view of the mind. 
 
A Cartesian mind: A single-process alternative. This view can be contrasted 
with Descartes’ (1641/1993). The ‘Cartesian Mind’ is able to comprehend 
information independently of assessing its veracity. Under this view, there would 
instead exist an initial period of indecision and a subsequent evaluation (Gilbert, 
1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). That is, where a Spinozan mind posits 
an early acceptance, the Cartesian mind posits an initial uncertainty. Because there is 
only a single judgmental process, it is considered a one-stage model in contrast to the 
Spinozan two-stage dual process model (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990). Gilbert 
and colleagues rejected the Cartesian mind because, in their view, it is not capable of 
accounting for an early truth bias. 
The rejection rests on the assumption that uncertainty will be exhibited by 
respondents as being equally likely to believe as to disbelieving, in line with the logic 
behind the two-alternative forced choice. I will call this the naïve Cartesian model 
because it assumes that under uncertainty raters respond randomly. However, decision 
strategies can employed by a decision-maker under uncertainty, and can be used to 
offer an ‘informed guess’. The Cartesian view can be modified to incorporate these 
strategies, which will be called the informed Cartesian model. Under this view, 
comprehension begins with a period of uncertainty. Knowledge and past experiences 
can bias initial uncertainty towards believing a statement, before a firm decision is 
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made whether to believe or doubt. If the decision-maker is forced into judgment 
despite not having made one yet, they can rely on their past knowledge of the world. 
The availability heuristic that ‘people usually tell the truth’ may be relied upon 
to help make this forced decision (see O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Because heuristics are the result of past experience with the world, they can be 
informative: studies show that the frequency at which truths are encountered far 
outweighs the frequency of lies we experience (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; DePaulo & 
Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; George & Robb, 2008; Hancock, Thom-Santelli & 
Ritchie, 2004; see also Cole, 2001; van Swol, Malhotra & Braun, 2012). The 
informed Cartesian mind would be expected to show a truth bias during the early 
moments of comprehension because it makes use of its prior knowledge. Both an 
informed Cartesian and a Spinozan mind can account for the findings. 
The informed Cartesian claim implies that the bias might not be constantly set 
to affirm automatically, but rather is a preferential bias that is dependent on 
experiential or situational factors. Pre-existing choice preferences can come from 
experience and expectations (Beukeboom, Finkenauer & Wigboldus, 2010; Deutsch 
et al., 2009; Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, Hopp & Shadlen, 2011; Hasson et al., 2005; 
Schroeder, Richter & Hoever, 2008; Schul, 1993; Schul et al., 2004; van 
Ravenzwaaij, Mulder, Tuerlinckx & Wagenmakers, 2012), and regulations 
constrained by the situation ('innocent until proven guilty’: Pennington & Hastie, 
1991), which have been shown to play an important role in comprehension (Glenberg 
& Robertson, 1999, 2000). 
There is some evidence that this preference can be modified, which, 
importantly, should not be possible of an automatic Spinozan bias towards 
acceptance. State suspicion shifts the bias towards doubting (Deutsch et al., 2009; 
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Kassin et al., 2005; Kim & Levine, 2011; Masip et al., 2005; Moore et al., 2012; 
Schul et al., 2004; see also Bond, Malloy, Arias, Nunn & Thompson, 2005), negated 
statements can be processed faster than affirming statements when the uncertainty 
inherent in the task is removed (Anderson et al., 2009, 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999; 
Hasson et al., 2005; Wegner et al., 1985; see also Beukeboom et al., 2010; Fraundorf, 
Benjamin & Watson, 2013; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000), and forewarning increases 
the tendency towards disbelieving (Allyn & Festinger, 1961; Benoit, 1998; Hovland 
& Weiss, 1951; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964; McGuire, 1964; Wood & Quinn, 2003). 
Thus under different conditions people can actually appear anti-Spinozan. 
To recap, the Spinozan mind hypothesis is a form of default-interventionist dual 
process model that makes predictions about the use of heuristic versus analytical 
processing on the time scale of seconds. Whilst a HAM account cannot explain the 
observed decrease in the truth bias found at the more coarse time scale of minutes, it 
may have success on this time scale. The advantages of using the Spinozan model are 
(1) it has received empirical support in other domains, (2) it continues to influence 
research across a variety of areas, and (3) if support is not found for a Spinozan model 
an obvious alternative candidate is readily available: the informed Cartesian rater that 
relies on past experience. Chapter 5 tests the predictions of each of these models. 
The findings of Chapter 5 will show how raters are not dual-process Spinozans, 
but are informed single-process Cartesians, making adaptive decisions under 
uncertainty. The concept of uncertainty plays a central role, and a distinction between 
internal and external uncertainty is made. Internal uncertainty reflects the inability to 
decide whether to believe or disbelieve because the information gathered from the 
environment is not sufficiently diagnostic to push us towards one judgment or the 
other. 
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Internal uncertainty, it is argued, can be used adaptively. Raters are typically 
less confidence when listening to lies than truths and are less confident in making lie 
judgments compared to making truth judgments (Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo, 
1992; DePaulo et al., 1997; DePaulo et al., 2003; Anderson, 1999, cited by DePaulo 
& Morris, 2004; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; see also Levine et al., 1999). Consider also 
that raters are better at spotting truths than spotting lies (Levine et al., 1999). 
Similarly, processing affirmed statements, e.g. ‘the eagle is in the sky’, are easier and 
take less processing time than negated statements, e.g. ‘the eagle is not in the sky’ 
(Anderson et al., 2010; Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Glenberg et al., 
1999; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Trabasso et al., 1971). In both cases, internal uncertainty 
can be used as an indicator that the statement is likely to be false. 
 External uncertainty results from a lack of information available in the 
environment on which to make a decision. Under external uncertainty, raters can 
come to rely on their prior knowledge of similar situations, or more general 
information about the current context. An availability heuristic such as ‘people 
usually tell the truth’ (Grice, 1975; O'Sullivan et al., 1988), and an understanding that 
communication of new information needs to be true information if it is to be useful 
(see Fiedler, Armbruster, Nickel, Walther & Asbeck, 1996; Grice, 1975; Swann, 
Guiliano & Wegner, 1982), can be used to guide the decision, and may result in a bias 
towards believing. The use of an availability heuristic under external uncertainty is 
explored in Experiment 6 and considered further in the next chapter. 
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Conclusion: Chapter 2 
 
To account for how we come to make decisions when situated in the real world, 
this thesis makes use of a social paradigm in which the information in the 
environment (the behaviours of the speaker) is ambiguous, creating a degree of 
uncertainty in the decision. Despite the inherent ambiguity, there is a systematic 
tendency towards believing others. This thesis takes as its starting point a theoretical 
framework that has been applied to the field of lie detection: the heuristic-analytic 
model. 
Four challenges were brought to bear against the HAM account: (1) the truth 
bias must have some cognitive component independent of the presented behaviour, 
(2) cumulative processing time must be able to predict the decline in the truth bias, (3) 
If processing time is unable to account for the decline in bias, then it must be shown 
that heuristic or analytical processing is chosen from the outset, and (4) If the HAM 
cannot account for the truth bias at a coarse temporal resolution, it should be able to 
do so at a more fine-grained. It will be shown that there is little evidence to favour a 
dual process account. Instead, evidence is offered to suggest raters are adaptive 
decision makers in the face of uncertainty and can make use of information from the 
environment, from prior experience or even make use of the uncertainty itself to aid 
decision-making. In the next chapter, the types of information used by an adaptive 
decision-maker are considered.
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Chapter 3: Context-Dependent Information Use 
 
 
I have so far considered a prominent process theory that has been applied to 
understanding lie detection: the heuristic-analytic model. I have argued that a HAM 
cannot explain the truth bias and that it may be better explained with an adaptive 
decision-maker account. This account claims that we make flexible use of a limited 
amount of context-relevant information in the environment and from past experience 
to aid making a decision under uncertainty. For example, participants in a learning 
task may discover that although all the cues are diagnostic, some are more diagnostic 
than others, and so will limit their attention to the more diagnostic ones in making 
their decision. 
This chapter considers what information may be used in the absence of 
information in the environment. An alternative to the adaptive decision-maker 
account will also be considered: the truth bias may simply reflect social norms of not 
accusing others of being a liar. 
The current chapter will argue that in the absence of behavioural cues, raters can 
make use of more general information such as base rate knowledge and information 
about the social world. However, it will be argued that while raters may make use of 
social information in an adaptive fashion, it is not the case that the truth bias reflects 
learnt socialisation practices of politeness. 
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The Availability Heuristic: Base Rate Knowledge 
 
In exploring cognitive HAM accounts, whether at the longer time scales found 
across speaker’s testimonies (the multiple-response interview) or at more fine-grained 
time scales during the process of comprehension (the Spinozan mind hypothesis), the 
evidence appears to suggest an overweighting of a single cue compared to the use of 
other available cues in order to make a judgment. It is suggested that when there is no 
information available in the environment, raters can make use of their prior 
knowledge and experience with similar situations. In this section the role of the 
availability heuristic considered in preceding chapter – i.e. ‘most people tell the truth’ 
– will be more directly considered. 
 
‘Most people tell the truth’ 
Believing others may be an accurate reflection of the real world. The average 
person lies on a daily basis, but the number of deceptive interactions is far outweighed 
by the number of honest interactions we experience (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Clark & 
Clark, 1977; DePaulo et al., 1996; Fan et al., 1995; O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 
1988). One possible reason for this asymmetry is that a high rate of honesty may be 
necessary to successfully communicate and to be understood (Echterhoff, Higgins & 
Levine, 2009; Grice, 1975). On those relatively rare occasions when people do lie the 
quality of the conversation is reported to be less pleasant and intimate (DePaulo et al., 
1996; Miller et al., 1986), which may also serve to discourage deception. Whatever 
the reason, the true base rate of honesty is likely far higher than the equal split of lies 
and truths presented in the laboratory (see DePaulo et al., 1996; O'Sullivan et al., 
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1988). As such, the ‘people rarely lie’ heuristic is likely a fair representation of the 
world. 
An informed decision-maker should factor this knowledge into their judgment 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980); after all, labelling most of our interactions as deceptive when 
there are likely to be few of them will result in high inaccuracy. Outside of the 
laboratory, this heuristic can serve as a useful aid to forming accurate judgments: 
anticipating that others will be honest is likely adaptive when an individual has 
encountered more honest than deceptive interactions in their daily lives. This 
information, it is predicted, is most likely to have an influence when there is little 
information available in the environment, i.e. under external uncertainty. 
There is some evidence suggesting the expected rate of honesty influences the 
truth bias. Participants made aware that they might be deceived rate speakers as more 
deceptive compared to naïve raters (Stiff et al., 1992; Toris & DePaulo, 1985), and as 
suspicion increases, statements are less likely to be rated as truthful (e.g. Bond et al., 
1992; Levine et al., 2000; Masip, Alonso, et al., 2009; McCornack & Levine, 1990). 
That is, ratings appear to reflect expectations of deceit. It is also worth noting that 
police investigators, who have a lie bias (Meissner & Kassin, 2002), expect their 
interviewees to lie to them (Kassin et al., 2005; Masip et al., 2005; Moston et al., 
1992). Lay raters similarly show a bias towards disbelieving others when those others 
are believed to be sales people (DePaulo & DePaulo, 1989), which the authors 
explained might reflect their perceptions of how honest these individuals typically are. 
Their expectations built up from past experience may be the cause of their biased 
responding (see Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, 2003). The use of simple rules such as 
these built up from past experience characterises a heuristic. 
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However, what is not clear is how suspicion comes to influence the judgment. 
Suspicion of deception may increase motivation to seek out the liars compared to 
those who are not suspicious. Or it may be that suspicion is used as a heuristic cue to 
the base rate: warned of the possibility of deception, raters may come to rely less on 
their general belief in others’ honesty and instead come to use a lie heuristic such as 
‘most of these people do not tell the truth’. That is, it is unclear whether suspicion 
increases motivation to detect liars or updates the perceived base rate. 
The adaptive decision-maker offers a specific time-course prediction in making 
use of base-rate information: when little information is available from the 
environment, during the earlier moments of comprehension, the provided base rate 
information should be used because it is the only available evidence about the current 
speaker’s veracity. Over time, as information becomes available, the base rate may 
come to have less of an impact on the judgment. 
That the truth bias is a direct reflection of the base rate is by no means a new 
suggestion (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; O'Sullivan et al., 1988). To my knowledge, 
though, there has been no direct test of the claim. To more directly assess whether the 
rate of honesty is being used as a relatively simple cue to an individual’s honesty, 
Experiment 6 will explicitly manipulate beliefs about the base rate of honesty, 
tracking over the course of the decision how the base rate information is used. 
 
Socialisation Practices  
 
Thus far consideration has been given to behavioural and cognitive accounts. 
But believing and disbelieving others is an inherently social task. From an early age 
we are taught that lying is morally wrong (Backbier, Hoogstraten & Terwogt-
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Kouwenhoven, 1997; The Global Deception Team, 2006; see also Boon & McLeod, 
2001; Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013), but it is encouraged when it can grease the wheels of 
social life (DePaulo et al., 1996; Lewis, 1993; Roggensack & Sillars, 2013; Vrij, 
2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). The final empirical chapter considers an 
alternative to the adaptive decision-maker position that has been advocated thus far. I 
will consider how the social world influences how we come to believe, and whether it 
can account for the truth bias. This section will begin by examining the accusatory 
reluctance account (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ekman, 1992; Miller et al., 1986; 
O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010), 
which proposes raters are willingly naïve in order to avoid an aggressive social act. 
To my knowledge, it has never been empirically tested. After considering this 
account, preliminary evidence will be presented suggesting that use of even a single 
social cue, similar to the overuse of a single cognitive cue considered earlier, may 
result in biased decision making. 
 
Accusatory reluctance 
Directly confronting someone we think is lying is a socially aggressive act. 
Accusing someone of lying challenges the claim, their integrity, and the relationship. 
In the short term, the other person could respond with equal social aggression, 
whether an argument and a defence of their claim or an attempt to socially distance 
themselves from the accuser. In the long term, the relationship may be harmed or even 
break down (Bell & DePaulo, 1996; Clark & Lemay, 2010; Cole, 2001; DePaulo & 
Bell, 1996; Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013; Miller et al., 1986; Roggensack & Sillars, 2013; 
although see Aune, Metts & Hubbard, 1998, for coping strategies upon discovery of 
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deception). There are clear negatives, then, both short and long term (see Sagarin, 
Rhoads & Cialdini, 1998). 
The positives are not so evident. In cases of serious deception, such as the 
denial of a theft, the obvious benefit is the return of the stolen item. But in less serious 
cases there may be no clear benefit, and as discussed there are likely to be negative 
outcomes associated with it (Vrij, 2008). For example, having given an unwelcomed 
gift that is accepted with thanks and feigned pleasure, spotting the lie means having to 
accept your chosen gift was not well thought out, the thanks undeserved and the 
monetary value lost. In this situation, we typically feign pleasure in receiving an 
unwanted gift (The Observer, OM Magazine, 11 January 2004, p. 12, cited by Vrij, 
2008). In a more consequential scenario, people use lying as a means of avoiding 
destructive arguments in an attempt to maintain relationships (Bell & DePaulo, 1996; 
Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo et al., 1996; Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013). 
Looking for the truth may damage the relationship. This wont to believe others and to 
not actively seek out the truth has been called by Vrij (2008) the Ostrich effect (see 
also DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). 
Thus there are tangible social benefits that accompany a willingness to sacrifice 
lie detection accuracy in favour of believing others. As such, a number of authors 
have noted these social practices may result in a bias towards taking others’ claims at 
face value (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ekman, 1992; Miller et al., 1986; O'Sullivan, 
2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). The 
accusatory reluctance account (most explicitly outlined by O'Sullivan, 2003) proposes 
listeners are biased towards believing others because the act of accusing another is an 
aggressive social act that breaks with societal rules and norms (Vrij, Granhag & 
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Porter, 2010), and in turn can result in equally aggressive social repercussions for the 
accuser. 
Although the accusatory reluctance has been proposed as a possible explanation 
when discussing the truth bias, the account has never been empirically tested. 
However, there is some empirical evidence that offers support for the position. A 
reluctance to label others as liars presupposes that we can detect deception at rates 
that are higher than have been typically reported. After all, while the experimenter 
may consider high accuracy the normative standard, participants may feel the 
pragmatics of social interaction, social perception and attribution to be more 
important forces in how they form their judgments (Fiske, 1992). Ekman and 
colleagues (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan & Scherer, 1980; O'Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen 
& Scherer, 1985) showed that raters attend to different sources of information 
available from the speaker depending on whether they were listening to lies or truths, 
suggesting they are making a distinction between these types of communications that 
are not explicitly reported. Similarly, Hurd and Noller (1988) found raters are more 
likely to consider the possibility of deception in their verbal reports whilst listening to 
a lie than whilst listening to a truthful account. Also, there is less trust placed in those 
who lie even when listeners do not explicitly acknowledge they have been lied to 
(Sagarin et al., 1998). 
The accusatory reluctance account also suggests raters should feel less 
comfortable when listening to a lie than when listening to a truth because of the 
apprehension associated with accusing another person. Indeed, research shows there is 
greater discomfort and less confidence when listening to lies than when listening to 
truths (Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 1997; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; see also 
Toris & DePaulo, 1985).  
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If the truth bias is predicated on our understanding of the social environment, 
we may also anticipate that as the nature of the social relationship augments, so too 
does the willingness to accuse another. Partners are less likely to give negative 
feedback to those with whom they are in close relationships compared to more distant 
relational partners (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Lemay & Clark, 
2008; Uysal & Oner-Ozkan, 2007; see also Boon & McLeod, 2001), and when it is 
given it is often subtle (Clark & Lemay, 2010; Metts, 1989; Swann, Stein-Seroussi & 
McNulty, 1992). 
Thus there is evidence to suggest raters may be reluctant to accuse others of 
deception, and that this reluctance could stem from socialisation practices. That is, a 
case can be built for the view that raters are unwilling to call out others on their lies 
because of the rules and norms that surround our perceptions of others as social 
agents. In Chapter 6, I directly test this claim. 
 
Social relatedness as an adaptive strategy 
Information about the social world can be used in a less socially oriented 
fashion. Rather than bringing a willing naïveté to the task, social cues, like others 
discussed already, could be used as a heuristic to making a judgment. There may be 
no such apprehension to label social agents liars, but knowing that a speaker is 
psychologically close (e.g. a relational partner) rather than psychologically distant 
(e.g. a stranger) may be sufficient for causing a truth bias. 
It has been argued that availability heuristics such as ‘people like me tell the 
truth’ and ‘people close to me are trustworthy’ are used when rating close relational 
partners (McCornack & Parks, 1986; O'Sullivan, 2003; Stiff et al., 1992; Wickham, 
2013). For example, there is a generalised tendency to trust partners when we feel 
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closer to them (O'Sullivan, 2003; Stiff et al., 1992; Wickham, 2013). As the 
relationship becomes closer and as the length of the relationship increases, there is an 
even greater bias towards believing them (Argyle & Henderson, 1984; McCornack & 
Levine, 1990; McCornack & Parks, 1986; Stiff et al., 1992; Stiff et al., 1989; van 
Swol et al., 2012; see also Boyes & Fletcher, 2007) and a greater tendency to trust and 
be more cooperative with them (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Voci, 2006). This social 
heuristic account claims social relatedness information can be used to aid decision-
making under uncertainty. In contrast, the accusatory reluctance account claims our 
understanding of the social world actively guides us towards inaccurate decisions in 
favour of abiding by social norms. 
Much research has explored the biasing effects of social relatedness. The 
minimal social grouping paradigm (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 
1971) isolates the effects of group belonging to study how even the most minimal 
degree of relatedness to others can influence our behaviour. Because assignment to 
groups is random, the only link between participants within a given group and the 
only difference between their group (known as the ingroup) and the other group 
(known as the outgroup) is the fact that they have been arbitrarily categorised. This 
paradigm has allowed researchers to examine the effects of social categorisation per 
se, independent of other features of grouping that tend to co-occur naturally such as 
attitude similarity between ingroup compared to outgroup members. As such, the 
paradigm allows researchers to explore how social relatedness information is used 
independently of other factors. 
This research consistently shows that we treat members of our own group more 
favourably than outgroup members (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979, 1999; 
Brewer & Silver, 1978; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Moy & Ng, 2006; Otten & 
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Mummendey, 2000; Tajfel et al., 1971; Voci, 2006), in line with the social heuristic 
account (McCornack & Parks, 1986; Stiff et al., 1992). In one such experiment, Tajfel 
et al. (1971, Study 2) presented participants with reproductions of abstract paintings 
by the modern artists Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky. They were led to believe 
they would be grouped based on their preference for one of the two artists, but in 
reality were randomly assigned to either the Klee preference or Kandinsky preference 
group. Having been assigned a group, participants distributed monetary reward to 
others. Despite there being no cost associated with rewarding both ingroup and 
outgroup members equally nor any benefit for rewarding the two groups unequally, 
there was nonetheless a tendency to favour the ingroup (see also Brewer & Silver, 
1978). Similar findings have been shown when the grouping was known to be based 
on the flip of a coin; that is, when participants were aware the grouping was in fact 
random rather than based on preferences (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). The mere act of 
being grouped with others is sufficient to cause changes in interpersonal behaviour. 
These findings suggest a preferential treatment of ingroup members rather than 
(or in addition to) a derogation of outgroup members. In three reviews of intergroup 
bias, the same conclusion has been reached: there is an asymmetry between ingroup 
preference and outgroup derision, such that members are more likely to show 
preferential treatment to ingroup members than they are to actively derogate outgroup 
members (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). 
As noted, the advantage of the minimal group paradigm is that the perceived 
relationship between two individuals can be studied independent of other factors that 
tend to co-occur with grouping, such as similar preferences on the grouping 
dimension (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Diehl, 1989; Tajfel et al., 1971), an understanding 
of social rules built between them (Vrij, 2008), or even the ease of processing the 
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speaker’s voice which may cause a sense of fluency (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Begg, Anas & Farinacci, 1992; Whittlesea, 1993). To date, studies showing a positive 
relationship between social relatedness and the truth bias have confounded these 
factors. This gives rise to two related concerns. First, the truth bias may be entirely 
independent of social relatedness, and instead attributable to, say, processing fluency. 
That is, we may give people we know the benefit of the doubt because we have 
experience with their accent and tonality, creating a sense of processing fluency that 
has been shown to be related to being truth biased (see Reber & Schwarz, 1999; 
Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991; Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch & Stahl, 2010). Second, 
even if there is a causal connection between relatedness and the truth bias, it is not 
clear whether it is a sufficient condition by itself or whether relatedness combines 
with these other factors that in turn leads to the emergence of a truth bias. That is, it is 
unclear whether relatedness is a sufficient condition to cause a truth bias.  
In Chapter 6 I will utilise the minimal social grouping paradigm as employed by 
Tajfel and colleagues (1971) to test the social relatedness account. That chapter will 
conclude with little support for an accusatory reluctance account, which claims the 
truth bias is an active self-derogation of accuracy. Instead, it seems social relatedness 
information can lead to judgmental biases in decision-making processes. 
 
Summary: Socialisation practices. Over the years it has been suggested the 
truth bias may be a reflection of the social environment. To avoid conflict and social 
exclusion, accuracy may be sacrificed in favour of believing others. At the foundation 
of these accounts rests the idea that the perception of others as social beings leads to a 
reluctance to label people liars (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ekman, 1992; Miller et 
al., 1986; O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & 
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Porter, 2010), known as an accusatory reluctance. Chapter 6 tests the account by 
examining whether the mere perception of others as social or non-social agents is 
sufficient to invoke or remove the truth bias, respectively. 
An alternative account was also presented: social information is but another cue 
to aid decision-making. Rather than willingly sacrificing accuracy, raters may make 
use of the available social information as a simple heuristic to guide the judgment. 
These simple rules are often accurate and useful under uncertainty: trusting a friend 
over a stranger is in the long run a useful strategy. In the laboratory where the 
environment can be manipulated, these simple rules can be seen most readily. By 
giving the appearance that some speakers are psychologically closer to the rater than 
others, the biasing effects of this information can be observed. I begin to explore this 
account in Chapter 6. To pre-empt the results, the accusatory reluctance account is not 
supported. However, social relatedness can be used as a cue to guide the judgment: 
perceiving others as psychologically closer to us results in a tendency towards 
believing them. As in Chapters 4 and 5, the adaptive use of limited information in the 
environment can be used to guide the judgment. 
 
 
Conclusion: Chapter 3 
 
This chapter considered the type of information used by an adaptive decision 
maker. Key to the adaptive component of the account is that the selection of 
information is flexible and context-appropriate. I will argue that raters can make use 
of a variety of sources of information dependent on their availability and needs. In the 
absence of information, base-rate knowledge can be used. Having observed a set of 
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behaviours, if uncertainty still persists then the uncertainty itself can be used to guide 
the judgment: truths are easier to spot than lies and so uncertainty can reflect 
deception. When available, knowledge about the social environment can also be 
brought to bear on the decision. This highlights the importance of understanding the 
social environment: it does not act independently, having only secondary effects on 
the decision process, but rather can be used to actively guide the decision. 
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Chapter 4: Testing the Dual Process Theory: 
The Multi-Response Interview 
 
 
Situations in which the bias is no longer present offer a window into studying 
the causal forces behind biased responding, and ultimately behind the decision-
making process. In this chapter I will present four experiments. The first three 
experiments will test the challenges I issued against the HAM account in Chapter 2. 
They were (1) that the truth bias must be in part explained by the cognition of the 
rater independent of the behaviour of the speaker, (2) that the shift in bias over time 
must be the result of the amount of processing time available, and (3) that if it time 
cannot predict the change in bias, then the type of information available must. In the 
last experiment in this chapter will consider and show empirical support for an 
alternative account of the change in bias over time: raters are making use of a 
consistency heuristic. 
Masip et al. (2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009) noted that typical lie detection 
studies present brief snippets of behaviour, often no longer than 30 s in duration, 
which may be too short to give enough information to the rater and to give them 
sufficient processing time. In their study, they considered statements lasting over a 
period of minutes. To more closely simulate a police interview setup, each speaker 
was asked three questions about different aspects of the same mock crime scene they 
had just witnessed. They were instructed to either lie or tell the truth throughout their 
statement, meaning that each speaker produced either three deceptive or three truthful 
  84 
responses as part of their statement. On presenting recordings of these interviews to a 
set of rater participants, an initial truth bias was found after the first response, but by 
the second and third response the truth bias showed a significant reduction and their 
accuracy increased. The authors interpreted these findings as evidence of a default-
interventionist HAM, which predicts an initial default heuristic processing is 
interrupted over time by a more analytical, less biased and less error-prone form of 
processing (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010). 
Whilst the findings are consistent with a HAM, there are a number of challenges 
that must be met if a HAM account is to be accepted over other potential 
explanations. First, the bias may be little more than an accurate reflection of the 
behaviour being rated (Fan et al., 1995; Zuckerman et al., 1987; Zuckerman, 
Koestner, et al., 1984). This challenge is taken up in Experiment 1. Evidence for an 
independent cognitive component to the truth bias will be shown. 
Second, previous studies have only captured the judgment at the point of the 
first, second and third response of the statement. This offers a proxy for the amount of 
processing time, but because any given response can be long or short, it is not an 
accurate indication. Because both default-interventionist and parallel-competition 
models make a claim to the duration of processing time as the mediating factor 
between heuristic and analytical processing (Evans, 2007), it is necessary to more 
directly assess the effect of processing time on the truth bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
logistic mixed effects models will be constructed to test this prediction. Although the 
point of rating can predict the decline in truth bias, the duration of processing time as 
measured by the cumulative viewing duration up until the point of judgment cannot. 
This presents the first major challenge to the HAM. 
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If HAMs are to account for the truth bias, the switch between the two systems 
of thought cannot be determined by processing time because this was not supported in 
Experiment 1. Default-interventionist and parallel-competition class of models make 
this prediction (Evans, 2007), but a third and final class of models identified by Evans 
(2007), pre-emptive conflict resolution models, do not. Instead, they propose heuristic 
or analytical processing is chosen at the outset of the decision-making process. For the 
HAM to be supported, it must be shown that if processing time cannot account for the 
decline in the truth bias, the selection of heuristic or analytical processing at the outset 
of the judgment can instead. For example, the decline in the truth bias may be 
attributable to a switch from the use of visual cues to verbal cues. Where only visual 
or only verbal cues are present, there should be observed no decline in the bias across 
the ratings; rather, visual cues should show a consistent truth bias and verbal cues 
should show consistently unbiased responding. However, Experiment 2 fails to find 
support for this account, showing a decline in the truth bias regardless of the channel 
(visual or verbal) available. 
In Experiment 3, the processing time challenge is revisited. Thus far, the mixed 
effects models have been used to statistically demonstrate the lack of an effect. A 
more robust test of the processing time prediction would be to manipulate the 
processing time. With shorter clips, there should be a lesser or no decline in the truth 
bias reflecting the continued use of heuristic processing, but with longer clips the 
decline in the truth bias should be observed as before. Consider also that the amount 
of processing time available ought be a useful cue as to whether to select heuristic or 
analytical processing from the outset, if a pre-emptive-conflict resolution model is 
true (Evans, 2007). However, in both conditions a declining truth bias is observed, 
again failing to support the HAM. 
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The decline in the truth bias can be observed across each new response, but it is 
not predicted by processing time. The presentation of each new response from the 
speaker may account for the decline in the truth bias. In Experiment 4, consideration 
is given to whether comparisons between the responses can account for the 
phenomenon. Note that this differs from the behavioural account tested in Experiment 
1 insofar as it is the perception of consistency that is important, not whether the 
speaker truly is or is not consistent. Raters disagree as to whether a given statement is 
consistent or not (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). The declining bias could reflect this 
perception. Experiment 4 supports this explanation, although it is noteworthy that 
consistency was found to be a diagnostic indicator of deception also. 
 
 
Experiment 1: The Behavioural Account 
 
Both truth-tellers and liars want to be believed to be telling the truth and so will 
adapt their behaviour accordingly (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Gilovich et al., 1998). The decline in the truth bias and increase in accuracy over time 
may be an indication that liars become more nervous over time, for example, or leak 
cues to their deceit in other ways (see Granhag & Strömwall, 2002). To support a 
HAM account, it must be shown that there is a cognitive component to the truth bias 
that operates independently of the behaviour being displayed. 
In line with the findings of Masip et al. (2006, 2009, 2010), the point at which 
the judgment is made (after the speaker’s 1st, 2nd, or 3rd response) was expected to 
be a key determinant of the truth bias. In the studies reported throughout, a truth bias 
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is measured by the proportion of truth judgments (PTJ) made, where a PTJ of greater 
than 0.5 indicates a truth bias.  
Because each response can stand in isolation of the other responses in the 
statement, it is possible to reverse the order of the responses recorded across the 
interview. If liars became more nervous over time, for example, it may be expected 
that a reversal of the recording order would show an increase in the truth bias rather 
than a decrease. If, however, the declining truth bias reflects a cognitive shift on part 
of the rater, the order of the behaviours should make little difference to the pattern of 
responding over time. It was predicted that truth judgments would decline over 
successive ratings regardless of whether the speaker’s first or last recorded response 
was presented initially. It was also hypothesised that accuracy would improve over 
successive ratings. These findings would offer initial support for a HAM account, 
where a shift towards an analytical process is indicated by less biased and less error-
prone decision-making. 
However, as discussed earlier, using the point of judgment may not be a useful 
proxy of time. Therefore, the cumulative duration of the speaker’s responses until the 
moment of rating were also examined. It was predicted this duration would be 
negatively related to the PTJ, such that the PTJ would decline with longer viewing 
durations, and positively related to accuracy. As raters may shift towards an analytical 
mode of processing before the speaker finished the first response, the influence of the 
duration of the speaker’s first presented response on raters’ PTJ and accuracy was 
also assessed. Longer durations were expected to yield a smaller PTJ and greater 
accuracy rates. 
To summarise the predictions, it was expected that for each new rating the truth 
bias would decline and accuracy would increase. To support a HAM position, the 
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decrease in bias and increase in accuracy would have to be predicted by the amount of 
processing time available. 
 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-seven psychology undergraduates at the University of 
Salamanca volunteered to participate in exchange for an academic incentive. Fourteen 
participants (seven in each condition) indicated that they had taken a seminar on lie 
detection and were therefore excluded from analyses.1 The final sample contained 83 
participants (66 female; age M = 20.75, SD = 0.20, range: 18 to 35). 
 
Materials. As described in the procedure section, I used a video set containing 
six speakers lying and six speakers telling the truth in response to three consecutive 
questions. These video clips had been recorded in an earlier study by Masip et al. 
(2006). A booklet was used to collect the respondents’ binary truth-lie judgments, as 
well as their Likert-scaled confidence ratings, immediately after viewing each 
response.  
 
Design. Raters were allocated randomly to one of two viewing conditions. 
Those allocated to the direct viewing condition (n = 44) watched the responses of 
each speaker in the order they were recorded, whereas those allocated to the reverse 
viewing condition (n = 39) watched the responses in reverse to their recording order. 
A stratified design was used in earlier work by Masip and colleagues (2009) to ensure 
that each experimental group contained approximately equal numbers of males and 
females with a similar distribution of ages. In this chapter the same stratified design 
                                                
1 Results reported throughout are similar with excluded participants added back into the analyses. 
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was used such that sex, χ2 (1, N = 83) < 0.01, p = .995, and age, t (81) = 0.10, p = 
.920, d = 0.02, distributions did not differ substantially between the two experimental 
conditions.  
The presentation order of each response (1st, 2nd, and 3rd presented response, 
within subjects), the viewing direction condition (direct or reverse, between subjects) 
and the veracity of each speaker (lies or truths, within subjects) served as independent 
variables. The dependent variables were the PTJ and the proportion of correct 
judgments (accuracy). Analyses of variance were run to examine the influence of 
presentation order vs. viewing direction on the PTJ and accuracy. Generalised logistic 
mixed-effects regression analyses were built in the R software package (R 
Development Core Team, 2011) using the LME4 (Bates, Maechler & Bolker, 2011) 
and languageR (Baayen, 2008) packages. The models were used to examine more 
closely the predictions made by default-interventionist and parallel-competition 
models. The specification of the models is detailed in the Results. 
 
Procedure. Mock crime stimuli. The video stimulus set was adopted from Masip 
et al. (2006, 2009). To collect statements, Masip et al. showed speakers one of two 
videotapes. The narratives of each video were scripted such that minor details 
between videos changed, but the underlying structure was similar. Each video 
involved a woman, a man with a moustache and a man dressed in a suit, the latter of 
which acted as a clerk whilst the other two played customers. One of the customers 
asked to be served first because she or he was short of time. After the interview, this 
person inadvertently left a briefcase full of money on the desk. The second person, 
having noticed the briefcase, seized it and asked to be excused in order to check 
whether she or he had locked her or his car. The interviewer either allowed the thief to 
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walk off, or noticed the briefcase being stolen and reprimanded the thief. The videos 
were later edited with the condition that they contained the same shots with the 
exception of the critical changes. The videos were over three minutes in length.  
Speaker statements. After viewing the mock crime footage, speakers were 
interviewed. They were informed that they would be asked three questions about what 
the characters in the videotape did, that they would be asked the questions twice, and 
that in one interview they had to tell the truth, whilst in the other one they had to lie. 
They were given ten minutes to prepare their statements, although they did not know 
the specific questions to be asked. This is not untypical of police interviews, where 
defendants have time to consider their explanations but do not know what the 
interrogator may ask exactly. As motivation, speakers were told that observers would 
try to spot their lies. They were challenged to try hard to be convincing and were told 
that they would receive feedback—their names would be posted on a their classroom 
noticeboard scored for how easy or hard their lies were to spot. 
The questions were always of the same format: “Describe in detail what the 
[man with a moustache/man in a suit/woman] did; I remind you that you have to [tell 
the truth/lie]”. Thus, each speaker provided a single statement about a single event by 
responding to three questions, as in police interviews. The order of the questions, 
whether the speaker lied or told the truth first, and the selected mock-crime videotape 
were counterbalanced, with an additional aim of equally distributing males and 
females into each Question-order x Lie-order x Mock-crime-videotape cell. Later, the 
recordings of the 24 speakers were divided into four videos with 12 different speakers 
in each video. The same speaker never appeared lying and telling the truth in the same 
video. The speakers’ responses were displayed in the clips, but in order for the video 
sets not to be too long the interviewer’s responses had been removed. 
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Because of sample size limitations, just one video set was selected for the 
current study —the video set that achieved ratings most representative of the overall 
results in Masip et al.’s (2009) research (video set A1). Further details can be found in 
Masip et al. (2006). The first recorded response lasted on average 50 s, Response 2 
averaged 37 s and Response 3 averaged 39 s. A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicated that these duration differences were not statistically significant, 
F (2, 35) = 0.26, p = .776, η2 = 0.01. 
Raters. Participants in the current study were randomly allocated either to the 
direct viewing condition (the responses of each speaker were shown in their original 
recording order; n = 44) or to the reverse viewing condition (the speaker’s third 
recorded response was presented and judged initially, followed by the second 
recorded response, and then by the first one; n = 39). Differences in sample size were 
a result of several participants not showing up. The procedure replicated Masip et al.’s 
(2009), with the exception of this experimental manipulation. The data were collected 
in a classroom with a group of participants taking part at the same time (two sessions 
were held for each viewing direction condition). The participants were sat apart such 
that they could not see each other’s responses. They were informed that each speaker 
provided only a single statement that consisted of three responses, and that a 
statement was either deceptive or truthful across the three responses. After each 
response, the video was stopped and the participants marked in the booklet their 
binary lie-truth judgment and their judgmental confidence (on a 1-to-7 scale, with 
higher ratings indicating more confidence). 
Throughout this thesis raters were not given any information about the 
proportion of lies and truths they would encounter unless otherwise stated. 
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Results 
Regardless of viewing order, the truth bias declined across successive ratings, 
supporting a role for the rater’s cognition in the truth bias independent of the 
speakers’ behaviours. However, the decline was not predicted by the amount of 
processing time available, evidencing the first challenge to the HAM position. 
Throughout this thesis all unreported effects are non-significant. 
 
Testing the behavioural account. Two 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive 
statement) x 3 (Presentation Order: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd presented response) x 2 
(Viewing Condition: direct/reverse) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the former 
two variables were conducted, the first on the PTJ and the second on accuracy. The 
first ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of veracity on the PTJ, F (1, 81) = 
16.55, p < .001, η2 = 0.17, with truthful statements being more often judged truthful 
(M = .62, SD = .02) than deceptive statements (M = .53, SD = .02). The main effect of 
presentation order was also significant, F (1.62, 131.58) = 21.20, p < .001, η2 = 0.21,2 
reflecting a decrease in truth judgments over time that was significant between the 
first (M = .61, SD = .16) and the second (M = .56, SD = .16) and between the first and 
the third (M = .54, SD = .17) response of the speakers (t (82) = 3.48, p < .001, d = 
0.40, and t (82) = 4.08, p < .001, d = 0.46, respectively), but that was not significant 
between the second and third responses, t (82) = 0.60, p = .155, d = 0.08. This pattern 
replicates previous findings (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). The 
Presentation Order x Viewing Condition interaction was not significant, F (1.62, 
131.58) = 2.71, p = .081, η2 = 0.03, suggesting that the PTJ decreased over time 
                                                
2 Because viewing direction violated the assumption of sphericity, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied. 
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regardless of the order in which the responses and their corresponding behaviours 
were presented. These findings support a cognitive influence on judgments. No other 
main effects or interactions were statistically significant in this ANOVA. 
 
 
Figure 1. (a) Accuracy as measured by A’ across the three responses of the full 
statement split by viewing direction: either in the original recording order (direct) or 
in reversed order (reverse) (left). (b) Response bias as measured by B”D across the 
three responses in the direct and reverse conditions (right). See in text for information 
on calculating and interpreting A’ and B”D values. Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
The second ANOVA revealed a main effect of veracity on accuracy, F (1, 81) = 
20.64, p < .001, η2 = 0.20. In line with a veracity effect (Levine et al., 1999), accuracy 
was greater for truths (M = .62, SD = .02) than it was for lies (M = .48, SD = .02). 
This main effect was moderated by the presentation order, F (1.62, 131.58) = 21.20, p 
< .001, η2 = 0.21. The interaction revealed that, in judging truths, accuracy was higher 
for the first presented response than for the second, t (81) = 3.58, p < .001, d = 0.34, 
and third presented responses, t (81) = 4.05, p < .001, d = 0.37. In contrast, when 
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judging lies accuracy was lower for the first presented response than the third 
presented response, t (81) = 3.79, p < .001, d = -0.34. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant in this ANOVA. 
Note that a decrease in bias could cause an increase in accuracy: that is, there is 
shared variance between the variables. To separate out the independent effects of 
accuracy and response bias, signal detection measures of A’, calculated using Rae’s 
(1976) formula, and B”D, calculated using Donaldson’s (1992) formula, were used 
respectively. The accuracy measure A’ is bounded between zero and one, with 0.5 
equivalent to chance. 
A 2 (Viewing Condition) x 3 (Presentation Order) ANOVA was conducted on 
the A’ scores and found no significant main effects or interactions, all ps > .128 (see 
Figure 1a). B”D measures response bias independent of accuracy effects and ranges 
from -1 (biased towards responding ‘lie’) to +1 (biased towards responding ‘truth’), 
where zero is equivalent to no bias. The previous ANOVA was conducted again using 
B”D as the dependent variable. A main effect of presentation order was found, F (1.53, 
123.82) = 17.96, p < .001, η2 = .181, such that the truth bias declined from the first (M 
= .39, SD = .47) to both the second (M = .21, SD = .48), t (81) = 4.16, p < .001, d = 
0.38, and third rating (M = .14, SD = .52), t (81) = 4.85, p < .001, d = 0.50, but did not 
decline between the second and third ratings, t (81) = 2.10, p = .105, d = 0.14 (see 
Figure 1b). Thus the signal detection measures compliment the analyses conducted on 
the raw PTJ and accuracy scores. 
Aside from the main effect of viewing order, which is an important prediction 
that has been met, it was also claimed that there was no interaction between the 
viewing condition (direct, reverse) and the presentation order, i.e. that the PTJ was not 
predicted by the first recorded, second recorded and third recorded behaviours. The 
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difficulty with interpreting null p values and their associated statistics is that it is 
unclear whether the lack of finding an effect results from an underpowered study or 
type II error, or from the lack of a real effect. That is, a non-significant effect does not 
show support for the null hypothesis, but rather merely indicates a lack of evidence.  
The Bayes factor circumvents this issue by asking how probable the data are 
given one model versus another. Data can be said to show support for or against the 
null or instead show the lack of an effect due to a lack of evidence in either direction. 
The BayesFactor package version 0.9.4 (Morey & Rouder, 2013) designed for the R 
statistical environment (R Development Core Team, 2011) was used to calculate a 
Bayes factor. A prior Cauchy scale of r = 0.5 over the effect sizes was selected; this 
prior includes 50% of the prior mass within the range of effect sizes between -0.5 and 
0.5. This scaling factor is used throughout this thesis.3 
A complex model entered the presentation order, the veracity of the speaker, the 
viewing condition, and their interactions as fixed effects, with the PTJ acting as the 
outcome variable. Fully specified random effects were included for rating participants 
and for speakers. This complex model was compared to a simpler model with the 
Presentation Order x Viewing Condition interaction removed. A Bayes factor 
indicated that in order to prefer the more complex model, we would need prior odds 
favouring it of greater than about 45. This was taken as strong support for the 
hypothesis that presentation order and viewing condition did not interact. The same 
analysis was conducted on the accuracy scores. The data were 100 times more likely 
                                                
3 A scaling factor of 0.5 is recommended by the BayesFactor documentation for most experimental 
designs given that it is readily computable and gives a stable integration of the likelihood. Lie detection 
research typically exhibits small effect sizes. It seemed appropriate to include 50% of the prior 
distribution’s mass under an effect size of 0.5 for this reason. The average reported Cohen’s d effect 
size in this thesis, for reference, is 0.48 (SD = .44). 
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under the null hypothesis, providing strong support for the lack of an interaction 
between presentation order and viewing condition. 
In summary, the pattern of results was the same regardless of whether the 
statements were presented in the order in which they had been recorded or in the 
opposite order. The PTJ tended to decrease over successive judgments. Accuracy 
tended to increase for lies but decrease for truths indicating a shift towards responding 
‘lie’ irrespective of whether raters were listening to a lie or truth. 
 
Testing the default-interventionist and parallel-competition models. Having 
established that the pattern of rating is not driven solely by the behaviours being 
displayed, I asked whether heuristic processing strategies are at the root of the biased 
responding (and in turn the shift away from the truth bias). Because the time of 
judgment is not a robust proxy of viewing duration, the results so far provide only 
initial support for HAMs and are also consistent with the step-by-step response mode 
account. Default-interventionist models propose that cumulative viewing duration of a 
speaker should predict the PTJ (with a negative trend) and accuracy (with a positive 
trend), as the shift to analytical processing is dictated by time. In contrast, a step-by-
step response mode account proposes cumulative viewing duration will not be able to 
predict the PTJ. 
Because the data are not easily amenable to traditional F-tests, a model 
comparison approach was used to assess whether the addition of cumulative duration 
could significantly improve the model. Two mixed-effects generalised logistic 
regression models were created. The fixed effect of cumulative viewing time was 
added to a simpler model that included the veracity and the viewing condition to 
determine whether cumulative time could significantly improve the model fit. The 
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simple model included the observer and the video-recorded speaker as random effects, 
each with its own random intercept. The random slopes included for the observer 
were the cumulative viewing direction, presentation order of the speakers’ responses, 
and veracity of the statement. The random slopes for the speaker were the cumulative 
viewing time, viewing direction condition and the presentation order. That is, slopes 
for all variables were permitted provided a slope was possible to model (i.e. provided 
the speaker or observer could be found in more than one cell for the given variable), 
resulting in a maximally specified mixed effects model. Restricted maximum 
likelihood estimates of the models were based on the Laplace approximation. The PTJ 
and accuracy acted as outcome variables. 
A significant difference in the predictive ability of these two models would 
indicate that the addition of cumulative viewing duration into the model significantly 
improved the fit of the data. It was found that the addition of cumulative duration did 
not significantly improve the model when attempting to predict either the PTJ, 𝜒2 (1) 
= 0.03, p = .861, or accuracy, 𝜒2 (1) = 1.22, p = .290. Thus the simpler model should 
be preferred. 
It might be the case that analytical processing strategies were adopted early on, 
as some speakers provided particularly long statements. Indeed, one response was so 
long that it was greater than three standard deviations from the mean initial response 
duration and so could be considered outlier from the other initial responses.4 Contrary 
to both default-interventionist and parallel-competition models, the duration of the 
first presented response could not significantly increase the prediction ability of either 
                                                
4 Similar results are found when this outlier is included back into the analysis, as is the case throughout 
this chapter. 
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the PTJ, 𝜒2 (1) < 0.77, p = .381, or accuracy, 𝜒2 (1) = 0.67, p = .411, in judging that 
response. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, raters judged the veracity of three successive statements of a 
number of speakers. Contrary to a behavioural account and consistent with the HAM, 
the PTJ was initially high and decreased over successive judgments regardless of the 
presentation order of responses. This finding suggests that the time of rating is a more 
potent influence on the veracity judgment than changes in behaviours that may occur 
over time.5 The decrease in truth judgments resulted in an increase in accuracy in 
judging lies, but also in a decrease in accuracy in judging truths. As a result, overall 
accuracy did not increase over time; instead, raters were more likely to rate a 
statement as a lie irrespective of its actual veracity. This is contrary to predictions and 
is the first suggestive piece of evidence that raters were not switching to a more 
reasoned and analytical processing strategy, as is claimed by default-interventionist 
and parallel-competition accounts.  
More conclusive evidence can be drawn from exploring the processing time 
raters had available. Contrary to these HAM models, regression analyses revealed that 
neither the cumulative viewing duration of a speaker’s statement nor the duration of 
the initially viewed response could predict the PTJ or accuracy. This was surprising, 
as a proxy of viewing duration (the point of rating: after the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd viewed 
response) had a significant influence on both PTJ and accuracy. Thus, it appears that 
the act of rating over several occasions, irrespective of the length of a statement, 
                                                
5 Of course, I do not dismiss the important influence of the behaviours of the speaker: after all, a rater 
might be considered foolhardy to ignore an admission of deceit. 
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reduces the truth bias and may improve detection accuracy (overall accuracy did not 
increase in this study, but it did in Masip et al.’s, 2009). 
However, these results do not allow us to dismiss HAMs altogether. A third and 
final class of HAM-based models identified by Evans (2007) outlined in the next 
section does not propose that analytical processing will only be seen later in the 
judgment process. This third class makes predictions about channel (visual, audio-
visual, audio) effects on judgments and accuracy. Experiment 2 was conducted to test 
these predictions and determine whether HAMs can explain the presence of the truth 
bias and the decline in the PTJ across time. 
 
 
Experiment 2: Channel Effects 
 
According to HAMs, heuristic processing is a rapid process that requires little 
cognitive effort. Conversely, systematic processing is a slow, controlled and 
thoughtful process that involves considerable cognitive effort - and hence needs 
cognitive resources to take place (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & 
Stangor, 1987; Evans, 2008). This is so regardless of whether heuristic processing is 
assumed to run prior to systematic processing (Evans’s, 2007, default-interventionist 
model), both heuristic and systematic processing are assumed to occur in parallel 
(Evans’s, 2007, parallel-competitive model), or a selection is made at the outset 
between heuristic or systematic processing (this latter strategy is called pre-emptive 
conflict resolution model by Evans, 2007).  
The selection can be motivated by internal factors such as task involvement 
(Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Chaiken & 
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Trope, 1999; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979, 1986; Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010), but can also be causally 
dependent on the type of information available in the external environment. 
Analytical processing is the preferred route when effortful processing is required 
(Chaiken, 1980; Evans, 2007; Evans et al., 1993). Speech content requires the listener 
to comprehend and reconstruct the narrative (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Gilbert & Krull, 
1988; Petty & Wegener, 1999). As such, processing speech requires greater cognitive 
effort and thus it is thought the analytical stream of processing is engaged (Forrest & 
Feldman, 2000; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, Study 2; Stiff et al., 
1989). Visual behaviours have been shown to require less cognitive effort to process 
(Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, Study 3; Stiff et al., 1989). 
When only visual information is present, the heuristic system is chosen (Reinhard & 
Sporer, 2008, Study 3; Stiff et al., 1989). 
Thus, the channel of communication (i.e., the availability of visual vs. verbal 
information) should influence truth judgments and potentially accuracy. Specifically, 
visual cues should yield a disproportionate degree of truth responding, having been 
processed by heuristic modes of thought, whereas the availability of verbal 
information should result in a low or no truth bias. In addition, because analytical 
processing takes a systematic approach towards forming judgments accuracy should 
be higher when verbal cues (processed analytically) are available. 
Gilbert and Krull (1988) showed precisely this; accuracy in interpersonal 
judgments was higher when using verbal cues if cognitive resources were available 
compared to when there was an additional cognitive load from a secondary task. 
Thus, provided no extraneous cognitive load is placed onto the raters, a heuristic 
account would predict that accuracy should be highest when verbal information is 
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present and lowest when verbal information is lacking. Indeed, this is what extant 
meta-analyses show (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo, Zuckerman & Rosenthal, 
1980; Zuckerman et al., 1981; see also reviews by DePaulo, Stone & Lassiter, 1985; 
Vrij, 2008). In addition, verbal cues are more revealing of deception than nonverbal 
cues (DePaulo et al., 2003), and people have more accurate beliefs about verbal than 
nonverbal deception cues (Strömwall, Granhag & Hartwig, 2004; although see 
Hartwig & Bond, 2011, for evidence that raters do not necessarily use the cues they 
self-report as being diagnostic). Therefore, raters processing verbal cues should be 
more accurate than those with access to nonverbal information only. 
The declining truth bias may be attributable to a switch in the use of cues, from 
visual cues to verbal cues. In Experiment 2, participants watched or heard the direct-
viewing condition video of Experiment 1 and had to perform the same task. However, 
one third of participants had access to only visual information from the video (video 
condition), one third to both visual and audio information (audio-visual condition), 
and one third to audio information only (audio condition). In line with the dual-
process account, it was predicted that more truth judgments would be made in the 
video than in the audio condition, with the audio-visual condition located between 
these, being the only condition to show an initially high truth responding that declines 
over time. Similarly, as predicted by the dual-process account, it was expected that 
accuracy would be lowest in the video condition and highest in the audio condition. 
In addition, if the decrease in truth judgments is a result of a shift from heuristic 
to systematic processing as per default interventionist and parallel competition 
accounts, then the decrease would be weakest in the video condition because 
switching to systematic processing would be difficult with the unavailability of 
revealing verbal information. The decline in the PTJ should be strongest in the audio 
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condition because the cues that are used for analytical processing (i.e. verbal cues) are 
available. Also, accuracy was expected to increase over consecutive judgments 
primarily in the audio condition, but not in the video condition for similar reasons 
consistent with a dual process position. 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-four psychology undergraduate students at a Spanish 
university volunteered to participate in exchange for an academic incentive and were 
allocated to either the video or the audio condition. Five participants (all in the video 
condition) indicated they had taken a seminar on lie detection and were therefore 
excluded from analysis. None of the remaining 49 participants (32 female; age M = 
20.43, SD = 3.21, range: 18 to 38) had participated in Experiment 1. These 
participants took part in the audio only and video only conditions. The current 
experiment was set up to collect independent data from a third group who would have 
taken part in the audio-visual condition. However, technical problems arose when 
playing the clips that discontinued data collection from the first group. For this 
reason, the data from the first 24 participants in Experiment 1 who viewed the videos 
in the original recorded order (15 female; age M = 20.21, SD = 2.32, range: 18 to 25) 
were analysed here to allow a comparison with ratings made when full audio-visual 
information was available. These participants had attended the same session in 
Experiment 1. In total, 73 participants were analysed in this Experiment (47 female; 
age M = 20.36, SD = 2.94, range: 18 to 38). 
 
Materials, design, and procedure. The booklet and stimulus video set used in 
Experiment 1 were employed. The design and procedure closely followed Experiment 
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1, except that here all participants viewed or heard the responses of each participant in 
the original recorded order and had access either to only the visual channel (n = 22), 
the audio channel (n = 27), or full audio-visual channels (n = 24). Sex, χ2 (2, N = 73) = 
0.20, p = .906, and age, F (2, 70) = 0.08, p = .928, distributions did not differ 
substantially between the three groups. The channel manipulation (visual, audio-
visual, audio) served as an independent variable along with response number (1st, 
2nd, or 3rd speaker’s response) and the veracity (truthful, deceptive) of each 
statement. 
Generalised logistic mixed-effects regression analyses similar to Experiment 1 
were conducted to determine the effects of cumulative viewing duration. The 
dependent and outcome variables of these analyses were the PTJ (used to assess the 
extent of the truth bias) and accuracy. 
 
Results 
The hypotheses were generally unsupported: regardless of the information 
channel available, there was a decline in the truth bias over successive judgments. As 
in Experiment 1, no evidence was found that the amount of processing time could 
predict the decline in truth responding. 
 
Truth bias. A 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 3 (Response Number: 
1st, 2nd, or 3rd response) x 3 (Channel: audio/visual/audio-visual) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the first two variables was run on the PTJ. The veracity 
main effect was not significant, F (1,70) = 2.27, p = .136, η2 = .031. Replicating 
Experiment 1, a significant main effect of response number was present, F (1.74, 
121.55) = 7.10, p = .002, η2 = .092, showing a reduction in the PTJ over successive 
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ratings (Figure 2). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests found that the PTJ declined 
between the 1st (M = .58, SD = .14) and the 2nd response (M = .53, SD = .14), t (71) = 
3.58, p = .002, d = 2.52, and between the 1st and the 3rd response (M = .53, SD = 
.16), t (71) = 2.80, p = .024, d = 0.33, but not between the 2nd and the 3rd response, t 
(71) = -0.09, p > .999, d < 0.01. 
The critical channel main effect failed to reach significance, F (2, 70) = 2.70, p 
= .074, η2 = .072. In fact, the means were in the opposite direction to what was 
predicted (for the video channel, M = .50, SD = .21; for the audio-visual channel, M = 
.57, SD = .22; for the audio channel, M = .58, SD = .23). Also, contrary to predictions 
the Response Number x Channel interaction was not significant, F (3.47, 121.55) = 
1.10, p = .357, η2 = .030. The reduction in the PTJ was very meagre for all three 
channels. However, as predicted, it was weakest in the video condition, for which 
none of the three planned pairwise comparisons were significant, all ps > .519. 
A significant decrease was apparent for the audio channel between the 1st (M = 
.61, SD = .23) and the 2nd response (M = .55, SD = .22), t (25) = 3.25, p = .005, d = 
0.27, but not between the 2nd and the 3rd response (M = .56, SD = .26), t (25) = -0.63, 
p > .999, d = -0.04; for the comparison between the 1st and the 3rd response, t (25) = 
2.08, p = .124, d = 0.20. The PTJ decreased with marginal significance for the audio-
visual channel (means and standard deviations for the 1st and 3rd response were M = 
.60, SD = .24, and M = .54, SD = .27, respectively), t (20) = 2.33, p = .067, d = 0.24, 
although the decrease from the first to the second response (M = .57, SD = .23) or 
from the second to the third one were not significant, t (20) = -1.66, p = .312, d = 
0.13, and t (20) = 1.40, p = .494, d = 0.12, respectively. 
Signal detection measures confirmed a main effect of response number on bias, 
B”D, F (1.75, 122.22) = 6.90, p = .002, η2 = .090, with no other main effects or 
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interactions. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons indicated a decline between 
the first (M = 0.28, SD = 0.47) and both the second (M = 0.13, SD = 0.49), t (71) = -
3.18, p = .007, d = 0.31, and third (M = 0.13, SD = 0.52) responses, t (71) = -2.85, p = 
.018, d = 0.30, but not between the second and third response, t (71) = -0.14, p > .999, 
d < 0.01 (see Figure 2b). 
 
 
Figure 2. (a) Accuracy as measured by A’ across the three responses of the full 
statement, whether given access to video only (dashed grey line, triangle), audio only 
(dashed grey line, inverted triangle) or the full audio-visual behaviours (solid grey 
line, diamond). Estimated marginal means for the overall pattern of responding is 
shown in black (left). (b) Response bias as measured by B”D across the three 
responses in the audio only, visual only or audio-visual conditions, with the overall 
pattern shown in black (right). Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
Bayes factors were calculated to test a main effect of channel and a Channel x 
Response Number interaction using a Cauchy prior with a scaling factor of r = 0.5 
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number (and their interactions) were compared with a simpler model that did not 
include the channel main effect, both of which included fully specified random effects 
for rating participant and speakers. The data were 3.3 times more likely under the null 
hypothesis, supporting the lack of a main effect of channel on the PTJ. A second 
Bayes factor compared the full model to a simple model that removed the Channel x 
Response Number interaction. The data were about 950 times more likely under the 
simpler model, providing strong evidence against the role for an interaction effect. 
Again replicating Experiment 1, a generalised logistic mixed effects regression 
analysis with maximal random effects determined that cumulative viewing duration 
could not add any predictive value to the model in fitting the PTJ, 𝜒2 (1) = 0.07, p = 
.790, in either the audio only, 𝜒2 (1) = 0.08, p = .772, or in the visual only Channels, 
𝜒2 (1) = 0.17, p = .680. However, raters may have switched from a heuristic to a more 
systematic processing method even before the end of the speaker’s first response. 
Overall there appears to be no effect of cumulative duration on the PTJ to the first 
response, 𝜒2 (1) = 0.82, p = .364, replicating Experiment 1. This was true whether 
only audio, 𝜒2 (1) = 0.82, p = .366, or only video information was present, 𝜒2 (1) = 
1.11, p = .293, standing in contrast to both a default-interventionist and a parallel-
competition account of heuristic processing. 
 
Accuracy. A 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 3 (Response Number: 
1st, 2nd, or 3rd response) x 3 (Channel: audio/visual/audio-visual) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the former two variables was run on accuracy. The only 
significant main effect was for veracity, F (1, 70) = 14.90, p < .001, η2 = .175, such 
that raters were more accurate in judging truths (M = .58, SD = .02) than lies (M = .46, 
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SD = .02). 
This was moderated by Response Number, F (1.73, 121.43) = 8.81, p = .001, η2 
= .112. Accuracy for lies increased between the 1st (M = .43, SD = .21) and the 2nd 
response (M = .48, SD = .17), t (71) = -3.16, p = .007, d = -0.26, and between the 1st 
and the 3rd response (M = .48, SD = .20), t (71) = -2.52, p = .047, d = -0.24, although 
it did not shift between the 2nd and 3rd response, t (71) = 0.25, p > .999, d < 0.01. 
Accuracy for truths decreased over successive judgments, but not significantly (for 
the 1st response, M = .61, SD = .02; for the 2nd response, M = .57, SD = .02; for the 
3rd response, M = .56, SD = .21). That is, the judgments of truth decreased, slightly 
decreasing accuracy in judging truths and increasing accuracy in judging lies. Neither 
the channel main effect, F (2, 70) = 0.85, p = .431, η2 = .024, or the Channel x 
Response Number interaction, F (3.57, 125.06) = 0.782, p = .526, η2 = .022, were 
significant, failing to support the prediction that accuracy would be dependent on the 
type of information channel available. 
An ANOVA conducted on A’ scores, a measure of accuracy independent of 
bias, found no significant main effects of response number or channel, nor any 
significant interaction between them, all ps > .162 (see Figure 2a). 
Bayes factors were calculated to test the main effect of channel on accuracy 
scores and the interaction of channel with response number on accuracy. A full model 
with all main effects and interactions between channel, response number and speaker 
veracity predicting accuracy was compared against a simpler model removing the 
channel main effect, both of which included fully-specified random effects for rating 
participant and speakers. The data shift the relative plausibility of the alternative to 
the null model by a factor of around 14, supporting the null. The same analysis was 
recomputed, except the simple model removed only the Channel x Response Number 
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interaction. In order to prefer the alternative model, we would need prior odds 
favouring it of greater than about 1000, again favouring the null. 
A comparison of generalised linear mixed effects models that either made use of 
or did not make use of cumulative duration as a predictor found that, contrary to a 
default-interventionist model, cumulative viewing duration could not predict 
accuracy, 𝜒2 (1) < 0.02, p = .878, in either the audio, 𝜒2 (1) < 0.01, p > .999, or video 
conditions, 𝜒2 (1) = 0.04, p = .840. Again, the duration of the first portion of the 
statement could not predict accuracy when rating the first response, 𝜒2 (1) = 2.12, p = 
.145. If only audio information was available, the duration of the first response could 
predict accuracy to it, 𝜒2 (1) = 5.90, B = 0.01, p = .015, but not if only video 
information was presented, 𝜒2 (1) = 1.21, p = .272. Provided only audio information 
was available, with greater cumulative duration of the initial response came improved 
accuracy. This offered partial support for the predicted increase in accuracy with 
longer viewing times.  
 
Discussion 
Overall, the effects found in Experiment 1 were replicated here; there was little 
support for the notion that the initial truth bias demonstrated in Experiment 1 and 2 
resulted from heuristic processing. Accuracy and truth judgments were similar across 
all three conditions, and changes over time did not match HAM-based predictions. In 
addition, the total amount of time available to the rater to process the information was 
not predictive of their bias at either the end of the speaker’s first response or over all 
three responses regardless of modality. Equally, accuracy could not be predicted from 
cumulative viewing time, with one exception: provided only audio information was 
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available, the duration of the first response was able to predict accuracy such that 
accuracy increased with longer processing times. 
This latter finding is consistent with an HAM: accuracy should increase with 
viewing time provided there are diagnostic cues available to the rater. Research shows 
raters are typically more accurate when making judgments from verbal than from 
nonverbal cues and that the former offer more valid indicators of deceit than the latter 
(see Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). However, HAMs 
explicitly predict a reduction in bias when switching from a heuristic to more 
analytical processing (Evans, 2007), which was not supported across the two studies 
reported thus far.  
One possible explanation for this effect rests on the serial nature of speech. 
Whilst there is relatively greater diagnosticity in speech content than visual behaviour, 
time is required for the speech to unfold and the diagnostic cues to become available. 
Indeed, cues such as latency and amount of time spent talking that offer some degree 
of diagnosticity (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006) are by definition 
time dependent. Thus as time progresses, there is the potential for greater numbers of 
cues to be enumerated (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). In contrast, 
visual behaviours can be presented in parallel (e.g. averted gaze and reduced overall 
bodily movement); even if visual cues were more diagnostic than speech content, 
greater viewing times may not lead to a greater enumeration of valid indicators. 
This account of increased accuracy in the audio only condition carries three 
caveats. First, this explanation is clearly post-hoc and speculative; future research 
could seek to exploit these differences between the channels of communication and 
explore how serial (speech cues) and parallel (visual behaviours) information is 
processed by the lie detector. 
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Second, it should be noted in the audio only condition raters had access to 
paraverbal as well as verbal cues. Paraverbal indicators such as pitch have been 
shown to accurately distinguish liars from truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003), and 
thus speech may also be considered to offer parallel information. Assuming raters 
used both the verbal and paraverbal cues available to them in the audio only 
condition, this would suggest the distinction between serial and parallel processing is 
not as important as the distinction that speech cues offer more diagnostic information 
than visual cues. 
Finally, whilst viewing time of the first response could predict accuracy in the 
audio only condition, this was not true of the audio-visual condition. This suggests the 
presence of visual information can actively impede the potential for improved lie 
detection accuracy, as found in prior research (Bond, Howard, Hutchison & Masip, 
2013; Maier & Thurber, 1968; Stiff et al., 1989). A recent study found when a 
perfectly diagnostic cue to a speaker’s intention to deceive was available, it was 
utilised with near perfect accuracy. However, when the raters were also shown the 
visual (but not the verbal or paraverbal) behaviour of the speaker, accuracy dropped 
markedly from 97% to 76% (Bond et al., 2013, Study 3). 
Thus far processing time has been unable to predict the decline in response bias. 
In order to test the effects of processing time more directly, in Experiment 3 the 
duration of processing time available to the rater was explicitly manipulated. The 
findings presented thus far suggest the manipulation should have no significant effect 
on the response bias, whilst default-interventionist and parallel-competitive HAMs 
would predict a decline in the PTJ with an increase in the available processing time. 
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Experiment 3: Thin-Slicing 
 
Whether accurate impressions about others can be formed from snippets of 
behaviour is unclear (Carney, Colvin & Hall, 2007). Some findings indicate accurate 
judgments of others can be greater with only short ‘thin slices’ of behaviour of 
between 5 and 20 s compared with judgments made using the full behavioural 
repertoire (Albrechtsen, Meissner & Susa, 2009; Fowler, Lilienfeld & Patrick, 2009). 
Others find similar accuracy rates whether viewing short or longer clips (Ambady & 
Rosenthal, 1992, 1993). Others yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, find that with greater 
amounts of information comes improved accuracy within limits, where accuracy gains 
eventually tail off (Borkenau, Mauer, Rieman, Spinath & Angleitner, 2004; Carney et 
al., 2007). I do not know of any studies that explicitly consider the effect of thin 
slicing on response bias, although Albrechtsen et al. (2009) report data showing no 
effect of thin slicing on the degree of biased responding. 
Nonetheless, in accord with the predictions of default-interventionist and 
parallel-competition HAMs short viewing durations of 8 s of behaviour was predicted 
to result in a greater reliance on heuristic processing and thus be more heavily truth 
biased compared to full-length clips of behaviour. 
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty-one undergraduate students took part in 
exchange for course credit. Thirty-nine participants indicated they had taken classes 
on lie detection and were excluded. This left 82 participants (63 female, age M = 
19.29, SD = 3.22, range 18 to 36 years).  
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Materials, design, and procedure. The booklet and stimulus video set used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 were employed. The design and procedure closely followed 
Experiment 1, except here all participants viewed or heard the responses of each 
participant in the original recorded order and either viewed the full-length responses 
of each speaker (long clips condition, n = 49) or saw only the first 8 s of each 
speaker’s response (short clips condition, n = 33). That is, those in the short clips 
condition saw all three responses made by each speaker, but only saw the initial 8 s of 
those responses. As mentioned in the methods section of Experiment 1, the first 
recorded response of the long clips lasted on average 50 s, Response 2 averaged 37 s 
and Response 3 averaged 39 s. That is, those in the long clips condition saw the full-
length clips shown to participants in Experiment 1. Note that the statements were of 
varying length for the long clips condition but in the short clips condition all 
statements were held at a constant 8 s duration. Sex, χ2 (1, N = 82) < 0.52, p = .470, 
and age, F (1, 80) = 0.09, p = .926, distributions did not differ substantially between 
the two conditions. The independent variables were clip length (long, short), response 
number (1st, 2nd, or 3rd speaker’s response) and the veracity (truthful, deceptive) of 
each statement. The PTJ and accuracy were the dependent variables. 
 
Results 
Whether raters had a relatively long or short period of time in which to process 
the information had no effect on the declining truth bias, offering direct experimental 
support for the notion that processing time cannot predict the decline in the PTJ. 
 
Truth bias. A 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 3 (Response Number: 
1st, 2nd, or 3rd response) x 2 (Clip Length: short or long) mixed ANOVA with 
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repeated measures on the first and third variables was run on the PTJ. There was a 
main effect of veracity, F (1, 80) = 18.32, p < .001, η2 = 0.19. Truthful statements 
were more often judged to be true (M = .59, SD = .16) than were deceptive statements 
(M = .49, SD = .18). There was also a main effect of response number, F (1.73, 
138.41) = 9.12, p < .001, η2 = 0.10, replicating Experiments 1 and 2. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc t-tests indicated a significant decline from the first (M = .57, SD = 
.15) to the second response (M = .53, SD = .14), t (81) = 2.86, p = .013, d = 0.28, a 
difference that was still significant at the point of the third response (M = .51, SD = 
.15), t (81) = 3.50, p = .002, d = 0.40. There was no significant decline between the 
second and third response, as in Experiments 1 and 2, t (81) = 1.45, p = .411, d = 0.14. 
The response number interacted with veracity, F (1.85, 148.26) = 9.49, p < .001, 
η2 = 0.10, such that the PTJ for deceptive statements showed a decline from the first 
(M = .55, SD = .22) to the second response (M = .48, SD = .21), t (81) = 3.24, p = 
.005, d = 0.33, and from the second to the third response (M = .43, SD = .19), t (81) = 
3.13, p = .009, d = 0.25, whilst for truths no such decline in the PTJ was evident at 
any point of rating, all ps > .890 (M = .59, .58 and .60, SD = .19, .17 and .21 for the 
first, second and third response, respectively). This interaction is indicative of an 
increase in accuracy: the proportion of truth responses declined in response to lies, but 
not in response to truths, over successive ratings of an individual. 
While there was no main effect of clip length, F (1, 80) = 1.99, p = .163, η2 = 
0.02, there was a statistically significant Clip Length x Response Number interaction, 
F (1.73, 138.41) = 3.55, p = .038, η2 = 0.04. There was no significant decline in the 
PTJ for the short 8 s clips at any point of rating, all ps > .999, see Figure 3. However, 
there was a significant decline in the PTJ when viewing the full length clips from the 
first to the second response, t (81) = 3.71, p = .001, d = 0.44, with the difference 
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between the first and third response also significant, t (81) = 4.60, p < .001, d = 0.62, 
but as in Experiment 1 and 2 no significant decline from the second to the third 
response, t (81) = 2.07, p = .123, d = 0.21. 
 
 
Figure 3. The shift in the PTJ over successive ratings split by whether raters were 
shown 8 s thin slices of each response or the full length response. Whiskers denote 
standard error. 
 
 
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between veracity, response 
number and clip length, F (1.85, 148.26) = 6.93, p = .002, η2 = 0.08. For truthful long 
clips, the typical pattern of declining truth judgments was observed. Truth judgments 
declined from the first (M = .62, SD = .19) to the second response (M = .54, SD = 
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clips also showed an overall decline in the PTJ. The PTJ at the point of the first 
response (M = .51, SD = .21) was not significantly greater than at the second response 
(M = .47, SD = .20), t (48) = 1.63, p = .300, d = 0.20, but did decline from the second 
to the third response (M = .41, SD = .19), t (48) = 3.10, p = .008, d = 0.31. Whether 
listening to lies or truths, there appears to be a general decline in the PTJ across the 
response numbers. 
For truthful statements in the short clips, there was an increase in the PTJ from 
the first (M = .56, SD = .18) to the second response (M = .62, SD = .17). This increase 
was not significant, t (32) = -2.00, p = .146, d = -0.34, but exhibited a medium effect 
size (Cohen, 1988). This increase continued to the third response (M = .65, SD = .20), 
and whilst the difference between the second and third response number again was 
not significant, t (32) = -1.08, p = .841, d = -0.16, there was an overall significant 
increase between ratings made at the point of the first and third response, t (32) = -
2.58, p = .037, d = -0.47. Deceptive statements, in contrast, showed a significant 
decline from the first (M = .58, SD = .22) to the second response (M = .49, SD = .21), 
t (32) = 2.84, p = .019, d = 0.42, but no significant decline between the second and 
third response (M = .45, SD = .19), t (32) = 1.40, p = .502, d = 0.20. Thus when rating 
short clips, the trend appears to be a decline in the PTJ for deceptive statements and 
an increase in the PTJ for truthful statements, which amounts to increasingly accurate 
judgments across the speakers’ responses. 
That is, the three-way interaction showed an overall decrease in the truth bias 
for long clips, but for short clips showed an overall increase in accuracy. 
 
Accuracy. A second 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted as above using accuracy 
scores as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of response number, F (2, 
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160) = 5.02, p = .008, η2 = 0.06. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons indicated 
a significant increase from the first (M = .52, SD = .14) to the second response (M = 
.56, SD = .14), t (81) = -3.23, p = .004, d = -0.29, but accuracy at the third response 
(M = .54, SD = .12) did not significant differ from accuracy at either the first or the 
second response, ps > .214. This main effect was moderated by clip length, F (2, 160) 
= 4.37, p = .014, η2 = 0.05, see Figure 4. For long clips, accuracy was greater when 
rating the third response compared to the first response, t (48) = -2.82, p = .022, d = 
0.29, but accuracy at neither of these points significantly differed accuracy in rating 
speakers’ second responses, all ps > .362. For short clips, accuracy was greater when 
rating the second response compared to both the first response, t (32) = -2.95, p = 
.011, d = -0.44, and the third response, t (32) = 2.71, p = .027, d = 0.50, with accuracy 
at the first and third responses not significantly different, t (32) = -0.10, p > .999, d < 
0.01. There was also a marginally significant effect of veracity, F (1, 80) = 3.56, p = 
.063, η2 = 0.04. Raters were more accurate in judging truthful (M = .56, SD = .13) 
than deceptive (M = .52, SD = .18) statements, exhibiting a veracity effect (Levine et 
al., 1999). 
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Figure 4. Proportion correct across successive ratings for those who judged 8 s thin 
slices and for those viewing full-length clips. Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
Finally, there was a significant Veracity x Response Number interaction, F (2, 
160) = 22.77, p < .001, η2 = 0.22. Accuracy for truthful statements did not differ 
significantly between the first (M = .58, SD  = .17) and second response (M = .60, SD 
= .21), t (81) = -1.06, p = .891, d = -0.11, although accuracy at both the first and 
second responses was significantly greater than at the point of the third response (M = 
.51, SD = .07), t (81) = 3.78, p = .001, d = 0.54, and t (81) = 3.86, p = .001, d = 0.58, 
respectively. Accuracy for lies increased from the first (M = .46, SD = .22) to the 
second rating (M = .52, SD = .21), t (81) = -3.24, p = .005, d = -0.32, and increased 
further by the point of the third response (M = .57, SD = .19), t (81) = -3.13, p = .009, 
d = -0.25. 
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Figure 5. (a) Accuracy as measured by A’ across the three long or short responses of 
the statement (left). (b) Response bias as measured by B”D across the three long or 
short responses of the statement (right). Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
 
Signal detection measures. The findings presented so far illustrates the 
importance of exploring the independent effects of response bias and accuracy on 
judgments, where interactions present in the first ANOVA exploring the PTJ made a 
complimentary appearance in the second ANOVA exploring accuracy scores. A 3 
(response number) x 2 (clip length) ANOVA was conducted on the B”D scores to 
examine response bias independent of accuracy. A main effect of response number 
was found, F (1.62, 129.58) = 4.63, p = .017, η2 = 0.06. Response bias showed an 
overall decline form the first (M = .22, SD = .52) to the third response (M = .06, SD = 
.52), t (81) = 2.51, p = .042, d = 0.81, although bias at the point of the second 
response (M = .14, SD = .48) did not differ significantly from response bias at either 
the first, t (81) = 1.63, p = .322, d = 0.15, or the third response, t (81) = 1.86, p = .195, 
d = 0.15. There was no significant main effect of clip length, F (1, 80) = 2.18, p = 
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.144, η2 = 0.03, or Response Number x Clip Length interaction, F (1.62, 129.58) = 
1.69, p = .193, η2 = 0.02. Thus regardless of clip length, whether long or short, 
response bias was seen to decline across the course of a speaker’s statement (Figure 
5b), as indicated by the main effect. 
A Bayes factor was calculated using a Cauchy prior distribution with a scaling 
factor of r = 0.5. A simple model included all the variables associated with the 
preceding ANOVA with the interaction term between the response number and clip 
length removed, both models entering fully specified random effects. In order to 
prefer the more complex model, we would need prior odds favouring it of greater than 
2.9, offering moderate support for the null hypothesis of no interaction effect. 
A similar 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on the A’ scores to explore accuracy. 
Again, a main effect of response number was found, F (1.97, 157.45) = 10.96, p < 
.001, η2 = 0.12, which interacted with clip length, F (1.97, 157.45) = 9.81, p < .001, η2 
= 0.11. Accuracy did not change significantly between the first (M = .60, SD = .20), 
second (M = .57, SD = .19) and third responses (M = .62, SD = .18) when rating long 
clips, all ps > .181. For short clips, there was an increase in accuracy from near 
chance rates at the point of the first response (M = .45, SD = .20) to the second 
response (M = .59, SD = .19), t (32) = -4.06, p < .001, d = -0.72, but did not increase 
further between the second and third response (M = .63, SD = .18), t (32) = -1.22, p = 
.665, d = -0.22. Thus the interaction indicates relatively low accuracy after watching 
an 8 s clip with higher and relatively stable accuracy rates with longer viewing 
periods (whether in the long or short clip condition: Figure 5a). 
In summary, a significant decrease in response bias was found across rating 
points, but the length of the clip did not moderate this. Neither was there a main effect 
of clip length on response bias. However, clip length did appear to influence accuracy 
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rates, such that with only 8 s of viewing mean accuracy was below .50 and with 
longer viewing durations accuracy increased to approximately .60. 
 
Discussion 
Default-interventionist and parallel-competition models propose a greater 
reliance on heuristic processing when only given a short period of time with which to 
process information. As such, if they were to account for the pattern of declining truth 
bias across a speaker’s statement, a greater degree of truth bias would be predicted 
when viewing short clips compared to when viewing full-length recordings of the 
statement. However, consistent with the mixed effects models conducted in 
Experiments 1 and 2, no support is found for the contention that truth bias declines 
with viewing time. Regardless of whether viewing long or short clips, there was a 
decline in truth bias, replicating Experiments 1 and 2 as well as prior research (Masip 
et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). 
Unlike the first two experiments presented here, there was an increase in 
accuracy between the first and second response in the short clip condition. Accuracy 
improved from around chance rates after 8 s of viewing time to 60% with longer 
viewing durations. Thus one plausible account is that there simply was not enough 
delineating information in 8 s of viewing that allowed for any accurate classification 
of lies and truths. 
So far the behavioural account of the truth bias has been tested (and rejected): 
regardless of the order in which behaviours were presented I found an initially high 
truth bias that declined across successive responses provided by a given speaker. I 
then turned to an explanation first suggested by Masip et al. (2006): HAMs can 
account for the decline with greater processing time. In three experiments support was 
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not found for three general classes of HAMs identified by Evans (2007). Viewing 
time does not appear to predict the declining truth bias, but rather the number of 
responses made. Consideration is given to how the presentation of multiple responses 
across the statement gives rise to the possibility for comparison. 
 
 
Experiment 4: Consistency Heuristic 
 
The act of making a rating is itself an influence on what judgment is reached 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 2000b; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). In thinking about how 
new judgments may be influenced by prior judgments, consideration was given to 
how it might be possible to account for the decline in truth bias between the first and 
second response, but with no further decline between the second and third response. 
This finding has been evidenced in two previous studies (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, 
Garrido, et al., 2009) as well as consistently exhibited in Experiments 1 through 3, 
regardless of any experimental manipulation. 
The act of rating after each new response provides not only new information but 
also new affordances for judgment. When two or more responses have been provided, 
it is possible to make comparisons between them. When the opportunity for 
comparison arises, raters utilise consistency of the tale more so than any other cue, 
such as the amount of detail they provided and even the plausibility of the statement 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2000a, 2001b; see also Strömwall et al., 2003). 
Consistency appears to have low diagnostic utility in distinguishing adults’ lies from 
truths (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2001a, 2002; Strömwall et al., 2003; although 
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see Strömwall & Granhag, 2007, for evidence of consistency as a predictive cue of 
children's deceptions). 
Consistency seemed a plausible candidate for explaining the decline in the 
initial truth bias over time. Because raters perceive inconsistencies even when they 
are not present, there could be a shift towards perceiving others as deceptive when the 
opportunity for comparison arises, i.e. after having viewed the second response. 
Having established inconsistency after the second response, there may be no 
additional effect of continued perceived inconsistency by the third response. Thus it 
was predicted speakers who were considered more inconsistent would be rated such 
that a greater decline in the PTJ between response one and two would be observed 
compared to speakers who were considered more consistent. 
 
 
Method 
Participants. Forty-nine undergraduates (40 females, age M = 19.04, SD = 2.78, 
range 17 to 30 years) rated the stimulus videos for verbal and nonverbal consistency 
in part fulfilment of their course. To determine whether consistency was able to 
account for the decline in the PTJ, the lie-truth judgments collected from those studies 
in which the full behavioural repertoire was available to raters (i.e. Experiment 1, n = 
83, and the Long Clips condition of Experiment 3, n = 49) were collated along with 
those published in Masip et al. (2009) that rated the same video stimulus set (n = 14). 
This yielded data from 146 participants (age M = 20.35, SD = 2.76, range 18 to 36 
years) who viewed the full behavioural repertoire, 117 (80.1%) of which were female. 
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Materials and procedure. An instruction sheet provided definitions of verbal 
and nonverbal consistency. Verbal consistency was defined as ‘how often the same or 
similar details are repeated over the three parts of their statement without 
contradicting themselves’. Nonverbal consistency was defined as ‘how often the same 
or similar behaviour is repeated over the three parts of their statement’. The booklet 
requested two consistency ratings – one for verbal and another nonverbal consistency 
– of speakers between the first and second response. Primary interest was in 
accounting for the decline in the PTJ between the first and second response in earlier 
studies. However, all three responses from a speaker were presented to as closely as 
possible replicate the setup of prior studies. So that this third statement served a 
purpose and did not appear out of place, participants were also required to indicate 
how consistent speakers appeared across all three responses. Thus for each speaker, 
there were four responses to be made: verbal and nonverbal consistency across the 
first and second response, and across the first, second and third response. 
The video stimuli from Experiment 1 direct condition was used for rating. 
 
Design and data collation. Verbal and nonverbal consistency ratings were 
collected for each speaker after viewing two of the speakers’ responses and after 
viewing all three responses, giving a 2 (veracity: lie or truth) x 2 (point of rating: after 
the second or third response) within-subjects design. These ratings were used initially 
to determine whether consistency was a diagnostic indicator of deception. 
Each cell of the 2 (channel: verbal, nonverbal) x 2 (point of rating: after the 
second or third response) consistency ratings array collected about the 12 speakers 
was used to median split the speakers. This resulted in a high/low split for each cell of 
the 2 x 2 array. Incorporating the veracity of the speakers, this gave a 2 (verbal 
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consistency: high, low) x 2 (nonverbal consistency: high, low) x 2 (point of rating: 
second or third) x 2 (veracity: lie, truth) within-subjects design. 
Cronbach’s alpha values were calculated to determine whether collapsing across 
channel (verbal, nonverbal) would be appropriate. Thus for each of the 2 (consistency: 
high, low) x 2 (consistency until rating point: second, third) x 2 (veracity: lie, truth) 
cells an alpha value was calculated. In four of the eight instances (all at the second 
rating point) the Cronbach’s alpha was exactly 1.00. The remaining four alphas were 
above 0.90, indicating high overall reliability. Ratings were collapsed across 
communication channel, resulting in a 2 (consistency) x 2 (rating point) x 2 (veracity) 
design. 
These consistency ratings determined which items in the stimulus set were 
relatively consistent and inconsistent. Having split the stimuli in this way, the aim was 
to determine whether the change in the PTJ over successive ratings differed according 
to the relative consistency of the speakers. The change in the PTJ between (i) the first 
and the second response and (ii) the first and the third response were calculated for 
the data collected in the previous studies that had access to the full behavioural 
repertoire. Namely, these were (i) both conditions of Experiment 1 (n = 83), (ii) the 
ratings from the full-length clips presented in Experiment 3 (n = 49), and (iii) ratings 
collected by Masip et al. (2009) from participants who viewed this stimulus set 
(referred to as the A1 video set in their publication) (n = 14). The change in the PTJ 
served as the dependent variable of the current analysis. All truth responses were 
coded as 1 and all lie responses were coded as 0, and the change in the PTJ was 
calculated as the judgment at the second (or third) response minus the judgment at the 
first response. As such, a shift from a truth (1) judgment after the first response to a 
lie judgment (0) after the second response was coded as (0 – 1 = ) -1, a shift from a lie 
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to a truth judgment was coded as (1 – 0 = ) +1, and no change in judgment was coded 
as (0 – 0 = 1 – 1 = ) 0. Thus a negative change value indicates a shift towards a lie 
response and a positive change value indicates a shift towards a truth response. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Consistency in these studies was a diagnostic indicator of deceit. Across the 
studies reported thus far it was generally the case that consistency was able to predict 
the decline in the PTJ. 
 
Diagnosticity. A 2 (veracity: lie or truth) x 2 (time of rating: t2 or t3) within 
subjects ANOVA determined whether inconsistency ratings were significantly 
different between truths and deceptions. Such a difference would indicate that 
consistency is a diagnostic cue to deception. The main effect of veracity was found, F 
(1, 48) = 5.24, p = .026, η2 = 0.10. Truths were rated as being more consistent (M = 
4.50, SD = 0.74 n=49) than lies (M = 4.71, SD = 0.70). If raters make use of 
consistency, this might be considered adaptive insofar as it has an objectively valid 
basis. 
There was also an effect of time, F (1, 48) = 9.64, p = .003, η2 = 0.17, indicating 
higher perceived inconsistency when considering only the first and second response 
(t2: M = 4.67, SD = 0.65) than when considering the inconsistency all three responses 
(t3: M = 4.54, SD = 0.68). There was no significant interaction between the time of 
rating and the veracity of the statements, F (1, 48) = 0.05, p = .831, η2 < 0.01. 
Surprisingly, in contrast to prior research (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2001b, 
2002; Strömwall et al., 2003), inconsistency was an objectively valid indicator of 
deception (see Strömwall & Granhag, 2007, for evidence of consistency as a 
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predictive cue of children's lies). This can be taken as an indication that a consistency 
heuristic (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) is an objectively valid heuristic to employ, at 
least for the current stimulus set. 
 
Consistency use. To determine whether raters were making use of consistency 
in their judgments, a set of 2 (consistency: low or high, within) x 2 (consistency up 
until rating point: second or third response, within) x 2 (veracity: lie or truth, within) 
ANOVAs were conducted on the change in the PTJ. Calculation of this variable is 
described in the Design section. Three separate analyses were conducted to determine 
whether consistency could account for the shift in the PTJ in (i) Experiment 1, (ii) the 
participants who viewed the full-length video clips from Experiment 3, and (iii) those 
who viewed the same stimulus set, video A1, in the original Masip et al. (2009) 
publication. 
The first ANOVA, conducted on the ratings from Experiment 1, found a main 
effect of consistency, F (1, 82) = 9.12, p = .003, η2 = 0.10 (Figure 6). Low consistency 
items showed a greater decrease in the PTJ (M = -.10, SD = .17) than high consistency 
items (M = -.03, SD = .14). In addition, a Consistency x Rating Point interaction was 
found, F (1, 82) = 18.93, p < .001, η2 = 0.19. The change in the PTJ between t1 and t2 
was significantly greater for low consistency statements (M = -.12, SD = .17) than for 
high consistency statements (M = -.001, SD = .15), as indicated by a Bonferroni-
correct t-test, t (82) = -4.83, p < .001, d = -0.74. The change in the PTJ between t1 and 
t3, however, was not significantly different for high (M = -.08, SD = .20) versus low 
consistency items (M = -.06, SD = .15), t (83) = -0.58, p = .556, d = -0.11. There was 
no significant main effect of veracity, F (1, 82) = 0.05, p = .827, η2 < 0.01. 
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Figure 6. The change in the PTJ (overall) for high versus low consistency items, 
separated by study. Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
The second ANOVA, conducted on the change in the PTJ in the ratings made of 
the full-length clips presented in Experiment 3, similarly found a main effect of 
consistency in the predicted direction, F (1, 48) = 8.39, p = .006, η2 = 0.15, see Figure 
6. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, including no effect of 
veracity, F (1, 48) = 0.03, p = .871, η2 < 0.01.  
The third ANOVA conducted on the change in the PTJ made by raters from the 
Masip et al. (2009) study again found a main effect of consistency in the predicted 
direction, F (1, 13) = 7.35, p = .018, η2 = 0.36. There was also a main effect of 
veracity, F (1, 13) = 7.40, p = .018, η2 = 0.36: judgments of deceptive responses 
showed a significantly greater decrease in the PTJ (M = -.16, SD = .12) than truthful 
responses (M = -.04, SD = .12). That is, across the responses raters were becoming 
more accurate, as reported by Masip et al. (2009). 
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Across the three studies conducted, consistency was a significant predictor of 
the change in the PTJ. Despite the use of a diagnostic cue, consistency, the decrease in 
the PTJ was not greater for lies than for truths with the exception of the 14 
participants recorded in the Masip et al. (2006) study. This may suggest other cues 
aside from consistency may be factored into the truth judgment. 
 
 
General Discussion: Chapter 4 
 
In making lie-truth judgments, raters tend to show a bias towards believing 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Zuckerman et al., 1979). Although there is relatively little 
research into the cognitive processes underlying lie detection (Lane & Vieira, 2012; 
Miller & Stiff, 1993; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008; Vrij & Granhag, 2012), a dual-
process HAM approach has so far seen favour. Examining the conditions under which 
the truth bias is seen to be present or absent offers a means of testing the processes 
involved in leading to a truth bias. In one line of research, it is seen as arising form a 
default-interventionist system that initially is biased towards believing but is later 
interrupted by a more effortful evaluation (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert 
et al., 1993; Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010). Here 
I tested the claims of these HAMs. 
First, I considered whether the shift in judgments is a result of a shift in 
behaviour. No support was found for this account (Experiment 1). I then considered a 
more stringent test of the HAM: the amount of processing time should predict the 
degree of biased responding. Across three experiments I showed both experimentally 
and observationally that this was not the case. I also considered whether a class of 
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HAMs that claims an early selection of processing routes might account for the 
decline. However, no support was found for this class of model. Finally, an alternative 
to the HAM was sought. It was shown that consistency ratings could explain the 
decrease in the truth bias in the data presented here as well as in a prior study (Masip 
et al., 2009). 
This section begins with a discussion of my findings in relation to past research 
and in relation to HAMs. I then consider my new interpretation of the phenomenon 
under a consistency explanation. 
 
Heuristic-Analytical Accounts of the Truth Bias 
In three experiments, the findings of Masip et al. (2006, 2009) were replicated, 
showing a decline of PJT across successive ratings. The predictions made by the 
HAM were not supported: the processing time up until the point of rating in 
Experiments 1 to 3 was unable to predict either PJT or accuracy, as default-
interventionist and parallel-competition HAMs would predict (e.g., Evans, 2007; 
Gilbert, 1991; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). This was true whether viewing time was 
manipulated experimentally or tested statistically. There was also no support for the 
claim that participants may have shifted to analytical reasoning before the time of the 
first judgment: neither the PJT nor accuracy in response to the first portion of the 
statement could be predicted by viewing duration. 
This lack of predictive ability of processing time fits with research showing a 
decline in the PTJ across a speaker’s statement at much larger time scales, from 1 
month to 5 months later (Anderson et al., 2002). It is also somewhat consistent with 
findings showing that with an equal viewing duration, those who made additional 
judgments between responses were more accurate compared to those who made a 
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single judgment after viewing all three responses of a speaker (Granhag & Strömwall, 
2001a). Whilst there was no increase in accuracy over successive ratings, the findings 
presented here also indicate that it is the act of making multiple judgments that causes 
changes in responding, not the amount of processing time available. 
Perhaps more difficult for HAMs, there was a decline in PJT even when there 
was no initial truth bias, as was the case when only visual information was present in 
Experiment 2. Thus the decline in PJT was not the result of a shift away from biased 
responding that would be expected to result from a heuristic processing strategy. 
A final class of HAMs, pre-emptive conflict resolution models, have also been 
considered in past research, albeit with a focus on accuracy rather than judgmental 
bias (Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010). These models, however, also 
found no support in accounting for the truth bias: the types of information available 
did not result in the choice of heuristic or analytical processing from the outset 
(Chaiken, 1987; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008). These findings are 
consistent with research showing that people do not give more time to processing 
conclusions that are relatively difficult to believe (Ball, Wade & Quayle, 2006; Evans, 
2007; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter & Campbell, 2003), as would be 
predicted by pre-emptive conflict resolution models: believability should be a readily 
accessible cue as to whether to select heuristic or analytical processing (Evans, 2007). 
Although this class of HAMs predict a truth bias when only visual information 
is present and no (or a reduced) bias when verbal information is provided, there was 
no such effect. In fact, the means suggested, if anything, the reverse was true. This is 
perhaps surprising, because verbal content and speech cues are often thought to 
contain more diagnostic information than visual channels (Burgoon, Stoner, Bonito & 
Dunbar, 2003). My findings are not atypical, though: Bond and DePaulo (2006) 
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conducted a meta-analysis on 50 studies and found (in both across-study and within-
study comparisons) that visual only statements are rated as less truthful than 
statements that have access to audio only or full audio-visual channels. 
There were two exceptions where a HAM could potentially have some 
explanatory power. First, in the audio-only condition of Experiment 2, the viewing 
time of the first response made could predict accuracy: with longer viewing durations 
there was greater accuracy. Of the four experiments presented, this was the only 
condition where visual behaviours were absent. One possible explanation of the 
finding is that speech cues are necessarily serial and take time to be fully presented. 
Visual behaviours can be produced in parallel. The increased accuracy with longer 
viewing times may reflect that fact that speech cues take time to become available. 
This explanation requires that when both audio and video information is 
available accuracy increases with longer viewing times of the first statement. In 
Experiments 1 and 3 this was not found. One possible explanation of this is that video 
cues take primacy over audio cues. Indeed, this has been shown in a number of 
studies (Bauchner, Brandt & Miller, 1977; Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Hocking, 
Bauchner, Kaminski & Miller, 1979; Maier & Thurber, 1968; Miller & Stiff, 1993; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Because visual behaviours are presented rapidly and in 
parallel with other behaviours, the increase in accuracy over time may only be seen 
when these behaviours are absent, as in the audio-only condition of Experiment 2. 
However, it is not possible to align these findings with a HAM. The model 
makes the claim that a shift between the types of processing modes leads to more 
reasoned and thus less biased responding. As a result of this shift, accuracy could 
potentially increase, but it need not (Chaiken et al., 1989). Thus a change in bias is a 
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necessary condition whereas a change in accuracy is not. I found that the amount of 
processing time was unable to predict a change in bias in the audio-only condition. 
Similarly, in Experiment 3 an increase in accuracy was observed for the thin-
slice 8 s clips between the first and second response, but not between the second and 
third. No change in accuracy was seen for the long clips. This could suggest that 
between 8 s (the point of the first rating in the short clip condition) and 16 s (the point 
of the second rating) there was a change in processing style which could not have 
been observed in the longer clips that averaged approximately 30 s in length. 
However, as with the audio-only condition of Experiment 2, the change in accuracy 
was not accompanied by a change in bias. Again, it is difficult to align this with a 
HAM for the same reasons as those above. An alternative explanation was suggested 
in the discussion of Experiment 3 that took a similar tack to the explanation of the 
audio-only effect of Experiment 2. Accuracy in the short clips was initially very low, 
near chance. There is little information to be gathered after 8 s. After 16 s, more 
information became available, and accuracy increased to around 60%, where it 
levelled off. Accuracy in the long clips condition was maintained at around 60%. 
Thus the apparent increase in accuracy may simply reflect the lack of information 
available after the first thin slice of behaviour. 
Thus far I have argued for a non-HAM interpretation of the findings. However, 
I do not attempt to claim that a heuristic-analytic model has no explanatory power in 
describing lie-truth judgments. In a number of experiments Reinhard and Sporer 
(2008, 2010) have shown the model does well at predicting when more or less 
accurate judgments are likely to be made. Accuracy was not the focus of the current 
research, but it is noteworthy that in Experiment 2 and 3 I found some evidence of 
accuracy differences. 
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It is also worth considering that I have tested the predictions made by various 
HAMs using a single phenomenon showing a declining truth bias across a speaker’s 
statement (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). The pre-emptive conflict 
resolution model makes clear the temporal course of the two processes: one or the 
other process is selected at the outset. But the remaining two classes of model, the 
default-interventionist and parallel-competition models, are less clear on the temporal 
course. With longer processing durations an analytic process should be employed, but 
a number has never been put onto the boundary at which heuristic processing stops. 
In the experiments conducted in this chapter, I have examined the judgment 
process over the course of minutes. However, it may be that the switch in processing 
occurs on the order of seconds. For example, Gilbert and colleagues (1990, 1993; 
Gilbert, 1991) propose a strong default-interventionist model. Their ‘Spinozan mind’ 
account claims the default process operates during the process of comprehension (i.e. 
as new behaviours are being presented) and that the intervening analytical process 
begins soon after. They show these switching effects between 0.75 s (Gilbert et al., 
1990, Study 1) and 5 s (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 2). In my experiments here, the 
shortest response made by any speaker was 8 s, which was also the selected length of 
the clip durations for the thin-slice condition of Experiment 3. A HAM may still be 
tenable at this more fine-grained time scale. This is examined experimentally in the 
next chapter. 
 
The Role of Behaviour in the Truth Bias 
To what degree do the behaviours of the speaker account for my findings? 
Experiment 1 sought to determine whether the truth bias could be explained simply as 
a reflection of the behaviours that are displayed by truth-tellers and that liars attempt 
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to convey in their self-presentation. It was shown that regardless of whether a 
speaker’s initial response or final response was rated first, there was a truth bias. 
Across multiple judgments the bias was seen to decline. This was taken as support for 
an independent cognitive component to the truth bias. 
Yet Experiment 4 found that inconsistency in the speaker’s response, a 
diagnostic indicator of their dishonesty, was able to account for the decline in the bias 
over time. Thus the phenomenon could be explained with recourse to the consistent or 
inconsistent behaviours displayed across the course of their statement. That is, there 
was a greater decline in the truth bias when the behaviours were inconsistent. 
 Consider also that Experiment 2 found an increase in accuracy with longer first 
responses of the speaker when given only audio information. One possible account of 
the finding suggested in the discussion of Experiment 2 was that the serial nature of 
speech, necessarily a temporally-extended cue, may account for the increasing 
accuracy: over time, more information became available to the rater. Similarly, in 
Experiment 3 accuracy increased for short clips between viewing 8 and 16 s, 
suggested to be due to the short amount of information available after 8 s. Again, 
there appears to be an exogenous influence on the judgment outcome. 
Thus it can be seen that although there is a role for an independent cognitive 
component to the truth bias (as shown in Experiment 1), the behaviours of the speaker 
are incorporated into the judgment. Precisely how this interaction between 
environmental cues produced by the speaker and cognitive influences that the rater 
brings to the task will be an important question, a theme that runs through this thesis.  
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The Step-by-Step Account: Consistency 
In the first experiment it became apparent that the decline in the truth bias was 
not attributable to processing time but rather to the number of judgments that had 
been made. This finding was replicated in Experiments 2 and 3. These findings are 
consistent with other research showing how the number of judgments made has a 
causal effect on subsequent judgments (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000b, 2001a; Hogarth 
& Einhorn, 1992). They are also consistent with research showing that even at much 
larger time scales, form 1 to 5 months later, there is a decline in bias with subsequent 
ratings of the speaker’s statement (Anderson et al., 2002). 
Because multiple judgments were made of a speaker, raters had the opportunity 
to make comparisons between statements. Granhag and Strömwall (2000b) found that 
when rating multiple responses from one speaker, 60% of the raters used consistency 
as a means of determining if the speaker was lying. It has been shown that consistency 
appears to have little diagnostic value as a means of detecting deception (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2001a; Strömwall et al., 2003), although both police officers (Greuel, 
1992), and laypersons (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000b, 2001a) agree that consistency 
implies truth telling and inconsistency implies deceit. 
Indeed, in my studies they would be well placed to hold that belief: consistency 
was in fact predictive of deception with the current stimulus set. The differences 
between my studies and those of Granhag and colleagues may be attributable to the 
differences in the nature of the lies told or some other difference that can be observed 
in the behaviours of the speaker. I cannot comment on why in my experiments 
consistency was a valid indicator of deception other than to note that it was. It is 
interesting to ask whether raters would make use of consistency information even if it 
were not diagnostic. The research of Granhag and colleagues discussed above 
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suggests that they would: raters in their studies appear to make heavy use of 
consistency despite its non-diagnosticity. 
What is perhaps surprising is that despite being diagnostic in my studies, 
accuracy did not increase with between the first and second rating, where the option 
for judging consistency between responses became available. There are at least two 
possible explanations. First, it may be that raters were not only making use of 
consistency information but also other cues, and it was these other cues that resulted 
in the lack of an increase in accuracy. In a recent study (Bond et al., 2013), 
participants were given a 100% diagnostic cue to deception: the incentives the person 
had for lying or telling the truth. When only this information was available, accuracy 
was near perfect, around 97%. In one of their experiments, participants were also 
given the audio-visual behaviours from the speaker’s statement. Because raters were 
making use of a 100% reliably diagnostic cue, there would be no need to integrate 
other cues into the judgment. Nonetheless, they did, and on doing so their accuracy 
suffered markedly, dropping to around 75% (Bond et al., 2013, Study 3). In contrast 
to one-reason decision-making accounts (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2008; Kyonka & Church, 2005), this may suggest other information 
is also being taken into account during the decision. Indeed, there is evidence that 
even when simple heuristics are being used other information is also brought to mind 
(Khader et al., 2011; Platzer & Bröder, 2012). This is considered further in Chapter 7. 
There is another interpretation. Consistency was only measured between 
responses. Raters may have also been making use of the internal consistency of a 
single response, which may also have been diagnostic of deception. This is 
speculative, but a plausible alternative explanation. Distinguishing between the 
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multiple-cue-use hypothesis above and the continued-consistency-use hypothesis here 
is not possible with the current data. 
 
Conclusions: Chapter 4 
In the first three experiments I have shown that, whilst judgments of truth are 
often high initially, they decline over successive ratings of a speaker’s statement. 
Contrary to an often-cited explanation of the truth bias, no support was found for a 
HAM account of either the initial truth bias or the decline in the PJT. It should be 
stressed that no claim is made that the findings here discredit heuristic models, or 
even that heuristics are not used when making lie-truth judgments. The findings 
indicate that an initial tendency towards believing a statement as truthful is not driven 
by heuristic processing, and that the shift away from truth responding as the speaker 
continues to deliver their statement does not reflect a shift towards an analytical 
processing strategy. 
It was shown that the decline in the bias was attributable to the act of making 
multiple judgments. Further research showed that the use of a relatively simple 
heuristic, the consistency heuristic, could account for the decline: statements that 
showed less consistency between the first and second response were less likely to be 
judged as truthful by the point of the second judgment. Instead, it is suggested a single 
process account can better account for the findings. What this single process system 
may look like is considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The Adaptive Decision Maker 
 
 
To date there has been little exploration of the cognitive processes underlying 
lie detection. This is surprising for two reasons. First, if the largely applied field of lie 
detection is to boost accuracy for law enforcement officials, it will need to consider 
how they make their decisions and why they so often go wrong. Second, lie detection 
is a real-world socially oriented decision making task that allows researchers to 
consider how contextual and social information influence the judgment process while 
maintaining experimental control. Those who have begun to consider the lie detection 
process have taken a HAM position. The previous chapter took that position as its 
starting point. 
A decline in the truth bias across time has been taken as evidence of a default-
interventionist HAM, where heuristic processing is interrupted upon by a more 
analytical form of processing after a given amount of time. My research indicates 
there is little support for the HAM, and instead I showed that, although not the full 
picture, perceived consistency in the speaker’s responses could better explain the 
decrease in truth judgments over time. 
However, it could be argued that the time scale of minutes is too coarse to 
explore the shift in processing (although see the thin slice condition of Experiment 3). 
This chapter begins by considering a model at a finer temporal resolution that has 
influenced thinking in philosophy (Burge, 1993; Millikan, 1987) as well as in the 
psychological domain, including hypothetical reasoning (Fitzsimons & Shiv, 2001; 
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Moore et al., 2012), text comprehension (Hasson et al., 2005; Prentice et al., 1997; 
Schul et al., 2004), persuasion (Green & Brock, 2000; Sperber et al., 2010) religious 
belief (Pennycook et al., 2012), and lie detection (Colwell et al., 2012; Levine et al., 
1999; Millar & Millar, 1997). The Spinozan mind hypothesis (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et 
al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993) proposes two stages of processing. In order to 
comprehend, the hypothesis claims it is necessary to believe the information to be 
true. In a second stage preceding comprehension, a more critical deliberation can lead 
to a reclassifying of belief from accepting the information is true to believing it is 
false. Because comprehension is online, which is to say that we comprehend each new 
piece of information as and when it becomes available (e.g. Heuttig et al., 2011; 
Spivey et al., 2005; Spivey, 2007), the effects of initial belief due to comprehension 
and the subsequent revision of information are proposed to take place within the 
initial few seconds of receiving information (Gilbert et al., 1990). 
Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993) 
contrasted the Spinozan mind with a Cartesian mind. The Cartesian approach claims 
there is no initial automatic acceptance of information. Instead, there is an initial 
period of uncertainty during comprehension, after which a decision can be made as to 
whether the statement is believed to be true or false. As such, it is a single processing 
model, in contrast to the dual-process model of the Spinozan mind. To distinguish 
these two accounts, it is necessary to examine the decision process during 
comprehension. It is only during the initial stages that the Spinozan and Cartesian 
mind accounts differ. The researchers interrupted the formation of judgments early in 
the comprehension process. When participants were tested for their memory of the 
statements, they were more likely to believe a statement was true than to believe it 
was false. This was taken as evidence that during comprehension there is a bias 
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towards believing information to be true. This paradigm underlies the direct support 
that the Spinozan mind hypothesis has received (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; 
Gilbert et al., 1993). 
However, the evidence is compromised by the structure of the task. An 
assumption is implicit in the two-alternative forced choice task: if there is uncertainty, 
there should be an equal number of responses for each of the options. That is, 
participants should be no more likely to use one response than another. The naïve 
Cartesian may be expected to guess randomly. The data do not support this, and so the 
naïve Cartesian can be rejected. But the random guessing assumption is violated in 
many experimental settings. Participants arrive at the laboratory with a history of 
experience. Unsurprisingly, people tell the truth far more often than they lie (Caspi & 
Gorsky, 2006; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; George & Robb, 2008; 
Hancock et al., 2004; see also Cole, 2001). An informed Cartesian model would 
predict that even during the early moments of processing, when there is initial 
uncertainty, if forced into making a judgment we rely on our prior knowledge or 
information about the current context. 
Models of language comprehension and belief formation have taken a similar 
view (see Johnson-Laird, 1983; Richter, Schroeder & Wohrmann, 2009; Schwarz, 
Sanna, Skurnik & Yoon, 2007; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998). Even in situations where effort has been taken to remove the possibility of 
using prior knowledge, such as word-learning studies using nonsense words (Gilbert 
et al., 1990), participants may make use of the meaningfulness (Beukeboom et al., 
2010; Hasson et al., 2005; Wegner et al., 1985) and ambiguity (Anderson et al., 2009; 
Fraundorf et al., 2013; Glenberg et al., 1999; Mayo et al., 2004; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989) of the definition or make use of contextual knowledge: e.g. in teacher-
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student environments like the language-learning task, teachers rarely provide 
inaccurate information (see Fiedler et al., 1996; Grice, 1975; Swann et al., 1982). 
By removing the necessity to generate a response, a Cartesian system need not 
make use of prior knowledge to make an informed guess; instead, they can explicitly 
indicate their judgmental uncertainty. Experiment 5 shows how, during the 
comprehension of new information, removing the necessity to make a judgment 
reduces the truth bias. Raters show an initially high degree of uncertainty that over 
time declines in favour of making a judgment, as would be expected of a Cartesian 
mind. It is suggested the use of prior knowledge may be used when forced into a 
judgment despite being undecided. 
Past knowledge may take the form of an availability heuristic (O'Sullivan et al., 
1988): there are more instances of truthful interactions in memory than instances of 
deceptions. Experiment 6 explores this heuristic further by explicitly manipulating the 
perceived base rate of honesty. During the comprehension of information, raters make 
use of their expectations of honesty to guide their judgments. After comprehension 
and at the point of making a lie-truth response, there is an evident truth bias. Base rate 
knowledge partially influences the truth bias insofar as it can amplify the bias, but 
expecting most speakers to lie does not result in a reduced truth bias at the point of 
making the response. This finding is consistent with the notion of an early use of more 
general prior knowledge in the absence of information and when forced into a 
judgment, followed by a switch towards making use of other decision-making 
strategies when the information is present but ambiguous. 
Because the bias seems to result from a forced choice rather than from the act of 
online comprehension, Experiment 7 considers whether the truth bias can be reduced 
after comprehension by allowing raters to indicate their uncertainty. Surprisingly, the 
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ability to explicitly withhold judgment results in an increased truth bias. Upon 
exploration it can be seen that the increase in the bias is artefactual insofar as a 
relatively large proportion of the lie judgments in a forced lie-truth choice become 
unsure judgments when allowed to indicate uncertainty. This effect is somewhat 
replicated in Experiment 8, a replication of Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1), although it 
should be noted that on exploration of the data the design of the study was not well 
suited to test the Spinozan or Cartesian account. 
The findings are considered evidence of the adaptive, flexible and situation-
dependent strategies that raters employ. When information has been gathered from the 
environment and when this information is not sufficient to make a distinction, raters 
rely on their past experience. This experience comes in the form of metacognitive 
certainty: raters are more confident in judging truths than in judging lies (Anderson et 
al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 1997; Anderson, 1999, cited by DePaulo & Morris, 2004; 
see also Levine et al., 1999). In a forced judgment, uncertainty in spite of sufficient 
available information can be taken as indication of the possibility of the statement 
being a lie. This form of uncertainty is internal to the decision maker. When there is a 
lack of information in the environment (Experiment 5), uncertainty can be considered 
as due to external factors. External uncertainty can no longer be used as a useful 
heuristic towards guessing the statement as deceptive. In the lack of available 
evidence in the environment, raters can rely on other past knowledge in the form of 
experience with the world – people usually tell the truth – a heuristic that has 
objective validity (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Clark & Clark, 1977; DePaulo et al., 1996; 
Fan et al., 1995; George & Robb, 2008; Hancock et al., 2004; Levine, Kim & Hamel, 
2010; O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Serota, Levine & Boster, 2010; van 
Swol et al., 2012). 
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Experiment 5: A Cartesian Mind - Online Comprehension 
 
To compare the Spinozan mind with the modified Cartesian account, an 
affirmation-negation task was derived from an experiment Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 
2) carried out to support the Spinozan view. Participants judged whether another 
person was being honest or deceptive. Two key changes were made to Gilbert et al.’s 
(1990) methodology: the number of responses participants could use, and how often 
they were sampled. Gilbert et al. (1990) obtained a single truth or lie judgment from 
raters by interrupting their decision process and sampling from that time point, which 
reveals little of how that decision process unfolded up until that point (Spivey, 2007; 
Spivey & Dale, 2006; Thelen & Smith, 1994; see also Allen & Ebbesen, 1981; 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Carlston & Skowronski, 1986). 
The Spinozan account rests upon the time course of the bias. To give a window 
onto the time course of this decision process, in the present study raters made 
continuous judgments across the full duration of a speaker’s statement. To 
foreshadow the results, this fine-grained measurement was able to replicate the 
Spinozan effect found in more coarse measures. That is, raters were truth biased even 
in the earliest moments of processing when asked to give a lie-truth response, 
replicating the findings of Gilbert and colleagues (1990, 1993). 
This could be because they are Spinozan raters and must automatically believe 
the statement in order to comprehend it; or, they are Cartesian raters, utilizing their 
past knowledge when forced to make a judgment. By giving the option to indicate 
their uncertainty, it is hypothesised that raters will appear Cartesian: that is, they will 
show a reduced or no bias because the rater is relieved of the necessity to lean 
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primarily on their pre-existing knowledge in order to select one of the experimenter’s 
presented options of either belief or disbelief. Put another way, a Spinozan form of 
responding is anticipated in the forced binary choice condition where participants 
have no option but to make a decision, even if they are entirely unsure. But the 
apparent automaticity claimed by the Spinozan view is expected to disappear when 
raters can abstain from judgment. 
Note that if the truth bias is a reflection of the system’s requirement to accept 
information (i.e. the Spinozan view), the addition of the unsure option should have 
little influence on (excessive truth) responses because such automatic processes 
cannot be overcome by deliberate attempts to suppress them (Neely, 1977; Shiffrin & 
Dumais, 1981). If raters are indeed Spinozan one would predict either no use or, less 
likely, random use of the unsure button. In both cases, a tendency towards believing 
over disbelieving would still be observed after removing the unsure responses. 
 
Method 
Materials. To explore truth-lie judgments, a stimulus set from a prior study was 
used (Street et al., 2011, April). Twenty-two participants were approached by a junior 
researcher posing as an assistant to a documentary director. The researcher claimed to 
be looking for volunteers to interview on camera about their holiday experiences. He 
determined a small set of countries participants had and had not visited. The 
researcher said he was short of time and had been unable to find anyone who had 
visited some countries. So as a favour he asked the participants to tell the director they 
had spent time in one of the countries they had never visited as well as giving a 
monologue about a country they had truthfully visited. The researcher stressed the 
director would believe they were telling the truth throughout. If participants agreed, 
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they were taken to a live filming studio where they were left alone with another 
experimenter posing as the director. The director stressed the importance of filming 
genuine accounts of their experiences in both countries. Participants signed a waiver 
to this extent stating that they would be entirely truthful in both their deliveries. The 
director was blind to which of the two statements would be deceptive, with the order 
of statements counterbalanced by the junior experimenter. Participants were 
positioned in front of three visible cameras such that their head and torso were visible. 
They were asked to speak for approximately 30 s in response to the question, “When 
you arrived in [country name], what was your first impression of the people there?”. 
After delivering both statements, participants were fully debriefed and given the 
opportunity to retrospectively withdraw their consent. No participants chose to 
withdraw their consent. Participants volunteered with no monetary compensation. 
Two speakers were excluded from the final stimulus set because they admitted 
to the director they were about to lie. Two further participants were selected as 
practice stimuli. This left 18 speakers each delivering a lie and truth, resulting in 36 
videos. From these, two stimulus sets were created such that the 18 speakers appeared 
only once in each set and that each contained nine lies and nine truths. Statements 
ranged between 10 s and 91 s. Truthful statements lasted 32.86 s (SD = 10.79) on 
average, while deceptive statements lasted 32.72 s (SD = 24.83). Although the 
average durations are similar, the variance is larger in the deceptive statements which 
may be an indication of certain individuals being unsure what to say while others 
being able to deliver lengthier lies (see Levine, 2010, for consideration of individual 
differences in the ability to lie). It should be noted that although we asked participants 
to speak for approximately 30 s they were not constrained to talk for this period. The 
duration of a statement may itself be a valid and/or perceived cue to deception. 
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These statements make up the Bloomsbury Deception Set (Street et al., 2011, 
April), and are used throughout this chapter. Videos were presented and responses 
collected throughout this chapter using MATLAB software (The Mathworks inc., 
2000: Natick, MA) and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
 
Participants. Forty-six rater participants took part and were compensated £3 for 
their time. One participant was excluded because their responses indicated that they 
did not understand the instruction. This left 25 females and 20 males with a mean age 
of 26.0 years (SD = 7.7 years, range = 18 to 54 years). 
 
Procedure. The written instruction explained that each speaker would lie or tell 
the truth about people they claimed to have met in a foreign country. They were also 
instructed they should continuously rate the statement as it was being delivered. 
Throughout each statement, participants indicated moment by moment whether they 
currently believed or disbelieved the speaker by holding down either the left or right 
arrow keys. Participants were instructed they must respond at the onset of the video. 
In this way, a continuous measure of the lie-truth judgment trajectory was captured. If 
both buttons were pressed simultaneously participants were instructed to release both 
keys and begin pressing with only one key. In the event of two buttons being pressed 
together, the system recorded the first of the two keys that the participant pressed. 
There was no on-screen feedback about which key they were holding. 
 This allowed us to sample the unfolding judgment rather than interrupting the 
process as Gilbert and colleagues did. The continuous response was binned into five 
proportional time points afterwards for ease of analysis. Participants in the lie-truth 
(LT) condition (n = 23) indicated throughout the video whether the speaker was lying 
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or telling the truth. Participants in the lie-truth-unsure (LTU) condition (n = 22) were 
given the additional option of indicating their uncertainty. 
At the end of each video participants in both conditions made a binary lie-truth 
response typical of lie detection experiments. That is, regardless of experimental 
manipulation, all participants at the point of the final judgment made a forced binary 
choice. The main aim of this study was to determine how the belief trajectory 
developed over time. For this reason, the end of statement responses were not of 
primary interest and so are not discussed further. There were two practice videos, 
after which the instruction was presented again and the remaining 18 experimental 
trials given. 
The selected video set, the position of the lie and truth response options on the 
screen, and whether participants were asked if the last speaker was ‘lying or telling 
the truth’ versus ‘telling the truth or lying’ were fully counterbalanced between 
participants and conditions. 
 
Design. The independent variables were the in-trial response conditions (LT or 
LTU), the veracity of the speakers’ statements and the proportional time that had 
elapsed. For ease of analysis, the proportional time was binned into 5 discrete time 
points. The dependent variable was the proportion of truth judgments, resulting in a 2 
(response condition: LT or LTU, between subjects) x 2 (speaker veracity: lie or truth, 
within subjects) x 5 (time point, within subjects) mixed design. 
 
Results 
Over the course of the statement raters in the LTU condition reported they were 
unsure on average between 35% (SD = 22.06) at the first binned time point and 17% 
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(SD = 12.16) at the last binned time point. In both conditions all participants made a 
forced binary choice at the end of the statement. During the early moments of 
processing there was a bias towards truth believing, replicating Gilbert et al. (1990), 
but only amongst those forced into making a binary lie-truth decision. Those able to 
indicate their indecision showed no such bias, instead exhibiting a pattern of 
responding consistent with a Cartesian rater. 
 
Belief trajectory. One could argue that a Spinozan rater may use the unsure 
button randomly. The presence of an additional response could artefactually decrease 
the proportion of truth judgments (PTJ). To prevent this, and to allow for comparisons 
of the belief trajectories between the LT and LTU conditions to be made, the PTJ of 
all the lie-truth responses was calculated. That is, in the LTU condition the unsure 
responses were discarded entirely. If they were kept, chance responding would be at 
0.33 because responses could be expected to be equally distributed amongst the three 
options. By discarding the unsure responses and examining only the use of the lie and 
truth buttons in the LTU condition, an equal (unbiased) distribution between these 
two responses would be 0.5, the same as is the case of the LT condition. Thus a bias 
to responding true (i.e. a ‘truth bias’) would be demonstrated if the PTJ were greater 
than half the responses made, irrespective of experimental condition. All findings in 
this and the following section discuss precisely these data. 
Since stimulus speakers provided spontaneous speech, strict durations for their 
statements could not be imposed. They varied from 10 to 91 s, with the average 
statement lasting 32.79 s (SD = 18.83). To compare across items the PTJ was binned 
into five equally spaced time points. In the following section the PTJ data are 
reanalysed exploring the first 2 to 10 s of the judgment period. It is during these early 
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moments of processing that Gilbert et al. (1990) found a Spinozan truth bias. To 
anticipate those analyses, the findings exploring the first 10 s mirror those exploring 
the proportional time across the course of the statement. 
Supporting the hypothesis, a 2 (response condition: LT or LTU, between) x 2 
(speaker veracity: lie or truth, within) x 5 (time point: t1 - t5, within) mixed ANOVA 
was conducted on the PTJ. A main effect of response condition was found, F (1, 43) = 
5.57, p = .023, η2 = 0.12 (see Figure 7). Having the option to indicate indecision 
resulted in a smaller truth bias both during the early moments of processing and 
across the remainder of the trial, compared to raters who were forced into a binary 
response. This main effect was not moderated by time point or speaker veracity, all ps 
> .1. 
There was a main effect of time, F (1.43, 61.56) = 3.81, p = .041, η2 = 0.08, 
which interacted with veracity, F (2.16, 92.95) = 5.94, p = .003, η2 = 0.12. Post-hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected t-tests indicated that the PTJ did not change significantly over 
time when rating deceptive statements, all ps > .1, but when rating truthful statements 
the PTJ increased from t1 to t2, t (44) = 3.60, p = .006, d = 0.33, and from t2 to t3, t 
(44) = 3.05, p = .046, d = 0.27, but did not increase further, all ps > .1. That is, the 
PTJ ran counter to the predictions of a decrease over time as would be made by a 
Spinozan account. 
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Figure 7. The proportion of truth judgments made in the LT and LTU conditions 
across the duration of the trial, split into five equal proportional time bins. Whiskers 
denote standard errors throughout the chapter. Note that the unsure responses from the 
LTU condition have been removed, and that chance PTJ is at 0.5 for both the LT and 
LTU conditions. Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
The main effect of condition, taken as support for the hypothesis, could be 
attributable to increased accuracy rather than a reduced bias. Signal detection analyses 
examined the independent effects of accuracy and response bias. Because the 
difference between conditions is of primary interest, which did not interact with time, 
the PTJ was collapsed across time points. An independent samples t-test found no 
significant difference in A’ between the LT and LTU conditions, t (32.99) = 1.77, p = 
.861, d = -0.03. One-sample t-tests determined A’ was not above chance rate in either 
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the LT or LTU conditions (all ps > .1). More importantly, there was a significant 
difference in B”D between the LT and LTU conditions, t (32.57) = 2.34, p = .026, d = 
0.70. One-sample t-tests confirmed LT raters (M = 0.35, SD = 0.23) were truth biased, 
t (22) = 7.38, p < .001, d = 1.54, whilst LTU raters (M = 0.12, SD = 0.41) were not, t 
(21) = 1.36, p = .189, d = 0.29. A Bayes factor using the JZS one-sample t-test 
equivalent determined that although the data were rather decisive for the presence of a 
truth bias when forced to judge (Bayes factor of around 50,000), there was negligible 
evidence in favour of a lack of a truth bias, with the data being only 1.6 times more 
likely under the hypothesis of a lack of response bias. 
Consider that the Spinozan effect makes predictions based at the earliest 
moments of processing, a position discussed in more detail in the next section. Two 
further one-sample t-test equivalents were conducted on the first proportional time 
point. It was found that for the forced judgment condition the data were 10 times more 
likely under the hypothesis of a truth bias being present, but when not forced into 
judgment the data were 3 times more likely under the hypothesis of a lack of bias. 
This provides evidence that, during the early moments of the trial, there is a lack of 
bias if not forced into judgment. This is considered further in the next section. 
 
Early moments of processing. As the average statement lasted 33 s, the first 
proportional time point reflects the decision process 6.6 s in for the average trial. 
Gilbert and colleagues demonstrate that judgments obtained as early as 10 s after 
initial presentation of a statement (8 s statement presentation plus 2 s delay before 
response) were truth biased. The data are re-analysed examining the first 10 s of the 
average trial by binning the data into 2 s windows. This also addresses the fact that 
statements varied in length. 
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Not all participants began responding at the point of video onset, despite 
instruction to do so. This significantly reduced the number of participants with full 
cells at the two-second period (nLTU = 8, nLT = 12). Nonetheless, the findings closely 
mirror those conducted above. A 2 (condition) x 2 (veracity) x 5 (time point: 2 s to 10 
s, within subjects) mixed ANOVA with the PTJ as the dependent variable 
demonstrated a main effect of condition, F (1, 18) = 4.33, p = .052, η2 = 0.19, with the 
PTJ higher in the LT (M = .60, SD = .31) than the LTU condition (M = .37, SD = .36). 
In addition, there was a Veracity x Time point interaction, F (1.44, 25.92) = 4.43, p = 
.033, η2 = 0.20. Post-hoc Bonferonni-corrected analyses were all non-significant, 
potentially because of the small sample sizes, but the means indicated a decline in PTJ 
for deceptive statements from 2 s (M = .54, SD = .40) to 10 s (M = .46, SD = .18), 
whilst the PTJ for truthful statements increased from 2 s (M = .40, SD = .40) to 10 s 
(M = .56, SD = .31). There was no main effect of veracity, F (1, 18) = 0.16, p = .690, 
η2 = 0.01. 
Signal detection measures were all non-significant, all ps > .1, with the 
exception of an independent samples t-test that, although only marginally 
significance, found the LT condition (M = .24, SD = .54) was more truth biased than 
the LTU condition (M = -.32, SD = .75), t (18) = 1.95, p = .067, d = 0.86. 
 
Cartesian responding. Thus far the use of the unsure response has been ignored 
in order to compare the LT and LTU conditions. Confirmatory support for a Cartesian 
mind can be found in the way in which raters use the unsure response option. A 
Cartesian account predicts a high proportion of uncertainty early on that declines over 
time. As noted in the previous section, not all participants began responding at the 
point of video onset despite instruction to do so. For that reason, the proportion of 
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responses during the early moments of video onset does not sum to 1: some 
participants chose to make no response at all. 
 
 
Figure 8. (a) The proportion of truth (square), lie (diamond) and unsure (inverted 
triangle) responses across the duration of truthful statements. Unsure responses are 
relatively high during the early stages of processing and decline over time in favour of 
lie and truth responses (left). (b) The proportion of truth, lie and unsure responses 
across the course of deceptive statements (right). 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA conducted on the proportion of unsure responses across the 
five time points found a significant effect of time point, F (1.40, 29.41) = 11.92, p = 
.001, η2 = 0.36 (Figure 8). Bonferroni-corrected t-tests found the proportion of unsure 
responses at time point 1 (M = .38, SD = .28) did not differ significantly from time 
point 2 (M = .35, SD = .23) or 3 (M = .27, SD = .15), both ps > .2.84, but was 
significantly greater than at time points 4 (M = .22, SD = .14) and 5 (M = .17, SD = 
.12), both ps < .036, ds = 0.72 and 0.98 respectively. Similarly, unsure responses at 
time point 2 were significantly greater than at points 4 and 5, both ps < .013, ds = 0.68 
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and 0.98, but not at time point 3, t (21) = 2.87, p = .087, d = 0.41. There were not 
significantly more unsure responses at time point 3 than at time point 4, t (21) = 3.00, 
p = .062, d = 0.35, but unsure ratings at time point 4 were significantly greater than at 
time point 5, t (21) = 5.33, p = .001, d = 0.38. Thus across the course of the statement 
the proportion of unsure responses was seen to decline, as would be predicted by a 
Cartesian but not a Spinozan account. 
 
Discussion 
Previous research has shown raters are biased towards accepting information is 
true in the earliest stages of comprehension (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). 
As Gilbert et al. (1990, p. 601) put it, ‘all ideas are accepted… prior to a rational 
analysis of their veracity, and that some ideas are subsequently unaccepted’ (italics in 
original). In contrast, a Cartesian account predicts a period of initial uncertainty that 
gives way to a judgment after comprehension. Given the differing time predictions of 
the two accounts, here the judgment process was tracked across its trajectory. First, 
the general Spinozan phenomenon was replicated: if forced into judgment raters were 
biased towards believing what others said, even during the early moments of 
processing. However, if they were able to indicate indecision (LTU condition), people 
acted like Cartesian raters, which was particularly noticeable during the earliest 
moments of comprehension. It would seem people do not merely believe what they 
are told, and can comprehend without having to automatically assign a belief value. 
Models of judgment formation have often taken a Cartesian approach, either 
implicitly or explicitly assuming uncertainty rules at first until some threshold or 
condition is met (Allen & Ebbesen, 1981; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Carlston & 
Skowronski, 1986; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff, Schmiedek & McKoon, 2008; Roe, 
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Busemeyer & Townsend, 2001; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012), but that even from the 
outset the judgment can be biased towards preferring one alternative (e.g. Roe et al., 
2001; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012). Prior experience (Bransford & Johnson, 1973; 
see also DePaulo et al., 1996; Fan et al., 1995; O'Sullivan, 2003) and expectations 
(Kassin et al., 2005; Masip et al., 2005; McCornack & Parks, 1986, 1990) can serve to 
bias the direction of judgment from these early moments. 
When unsure but required to make a judgment, the logical choice would be to 
select the option for which there is most evidence, whether this evidence is built up 
from prior experience or directly from the stimulus item. Assuming our stored 
knowledge of prior experiences with the world, for example, has at least some basis in 
reality (or is at least perceived to hold some validity), utilising this knowledge when 
there is no other information to work from will result in greater accuracy than random 
responding. Thus under conditions of uncertainty a rater can appear as though they 
are automatically accepting statements as true but may in fact be responding 
adaptively and appropriately given their uncertainty. 
The findings from the Spinozan and Cartesian camps have been aligned by 
showing that when a Cartesian rater is forced to affirm or deny a belief they appear 
distinctly Spinozan, but when able to express their indecision they once again appear 
Cartesian. The mind is able to comprehend information before having accepted or 
denied it as the truth. Yet if pressed for a judgment before one has been reached, we 
are sufficiently flexible to be able to incorporate prior knowledge and experience into 
the judgment. 
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Experiment 6: Most People Tell the Truth – The Availability Heuristic 
 
The current study considers what sorts of information may be used under 
uncertainty. If raters come to rely on their prior knowledge with similar situations, 
one likely possibility is that they will make use of base rate information: that is, how 
often people typically lie or tell the truth.  
That the truth bias reflects the base rate is certainly not a new suggestion (Clark 
& Clark, 1977; DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; O'Sullivan et al., 1988), but to date there 
have been no direct test of the claim. There is some strong suggestive evidence in 
favour of the use of base-rate information. For example, there is a greater truth bias 
when rating those with who we are in close relationships (Argyle & Henderson, 1984; 
McCornack & Levine, 1990; McCornack & Parks, 1986; Stiff et al., 1992; Stiff et al., 
1989; van Swol et al., 2012; see also Boyes & Fletcher, 2007; more on this in Chapter 
6), people that we expect to tell us the truth (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Voci, 2006), 
whilst police investigators, who tend to disbelieve others more often than not (Ask, 
Rebelius & Granhag, 2008; Meissner & Kassin, 2002), expect in general that their 
interviewees will lie to them (Kassin et al., 2005; Masip et al., 2005; Moston et al., 
1992). 
Making use of base-rate information is adaptive insofar as it increases accuracy 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For instance, people tell fewer 
lies to close relational partners compared to strangers (Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Kashy, 
1998), and in general people tend to tell the truth more often than they lie (Caspi & 
Gorsky, 2006; Clark & Clark, 1977; DePaulo et al., 1996; Fan et al., 1995; O'Sullivan, 
2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; van Swol et al., 2012). 
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Although early research has suggested such a neglect of base rate information 
in favour of using more individuating information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), in recent years research has 
begun to question whether the base rate is taken into account, with research showing 
how it can influence decision making (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Barbey & Sloman, 2007; 
Ginossar & Trope, 1980; Koehler, 1996; although see Kahneman, 2003) and social 
judgments (Funder, 1996). That early research found no effect of base rate 
information may be a result of how that information was framed: reframing the 
information reduces neglect of the information (Hilton & Slugoski, 2001; Schwarz, 
Strack, Hilton & Naderer, 1991; Zukier & Pepitone, 1984). That is, base-rate 
information use is context-dependent (Kruglanski et al., 2007) 
In the current study participants’ beliefs about the base rates of lies and truths 
was explicitly manipulated to determine its effect on the truth bias both during the 
development of the judgment, while the statement was being delivered, as well as at 
the point of the final judgment, after the information from the environment had been 
obtained. It was predicted base-rate expectations would influence responding, 
particularly during the early moments of statement comprehension because it is here 
that participants will have little behavioural information from which to work from. 
 In addition, greater confidence was predicted in making ‘truth’ compared to 
‘lie’ ratings when the majority of the statements were expected to be truthful, whilst 
the reverse was predicted when the majority of the statements were expected to be 
deceptive. 
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Method 
Materials. The Bloomsbury Deception Set (Street et al., 2011, April) used in 
Experiment 5 was used here. 
 
Participants. Ninety-nine first year psychology students participated as part of 
their undergraduate studies. Fifteen participants were excluded because they had 
taken part in a similar study for course credit at an earlier date. One participant was 
excluded because of hearing difficulties, leaving 83 participants (67 females) with a 
mean age of 18.7 years (SD = 0.70 years, range 17 to 21 years). 
 
Procedure. Participants were tested in isolation. Instructions explained the 
speaker had provided a truthful and deceptive account about having visited a holiday 
destination, but that they would only see one of these accounts. As in Experiment 5, a 
continuous measure of the lie-truth judgment trajectory was captured. Each video was 
counted in from three to one before onset. After each video, participants were 
instructed to indicate whether they believed the speaker was lying or telling the truth 
by clicking with the mouse one of the two response options presented on screen. They 
also rated how confident they were in their response on a scale of 1 (not at all 
confident) to 10 (very confident). 
Participants in the low truth expectancy condition (n = 26) were told only ‘20% 
of the speakers were telling the truth that they had visited the country, 80% of 
speakers lied. That is, most people lied.’ The high truth expectancy condition (n = 27) 
was told 80% of speakers told the truth, whilst the equal split expectancy condition (n 
= 30) was told half the speakers lied and half told the truth. Note the base rate 
information is presented both as a normalised frequency, i.e. a percentage, as well as 
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in a more accessible fashion, i.e. text explicitly explaining whether the majority of the 
speakers lied or told the truth, making the base rate information more readily 
comprehendible (see Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Gaissmaier, Straubinger & Funder, 
2007). 
In reality, all conditions saw an equal split of lies and truths. Assignment of 
video set, position of lie-truth buttons on the screen, and question order (‘did the last 
person lie or tell the truth’ versus ‘did the last person tell the truth or lie?’) were 
counterbalanced. 
 
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. The 
independent variables were the anticipated proportion of truths to lies, i.e. either 20%, 
50% or 80% of truths were expected, and the veracity of the speaker’s statement. The 
dependent variables were the PTJ, confidence and accuracy taken after each statement 
had ended. In addition, signal detection measures of bias and accuracy were taken to 
assess the effects of bias and accuracy independent of each other. This resulted in a 2 
(veracity: lie or truth, within subjects) x 3 (expectation of truth: low, medium or high, 
between subjects) mixed design. 
The continuous sampling of the judgment trajectory was also captured. The 
duration of a statement was split into five equal time points, resulting in a 2 (veracity) 
x 3 (expectation of truth) x 5 (time point: t1 to t5, within subjects) mixed design. 
Again, the PTJ, A’ and B”D were the dependent measures. 
 
Results 
While listening to the statements, participants showed a lie bias when expecting 
mostly lies and a truth bias when expecting mostly truths. But surprisingly, the effect 
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of base rate beliefs at their final judgment did not mirror the continuous rating of the 
statement as it was being presented. Raters were most truth biased when expecting 
mostly truths. Interestingly though, expecting the majority of speakers to lie resulted 
in approximately half of all statements being judged as truthful. 
Base rate information influenced confidence in much the same way. 
Participants were more confident in their truth than their lie judgments when 
expecting half or a majority of truths, but were similarly confident in their lie 
judgments as their truth judgments when expecting mostly lies. Signal detection 
measures confirm that these effects are attributable to response bias effects rather than 
accuracy effects. 
 
Belief trajectory. Throughout the duration of each statement raters indicated 
their belief in the statement. A 2 (veracity, within subjects) x 3 (expectation of truth 
condition, between subjects) x 5 (time point, within subjects) ANOVA was conducted 
on the PTJ. In line with the prediction, a main effect of condition was observed, F (2, 
57) = 9.64, p < .001, η2 = 0.25 (Figure 9). Planned post-hoc t-tests found the low truth 
expectancy condition (M = .43, SD = .12) differed significantly from the equal split 
(M = .53, SD = .12) and high truth expectancy conditions (M = .60, SD = .12), t (35) = 
-4.34, p < .001, d = -0.83, and t (42) = -2.41, p = .018, d = -1.42, respectively. The 
equal split and high truth expectancy conditions did not differ significantly, t (40) = 
1.69, p = .096, d = 0.58, although exhibited a medium to large effect size. 
The assumption of sphericity was violated for the within-subject effect of time 
point. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. A main effect of time was found, F 
(1.99, 113.52) = 7.76, p = .001, η2 = 0.12, showing significant linear, F (1, 57) = 
10.95, p = .002, η2 = 0.16, and quadratic components, F (1, 57) = 5.51, p = .022, η2 = 
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0.09. Finally, there was a main effect of veracity, F (1, 57) = 4.32, p = .042, η2 = 0.07, 
such that truths received a significantly higher PTJ (M = .55, SD = .18) than lies (M = 
.49, SD = .14). 
 
 
Figure 9. The proportion of truth judgments over the course of the average statement, 
split by beliefs about the base rate. Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
Signal detection measures were used to separate the effects of accuracy and 
response bias. Two 3 (truth expectancy condition) x 5 (time point) ANOVAs were 
conducted on the A’ and B”D scores, respectively. There were no significant effects 
on A’ scores, all ps > .174. The measure of response bias, B”D, found a main effect of 
time, F (2.28, 129.94) = 7.43, p = .001, η2 = 0.12, and more importantly for the 
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current purposes, a main effect of condition, F (2, 57) = 12.09, p < .001, η2 = 0.30. 
Planned pairwise comparisons reflected those conducted on the PTJ. Specifically, the 
low truth expectancy condition showed, if anything, a lie bias (M = -.22, SD = .37), 
which differed significantly from response bias of both the equal split, (M = .16, SD = 
.37) and high truth expectancy conditions (M = .33, SD = .37), t (35) = -3.09, p = 
.009, d = -1.49, and t (42) = -1.03, p < .001, d = -1.49, respectively. The equal split 
and high truth expectancy conditions did not show a significantly different degree of 
truth bias, t (40) = -1.47, p = .443, d = -0.45. 
Finally, three one-sample t-tests compared the degree of bias, as measured by 
B”D, to no bias, zero. The low truth expectancy condition showed a significant lie 
bias, t (18) = -2.97, p = .008, d = -0.68. The equal split condition showed no evidence 
of a bias, t (16) = 1.91, p = .075, d = 0.46. Finally, the high truth expectancy condition 
showed a significant truth bias, t (23) = 3.88, p = .001, d = 0.79. Bayes factors were 
calculated for each using JZS one-sample t-test equivalent using a Cauchy prior 
distribution of scaling r = 0.5 over the effect sizes. For the low truth expectancy 
conditions, the data were 6 times more likely under the hypothesis that there was a lie 
bias, while for the high truth expectancy the data were 45 times more likely under the 
hypothesis of a truth bias. However, for the equal split condition, the data were not 
sufficient to determine whether there was a response bias or a lack of bias, generating 
a Bayes factor of 1.23. These findings are in line with the hypothesis. 
 
Truth bias as base rate belief. After rating throughout the trial, participants 
provided a single lie-truth judgment of the statement as a whole. A 2 (veracity, within 
subject) x 3 (expectation of truth condition, between subjects) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on the PTJ. A main effect of veracity was found, F (1, 80) = 64.64, p < 
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.001, η2 = 0.45, such that truthful statements (M = .67, SD = 0.16) received a higher 
PTJ than lies (M = .50, SD = 0.16). The predicted main effect of expectation was also 
significant, F (2, 80) = 24.30, p < .001, η2 = 0.38. Planned t-tests found the high truth 
expectancy condition received a significantly higher PTJ than the equal split 
expectancy and low truth expectancy conditions, t (80) = 3.47, p < .001, d = 1.32 and t 
(80) = 4.71, p < .001, d = 1.79 respectively. The equal split and low truth expectancy 
conditions, however, did not differ significantly, t (80) = 1.26, p = .079, d = 0.49 (see 
Table 1). 
The Veracity x Expectation interaction was also significant, F (2, 80) = 3.20, p 
= .046, η2 = 0.07. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests showed that when rating lies, 
the high truth expectancy condition produced a significantly higher PTJ than both the 
equal split and low truth expectancy conditions, both ps < .001, ds = 1.40 and 1.48 
respectively, but the equal split and low truth expectancy conditions did not differ 
from each other, t (52) = -0.30, p > .999, d = -0.09. Truthful statements received a 
significantly different PTJ in each of the three conditions, with the high truth 
expectancy condition receiving a significantly higher PTJ than both the equal split, t 
(56) = 2.52, p = .031, d = 0.69, and low truth expectancy conditions, t (55) = 5.26, p < 
.001, d = 1.43, and the equal split condition receiving a significantly higher PTJ than 
the low truth expectancy condition, t (52) = 2.61, p = .031, d = 0.73. That is, ratings of 
truths followed the predicted decline in PTJ in line with the raters’ expectations. 
However when rating lies the decline in PTJ from high to low expectancy did not 
follow predictions, with participants in the low truth expectancy making a comparable 
degree of truth judgments as those in the equal split expectancy condition. 
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Table 1. Mean proportion of truth judgments and accuracy rates in each expectancy 
condition. 
  Low truth 
expectancy 
 Equal split 
expectancy 
 High truth 
expectancy 
  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Proportion of truth judgments       
 Truths*  .55a 0.16  .67b 0.18  .79c 0.15 
 Lies*  .41a 0.17  .42a 0.18  .66b 0.15 
 Overall  .48a 0.13  .55a 0.14  .72b 0.12 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Accuracy        
 Truths*  .55a 0.16 .67b 0.18 .79c 0.15 
 Lies*  .59a 0.16 .58a 0.18 .34b 0.16 
 Overall  .57a 0.10 .62a 0.10 .56a 0.09 
 
       
Signal detection measures      
A’  .61a 0.16  .69b 0.13  .62a 0.15 
B”D  -0.09a 0.49  0.13a 0.50  0.70b 0.29 
Note: Means with a different letter superscript in a row differ significantly (p ≤ .05) 
from each other. *Post hoc tests, Bonferroni-adjusted alpha. 
 
 
Accuracy. The differences in the PTJ when rating lies versus truths may suggest 
a shift in accuracy rather than a shift in bias. This possibility was explored using a 
mixed ANOVA on the proportion of correct responses. Accuracy and bias were 
further delineated using signal detection measures. 
A 2 (veracity, within subjects) x 3 (expectancy condition, between subjects) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on accuracy rates. All main effects and interactions 
were significant. The main effect of veracity, F (1, 80) = 31.13, p < .001, η2 = 0.28, 
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indicated greater accuracy when judging truths (M = .67, SD = 0.16) than lies (M = 
.50, SD = 0.16). The main effect of condition was also significant, F (2, 80) = 3.20, p 
= .046, η2 = 0.07. The equal split condition was more accurate than the high truth 
expectancy condition. Whilst a Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-test found this 
difference was not significant, t (56) = 2.40, p = .059, d = 0.64, there was a medium to 
large effect size. The equal split condition was not significantly more accurate than 
the low truth expectancy condition, t (52) = 1.96, p = .167, d = 0.53, although again 
showing a medium effect size. The high and low truth expectancy conditions also did 
not differ significantly, t (55) = 0.35, p > .999, d = 0.11. That the equal split condition 
was the only group given veridical base rate information may explain these 
differences. 
The Veracity x Expectancy interaction was significant, F (2, 80) = 24.30, p < 
.001, η2 = 0.38. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated when judging 
lies, the high truth expectancy condition was significantly less accurate than both the 
equal split and low truth expectancy conditions, both ps < .001, ds = -1.29 and -1.48 
respectively, but the low truth and equal split expectancy conditions did not differ 
significantly, t (52) = -0.30, p > .999, d = 0.08. When rating truths, accuracy was 
highest in the high truth expectancy condition, which differed significantly from the 
equal split and low truth expectancy conditions, t (56) = 2.52, p = .031, d = 0.67, and t 
(55) = 5.25, p < .001, d = 1.34, respectively. Also, accuracy was significantly higher 
in the equal split than in the low truth expectancy condition, t (52) = 2.61, p = .031, d 
= 0.73. That is, those expecting mostly truths tended to be the most accurate in 
judging truths, those expecting mostly lies were the most accurate when it came to 
judging lies, and the equal split expectancy condition, which was given veridical 
information about the base rates, were generally accurate whether rating lies or truths. 
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Signal detection measures. To confirm the shift in the PTJ between the 
expectation conditions was attributable to a shift in bias rather than a shift in 
accuracy, one-way ANOVAs were performed using A’ and B”D as the dependent 
variables to explore the effects of accuracy and bias, respectively, independently of 
each other. There was no evidence that accuracy differed between the three 
conditions, F (2, 80) = 2.19, p = .119, η2 = 0.05. As predicted, bias did differ between 
the three conditions, F (2, 80) = 25.29, p < .001, η2 = 0.39. The high truth expectancy 
condition was significantly more truth biased than both the equal split and low truth 
expectancy conditions, both ps < .001, ds = 1.36 and 1.83, respectively, but the equal 
split condition was not significantly more truth biased than the low truth expectancy 
condition, t (52) = -1.89, p = .063, d = 0.52. 
Three Bonferroni-corrected t-tests compared the A’ scores of each of the three 
conditions to chance rate (0.50). The low, t (25) = 3.39, p < .001, d = 0.69, equal split, 
t (26) = 7.19, p < .001, d = 1.46, and high truth expectancy conditions, t (29) = 4.24, p 
< .001, d = 0.80, all showed accuracy significantly above chance rates. Similar 
analyses conducted on the B”D scores found both the low truth expectancy, t (25) = -
0.95, p = .350, d = -0.18, and equal split conditions, t (26) = 1.39, p = .178, d = 0.26, 
showed no evidence a significant bias in responding in the final judgment. Only the 
high truth expectancy condition showed a significant truth bias, t (30) = 13.03, p < 
.001, d = 2.41. 
Bayes factors were calculated to determine whether the response bias showed 
evidence in favour of no effect or of a present effect. A Cauchy prior distribution with 
a scaling factor of r = 0.5 was used. An equivalent of a one-sample t-test was 
performed using the JZS t-test described by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey and 
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Iverson (2009). When expecting mostly lies, the data were 2.5 times more likely 
under the null hypothesis, offering moderate support in favour of a lack of response 
bias in this condition. When expecting an equal split of lies and truths, the data were 
1.65 times more likely under the null, suggesting there was not sufficient data to 
determine whether there was or was not a truth bias in this condition. Finally, when 
expecting mostly truths there was very strong evidence in favour of a truth bias, with 
a Bayes factor of approximately 50 billion. Thus there appeared to be a lack of bias 
when expecting mostly lies but a truth bias when expecting mostly truths at the point 
of the final judgment. 
 
Divergence in the final judgment. The findings thus far appear to indicate the 
belief trajectory and the end judgment diverge: the former shows a lie bias when 
expecting mostly lies, but the latter does not necessarily reflect this, showing no 
evidence of a bias. The main effect of base rate expectations on the belief trajectory 
collapses across time, but a main effect of time was observed such that the PTJ was 
seen to increase. Thus the belief trajectory and the final judgment differences may be 
accounted for by this change over time. 
A linear regression asked whether the belief trajectory at the end of the 
statement, i.e. at t5, was able to predict the final judgment after partialling out the 
effect of base rate beliefs. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether there 
truly is a divergence from the end of the belief trajectory to the point of final 
judgment. The predictors were the PTJ at t5 and the truth expectancy condition. The 
outcome variable was the PTJ at the end of the trial. Expectations about the base rate 
at t5 significantly predicted the PTJ at the end of the trial, b = .11, t (74) = 6.03, p < 
.001, as did the PTJ at t5, b = .34, t (74) = 3.65, p < .001. That is, the final lie-truth 
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judgment was in part related to the end point of the belief trajectory and on their 
expectations about the base rate. 
 
Confidence. Replicating much past research (see Aamodt & Custer, 2006), 
there was no significant correlation found between confidence and accuracy, r (81) = 
0.06, p = .615. It is of interest to ask whether anticipating a majority of truthful 
statements leads to higher confidence in making a truth judgment, and whether 
anticipating a majority of lies leads to higher confidence in making lie judgments. A 2 
(judgment type: lie or truth judgment, within subjects) x 3 (expectancy condition, 
between subjects) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the confidence scores when 
making lie and truth judgments. There was no main effect of condition, F (2, 80) = 
0.32, p = .731, η2 = 0.01: there was no evidence that participants felt any more or less 
confident solely as a result of differing expectations. A Bayes factor was calculated 
using a Cauchy prior distribution over the effect sizes with a scaling factor of r = 0.5. 
The ANOVA design above served as the complex model and was compared against a 
model without the main effect of expectancy condition. Both models specified full 
random effects for participants and speakers. In order to prefer the complex model 
with a main effect of expectancy condition, prior odds favouring it of at least 2.8 
would be needed, offering moderate support for the lack of an effect of base rate 
expectations. 
There was a main effect of judgment type, F (1, 80) = 14.48, p < .001, η2 = 0.15. 
Raters were more confident in making truth judgments (M = 4.59, SD = 0.81) than lie 
judgments (M = 4.28, SD = 0.85), as found in prior research (DePaulo et al., 1997). 
In line with the prediction, there was a Judgment Type x Expectancy Condition 
interaction, F (2, 80) = 16.02, p < .001, η2 = 0.29 (Figure 10). Planned t-tests provided 
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no evidence that raters in the low truth expectancy condition were more or less 
confident in making truth than lie judgments, t (25) = -1.85, p = .069, d = -0.32, but 
both the equal split, t (26) = 2.39, p = .019, d = 0.41, and the high truth expectancy 
conditions, t (29) = 6.34, p < .001, d = 1.03, were significantly more confident in 
making truth ratings than lie ratings. Again a Bayes factor was calculated with 
parameters specified above. The complex model specified the main effect of judgment 
type using only the data from the low truth expectancy condition, whereas the simple 
model specified no predictor variables, with both models specifying random effects 
for participants and speakers. The Bayes factor of 1.1 indicated there was not 
sufficient power to determine whether there as evidence in favour or against the 
difference in confidence when making lie or truth judgments in the low truth 
expectancy condition. 
The shift in confidence between conditions was of interest as well as between 
lie-truth judgments, although here no specific predictions were made. Bonferroni-
corrected t-tests indicated that, when making lie judgments, the only significant 
difference was a greater confidence in making lie judgments in the low truth 
expectancy condition compared to the high truth expectancy condition, t (55) = 1.91, 
p = .045, d = 0.67, all other ps > .179. Similarly, when making truth judgments, there 
was greater confidence in the high compared to the low truth expectancy condition, t 
(55) = 2.56, p = .037, d = 0.69, but no other comparisons were significant, ps > .213. 
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Figure 10. Confidence when making judgments of ‘lie’ or ‘truth’ as a function 
of base rate beliefs. Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
People have a somewhat regular propensity to lie, around once or twice per day 
according to some reports (DePaulo et al., 1996), but the rate of honesty is far greater 
(Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Clark & Clark, 1977; DePaulo et al., 1996; Fan et al., 1995; 
O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988). Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that raters 
tend to judge statements as truthful more often than as deceptive. This study reports 
on the effects of the perceived base rate of honesty on the tendency to believe others. 
The findings indicate the truth bias can be moderated by expectations of the base rate 
of honesty. Across the course of the statement and the raters’ developing judgments, 
there was an effect of base rate beliefs in the predicted direction: raters showed a lie 
bias when expecting mostly lies and a truth bias when expecting mostly truths. That 
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is, under uncertainty and when there was no other information available to the rater 
about the current task, they relied on generalised contextual information. 
The final judgments of the statements only partially reflected this effect. There 
was a greater truth bias observed when expecting mostly truths compared to expecting 
an equal split of lies and truths. Raters in both conditions expressed more confidence 
in making truth compared to making lie judgments. However, despite expecting every 
four out of five speakers to deceive them, raters in the low truth expectancy condition 
surprisingly showed a rate of truth responding that did not differ significantly from 
the equal split condition. Signal detection measures found no significant response bias 
when raters believed the majority of statements were to be deceptive. Similarly, they 
were no more or less confident in their truth ratings than their lie ratings. Expecting a 
high rate of dishonesty was sufficient to cause a change in confidence compared to the 
equal split and high truth expectancy conditions, but it was not sufficient to cause a 
reversal such that raters in the low truth expectancy condition were more confident in 
their lie than their truth judgments. Put another way, they became appropriately less 
confident in their truth judgments, but did not have increased confidence in making lie 
judgments. In each base-rate belief condition, confidence in making truth compared to 
lie judgments reflected the tendency to exhibit a truth bias in the final judgment. 
It might appear the belief trajectory is distinct from the final lie-truth judgment 
insofar as the degree of truth bias as the statement was being delivered differed from 
the truth bias observed at the end of the trial. However, this difference can be 
accounted for by the fact that the degree of truth bias shifted over time. The findings 
seem to indicate perceptions of the base rate can cause both a lie bias and a truth bias, 
but that over time there is an increasing tendency towards believing the speaker is 
being honest. 
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Beliefs about the base rate may have had a relatively early effect on responding 
because there was little information available from the speaker at the initial moments. 
As a result, raters may have utilised other available evidence, in this case their beliefs 
about the base rate. This initial rating based on base rate beliefs may have served as 
an anchor (Fan et al., 1995; Zuckerman et al., 1987), from which the belief developed. 
Over time more behavioural information would have become available from the 
speaker. Given that both the honest and deceptive speakers seek to be perceived as 
telling the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003), their self-presentational behaviour may have 
successfully persuaded raters of their honesty and resulted in an increase in the PTJ. 
That is, the shift towards a truth-biased response may be attributable to increasingly 
availability of apparently honest behaviour from the speaker (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996; Chung & Fink, 2008). 
An alternative account would suggest the initial use of base rate information is 
followed by the onset of some cognitive process that causes the truth bias. This 
account suggests the shift towards a truth bias is a cognitive phenomenon on part of 
the rater rather than attributable to the self-presentational behaviour of the speaker, 
and that it operates at a later time scale than base rate information. Whether a 
behavioural or cognitive account can best explain the shift in the PTJ over time is 
unclear.  
The findings could be explained with sole reference to the use of base rate 
information, provided a distinction is made between the sample base rate and the 
population base rate. By sample base rate we mean the information offered to 
participants in this study regarding the small sample of speakers they were to rate. 
This varied between conditions. By population base rate it is meant the information 
participants bring to the task about the base rate of honesty from their entire history of 
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interactions in their daily lives. As discussed, the rate of honesty in real-world 
interactions is far greater than the rate of deception experienced (e.g. Caspi & Gorsky, 
2006; DePaulo et al., 1996; O'Sullivan et al., 1988). As a statement progresses, raters 
may be more influenced by their experiential knowledge of the population base rate 
and shift towards a truth belief. Future research should seek to contrast such cognitive 
accounts with behavioural accounts of the truth bias. 
The findings suggest a sceptic view may result in a tendency towards 
disbelieving whilst listening to a statement, in contrast to Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 2; 
Gilbert, 1991) but in line with other research (Masip, Alonso, et al., 2009; Mayo et al., 
2004; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012). Yet at the point of making the final judgment there 
is no evidence of a lie bias. One possible interpretation is that a bias brought to the 
task can be amplified or dampened by perceptions of how often people in general will 
tell the truth. Base rate information is incorporated into the judgment and can 
modulate the degree of the response bias. An important question for future research, 
then, is whether police investigators who bring a lie bias to the task will show an 
increased lie bias if they believe most of the speakers will lie, and a dampened 
response bias if they believe most speakers will tell the truth. 
This study offers the first empirical exploration of the effects of perceived base 
rates on the truth bias. Interestingly, whilst over the course of the statement their 
developing judgment was in line with the perceived base rates, by the point of their 
final judgment there was no direct one-to-one relationship between the expected 
proportion of deceptive and honest statements and the actual proportion of lie and 
truth judgments. An increasing shift towards believing the statement to be true over 
time was observed prior to the final judgment, although it is unclear why this shift 
occurred. This experiment shows beliefs about the base rate (independent of the actual 
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base rate) do influence the trajectory of the belief and the final lie-truth judgment, 
resulting in an early lie bias when expecting mostly lies and an early truth bias when 
expecting mostly truths. Taking into account the perceived base rate is better seen as a 
normative use of information (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) rather than a biased and 
inaccurate view of the world. 
One last note of consideration is worthy of mention. The manipulation explicitly 
informed participants the percentage of truth-tellers in the stimulus set. One might 
wonder whether participants given this information were acting in line with what they 
thought was the experimental manipulation, which was clearly presented to 
participants. That is, there is a worry the results may be an artefact of demand 
characteristics. 
This is of course a valid concern that cannot be dismissed with the current 
experimental setup. However, it is worth noting that there is no clear evidence of a 
direct one-to-one mapping between the base rate manipulation and the proportion of 
truth responses made. Although there was clear early evidence of an effect of base 
rate information, it is clear from Figure 9 that the PTJ increased over time. In 
addition, at the point of the final judgment raters showed a propensity towards 
believing over disbelieving the speaker, albeit to different degrees, regardless of the 
base rate information given. Of course, despite this complicated pattern of responding, 
it is not possible to rule out demand characteristics interacting with other factors, and 
this should be borne in mind when interpreting the current results. 
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Experiment 7: A Cartesian Mind – Post Comprehension 
 
The findings of Experiment 5 show there is no automatic tendency to believe 
during the process of comprehension. Rather, the truth bias is invoked by forcing a 
decision from a rater who has yet to receive enough information from the 
environment to make a decision. That is, the bias results from the structure of the task 
rather than from the structure of the mind. Experiment 8 capitalises on this. Here it is 
considered whether the truth bias observed in the final decision, rather than across the 
course of the decision making process, can also be modulated by whether the rater is 
forced into making a judgment. 
There is room for much uncertainty even after all the information has been 
considered. We are particularly good liars and produce few cues to our deception 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Vrij, 
Granhag & Mann, 2010), possibly none at all (Levine, 2010; although see Duran, 
Dale, Kello, Street & Richardson, 2013, for evidence of nonverbal indicators of 
deception at the individual level). How a rater should interpret a single instance of a 
cue is unclear: even truth tellers can appear nervous, for example, resulting from the 
accusatory situation (Ekman, 1992; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). There 
is a degree of uncertainty inherent in the lie detection task, reflected in consistently 
low accuracy rates (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Kraut, 1980; 
see also Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Frank & Feeley, 2003). 
It is predicted that when able to indicate uncertainty, there will be no need to 
rely on prior knowledge to make an informed guess and as a result there will be a 
reduced truth bias. 
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Method 
Participants. Eighty-two University College London psychology students 
participated in this study. One participant retrospectively withdrew consent. Two 
participants failed to provide their age and sex, but were not excluded from analyses. 
Of the 79 participants that reported demographic details, 54 were female (age M = 
19.87, SD = 1.31, range 18 to 22). Participants received either course credit or £3 
compensation. 
 
Materials, Design and Procedure. The Bloomsbury Deception Set (Street et al., 
2011, April) in Experiment 5 was used. Videos were presented and responses 
collected using MATLAB software (The Mathworks inc., 2000: Natick, MA) and the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
The independent variables were the response conditions (LT or LTU) and the 
veracity of the speakers’ statements. The dependent variable was the proportion of 
truth judgments, resulting in a 2 (response condition: LT or LTU, between subjects) x 
2 (speaker veracity: lie or truth, within subjects) mixed design. 
The procedure follows Experiment 5 with two exceptions. First, raters did not 
indicate their belief as the video progressed. Rather, they viewed the video and only 
afterwards made a response. Second, only raters in the lie-truth (LT) condition (n = 
39) made a forced binary choice: raters in the lie-truth-unsure (LTU) condition (n = 
40) were given the additional option of indicating their uncertainty. That is, raters 
viewed a video passively, and after each video either made a lie-truth or lie-truth-
unsure judgment. 
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Results 
Having the option of explicitly indicating uncertainty did affect the truth bias, 
but in the opposite direction than predicted. Being able to indicate uncertainty 
increased the truth bias. Further exploration of the data indicated this effect was due 
to a shift away from making lie responses and towards making unsure responses. This 
was further supported by the fact that lies were more likely to receive unsure ratings 
than were truths. 
As in Experiment 5, the unsure responses were removed from the LTU 
condition in order to compare the LT and LTU conditions. After removal, a PTJ of 
0.50 would indicate no bias. A 2 (response condition: LT or LTU) x 2 (veracity: lie or 
truth) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor was conducted 
with the PTJ serving as the dependent variable. A main effect of veracity was found, 
F (1, 77) = 36.02, p < .001, η2 = .319. Truths (M = .66, SD = .18) received a higher 
PTJ than lies (M = .50, SD = .19), indicating raters were above chance accuracy 
overall. Central to the hypothesis, there was a main effect of response condition, F (1, 
77) = 4.50, p = .037, η2 = .055. Surprisingly, there was a greater bias in the unforced 
choice LTU condition (M = .61, SD = .15) than in the forced choice LT condition (M 
= .54, SD = .14). 
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Figure 11. (a) Accuracy (A’) in the forced choice LT and the unforced choice LTU 
conditions. 0.5 indicates chance accuracy (left). (b) Response bias (B”D) in the LT and 
LTU conditions. Zero indicates no bias; positive values indicate a truth bias. Whiskers 
denote standard error. 
 
 
Signal detection measures of accuracy (A’) and response bias (B”D) were also 
calculated to determine their independent effects. Two independent samples t-tests 
found no significant different in accuracy between the LT and LTU conditions, t (77) 
= 0.09, p = .929, d = 0.02 (Figure 11a), whereas the difference in bias was statistically 
significant, t (77) = 2.06, p = .043, d = -0.65. (Figure 11b). 
 
 Exploration of the data. In order to understand the reversal of the effect, 
further examination was carried out. First, the unsure responses were reintroduced 
into the LTU condition data. Comparing the proportion of truth judgments between 
the conditions and the proportion of lie judgments between the two conditions will 
give an indication of whether the unsure responses in the LTU condition were likely 
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to draw away from making lie responses. I will refer to this as the artefactual truth 
bias because the proportion of truth to lie judgments increases only as a result of 
making fewer lie responses. Another possibility is that the unsure response is not used 
frequently, and the proportion of truth responses in the LTU condition exceeds the 
proportion of truth responses in the LT condition even when the unsure responses are 
considered. I will refer to this as the veridical truth bias to indicate the fact that truth 
responding is greater in the LTU condition than in the LT condition when all 
responses are taken into account. 
Two independent samples t-tests compared the proportion of truth judgments 
and the proportion of lie judgments in the two response conditions. The proportion of 
truth responses did not differ significantly between the LT (M = .54, SD = .14) and the 
LTU conditions (M = .50, SD = .14), t (77) = 1.23, p = .223, d = 0.28. The proportion 
of lie responses did differ significantly, t (77) = 4.25, p < .001, d = 0.96. There were 
significantly fewer lie judgments made in the LTU condition (M = .33, SD = .14) than 
in the LT condition (M = .46, SD = .14). This suggests an artefactual truth bias: it was 
not the case that raters were more likely to make truth judgments in the LTU 
condition, but rather that they were less likely to make lie judgments, instead making 
use of the unsure response (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. The proportion of lie, truth, and unsure (where applicable) responses in the 
LT and LTU conditions. As can be seen, the increased truth bias in the LTU unforced 
choice condition results from a reduction in the use of the ‘lie’ response. Whiskers 
denote standard error. 
 
 
A second analysis explored the use of the unsure response in the LTU condition 
in more detail. Prior research suggests there is greater uncertainty when judging lies 
than judging truths (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1997). A paired-samples t-test compared the 
proportion of unsure responses in the LTU condition when rating lies versus when 
rating truths. As expected, there was a significantly greater proportion of unsure 
responses when rating lies (M = .39, SD = .19) than when rating truths (M = .26, SD = 
.18), t (38) = 3.40, p = .002, d = 0.15. 
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Discussion 
The current experiment sought to test the possibility whether the truth bias 
observed in the final judgment could be reduced or removed by allowing respondents 
to indicate their uncertainty explicitly, rather than forcing them into a binary choice. 
Contrary to expectations, there was a greater truth bias when given the option of 
indicating uncertainty. Further exploration of the data revealed the increase in the 
truth bias was artefactual: there was no increase in truth responding in the LTU 
condition, but rather there was a decrease in making lie responses and instead 
favouring the use of the unsure response. 
It is important to note that a Cartesian system does not make predictions 
regarding the truth bias after comprehension, only that there is no decision made 
during the comprehension process (Gilbert, 1991). The findings of this study cannot 
be said to contradict the Cartesian account. However, they may be explained as an 
adaptive decision-maker that makes use of contextual knowledge. 
Of particular interest is why the truth bias increased in the unforced LTU 
condition. Raters were less likely to use the lie response and instead opt for the unsure 
response. This suggests that, in the case of a forced binary choice, when there is 
uncertainty this in itself can be used as a guide towards a judgment: if unsure, guess 
‘lie’. This strategy would in general be successful: research indicates people have 
greater uncertainty when rating a deceptive statement than an honest statement 
(Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 1997; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Anderson, 1999, cited by DePaulo & Morris, 2004; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Levine et 
al., 1999; see also Hurd & Noller, 1988). This may be because liars, through fear of 
getting caught, may purposely deliver vague statements (Vrij, 2008), or because raters 
are less familiar with lies than truths (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 1996). The 
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current study confirms this view: raters were indeed more likely to make an unsure 
response when listening to lies than when listening to truths. Thus the apparent 
increase in bias may be better thought of as a reflection of an adaptive decision maker 
that can make use of contextual knowledge (lies are typically harder to detect than 
truths: Levine et al., 1999) by using their internal uncertainty to improve the quality of 
the judgment (see Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Payne et al., 1993). 
Adaptive use of uncertainty could only be successful after the information has 
been comprehended. Being unsure in this respect means the evidence gathered from 
the environment is not sufficiently clear to make a distinction between whether the 
statement is a lie or a truth. Because truths are easier to detect than are lies, a 
phenomenon known as the veracity effect (Levine et al., 1999), internal uncertainty 
can be taken as an indication of the possibility of the statement being a lie: deceptions 
are more difficult to detect. 
The internal uncertainty claim assumes raters are meta-cognitively aware of 
their difficulty in making a categorical judgment with the information available, and 
can use that uncertainty itself as a guide towards making a judgment. This may seem 
to suggest that with greater uncertainty we may expect raters to be better able to make 
a decision, provided they can employ their own uncertainty as a factor in the decision 
process. This claim is not being made; there is a step missing. It is because the 
experimental design requires participants make a decision that they may come to use 
that uncertainty when forced into judgment. When this necessity to make a judgment 
is removed, as seen in the LTU condition of this experiment, raters are less likely to 
make use of their uncertainty in this way. Instead, they prefer to explicitly indicate 
their uncertainty. That is, indecision itself is used as a factor in the decision when 
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there are additional requirements made by the task, viz. to make a categorical 
decision. 
Uncertainty during comprehension, on the other hand, is due to the lack of 
information obtained from the environment. Being unsure in this respect results from 
a lack of information. This external uncertainty cannot be used as an indication of 
deceit or honesty: it is equiprobable that the statement is a lie as it is a truth. The rater 
has to rely on information that does not relate to the immediate environment, but 
rather on more general principles from past experience with similar situations, such as 
the availability heuristic (‘people usually tell the truth’: Experiment 6). 
One weakness with the internal-external uncertainty explanation is that it results 
from an exploratory analysis of the data. Experiment 8 takes a confirmatory approach 
to the question, beginning from the hypothesis that judgments made after information 
has been gathered will show a greater truth bias if not forced into a judgment, an 
artefact of not making use of internal uncertainty as a guide to deception and instead 
explicitly indicating uncertainty, thereby reduced lie responses. When task-specific 
information in the environment has not been encoded, either because sufficient 
information or time is not available, prior experience with internal uncertainty cannot 
be used as a guide to deception. Instead, knowledge built up through past experience 
with similar situations can be used, such as ‘people usually tell the truth’. 
 
 
Experiment 8: The Cartesian Hopi Word Experiment 
 
The aim of the current experiment is to replicate and extend the findings and 
conclusions of Experiments 5 and 7. After information from the environment has been 
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encoded, it is claimed the use of internal uncertainty can be used strategically as an 
indication of falsity. If there is no information available in the environment, (external) 
uncertainty cannot be used strategically. Instead the rater must rely on other available 
information, such as that built up from past experience with similar situations. 
The current study closely replicates an experiment carried out to support the 
Spinozan view (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 1) for two reasons. First, it is important to 
show that previous data supporting the Spinozan view can better be accounted for by 
an informed Cartesian view that takes an adaptive approach to decision-making. 
Second, the experimental setup lends itself well to the empirical testing of the 
internal-external account suggested by the findings of Experiment 7. 
Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1) manipulated the amount of time for encoding 
veracity information (for a fuller description of their study, see the methods of this 
experiment). Participants were set the task of learning the definitions of ostensibly 
Hopi Indian words, but were in fact nonsense words (e.g. ‘A twyrin is a doctor’). 
After presentation of the word-definition pair, a true or false signal word was 
presented to indicate whether the definition was either true (a twyrin is in fact a 
doctor) or false (a twyrin is not a doctor). The veracity signal word was presented for 
either 3 sec or interrupted after only 750 msec. When given little time for encoding, 
raters showed a truth bias, which the authors took as confirmatory support for the 
Spinozan view. However, as was argued in Experiment 5, the evidence is 
compromised by the fact that raters were forced to decide under external uncertainty: 
whether due to a lack of available information or, in this instance, a lack of time to 
process the available information. Under external uncertainty, raters can make use of 
their prior knowledge from similar situations, such as ‘people usually tell the truth’ 
(Grice, 1975; O'Sullivan et al., 1988), and an understanding that communication of 
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new information needs to be true information if it is to be useful (see Fiedler et al., 
1996; Grice, 1975; Swann et al., 1982). This conclusion was supported in Experiment 
5. 
Given sufficient time to process the information, i.e. without interruption, the 
researchers found a reduced truth bias (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 1). The findings of 
Experiment 7 suggest that, given task-specific information has been gathered, 
uncertainty reflects indecision about the information (internal uncertainty). Rather 
than guessing randomly, internal uncertainty can be used adaptively. It has been 
known for a long time that processing negated statements takes longer and they are 
more difficult to comprehend than non-negated statements (Anderson et al., 2010; 
Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Glenberg et al., 1999; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Trabasso et al., 1971). What is more, true statements are encountered more 
often than negated statements in our daily lives (Skurnik, 1998, cited by Hasson et al., 
2005). Thus uncertainty can be taken as an adaptive heuristic guide to the veracity of 
the statement by assuming those statements that are difficult to process are more 
likely to be false. This adaptive use of internal uncertainty would be expected to offset 
the tendency towards accepting statements as true, resulting in a reduced response 
bias. 
This setup allows for a replication of the Spinozan effect as shown by Gilbert 
and colleagues (1990) and to further demonstrate how the adaptive use of either past 
experience (when little task-specific information is available) or internal uncertainty 
(when task-specific information fails to guide the decision to a conclusion) can result 
in biased or unbiased responding. 
Participants were led to believe they were taking part in a learning experiment 
and that their task was to learn words from the Hopi Indian language. Definitions 
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were presented and followed by signal word indicating whether the definition was 
true or false. The amount of time processing the signal word was varied, replicating 
Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1). After the learning phase followed a test phase, and half 
the participants were asked to recall whether the presented definition was true or false 
for the word presented, or whether the word-definition pair had not been seen during 
learning. The other half of the participants had the additional option of explicitly 
indicating they were unsure about the statement’s veracity. 
It was hypothesised that those forced to make a true-false judgment would 
exhibit the Spinozan truth bias, replicating Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1). That is, a 
truth bias should be exhibited when processing the veracity of the statement during 
the learning phase was interrupted; there would be a reduced biased if there was no 
interruption during learning. When able to indicate uncertainty, the adaptive decision-
maker account predicts a reverse Spinozan effect. It is claimed that interruption in this 
task would lead to the use of prior knowledge, but only when forced. If unforced, 
biased responding should reduce because the decision-maker is no longer forced to 
make a judgment under external uncertainty, in line with the reasoning of Experiment 
5. Given sufficient time to encode the veracity information, uncertainty can be used 
adaptively. The processing of false statements is considered more difficult than 
processing affirmed statements (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Trabasso et al., 1971), perhaps because they are underspecified: 
a negated statement (‘a twyrin is not a doctor’) gives no information as to the true 
meaning of the word, and as such may require the processing of the various 
alternatives (Anderson et al., 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999). When able to indicate 
uncertainty, there would be no necessity to make an informed guess if unsure. With 
fewer ‘false’ guesses, an artefactual truth bias is predicted. 
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Method 
 Participants. Eighty-three participants took part in return for either course 
credit or £3 compensation. One participant took a phone call mid-experiment. The 
delay manipulation explained below did not work correctly for three participants. 
These four participants were excluded. Of the remaining 79, 53 were female (age M = 
21.47, SD = 4.56, range = 18 to 41). Participants were pre-screened for their 
knowledge of the Hopi Indian language. All participants spoke English as their native 
language. 
 
Materials. Twenty-eight stimulus propositions were taken from Gilbert et al. 
(1990, Study 1, Table 1). Two additional word-definition pairings were generated in 
order to balance the design, another four were generated for the practice phase and a 
final for use during a practice phase, and a further nine foil items were generated for 
use during the test phase. Table 2 lists the stimulus items presented during both the 
learning and test phases. 
 
Procedure. Learning phase. Participants signed up to take part in a ‘natural 
language learning’ experiment. Instructions were adapted as closely as possible from 
Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1). A series of propositions were presented one at a time of 
the form ‘An X is a Y’ for a period of 8 s, where X was a nonsense word and Y a 
noun. The order of presentation was fixed as shown in Table 2. A blank screen of 
either 2 or 10 s followed each presentation, as per Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1). It was 
explained this gap was because ‘the computer is attempting to locate a new 
proposition in its internal dictionary for the next trial’. 
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On two-thirds of the trials, a signal word was then presented, indicating whether 
the definition was accurate of the word (true) or not (false) for 3 s. It was explained 
that in order to simulate natural learning a signal word would not always be given 
because ‘in natural language learning we do not always get feedback about the 
meaning of words.’ On the remaining third of the trials, there was no signal word and 
instead a second blank screen was shown for 3 s. The counterbalancing presented in 
Table 2 meant that each proposition was followed by either a true, false or no signal 
word across the course of the experiment. 
A second simultaneous task was given to participants. As well as the word-
learning task, participants had to response to a 600 Hz tone as fast as possible with a 
button response. Instructions explained ‘some research suggests that the speed of 
response is related to the ability to learn new languages’; however the true purpose of 
the tone response was to interrupt processing of the signal word. Whether participants 
actually responded to this tone was captured, but because the purpose of the tone was 
simply to interrupt participants, the responses are not analysed here. Of the 30 
propositions, the first and last six were used as buffers to avoid primacy and recency 
effects. Of the remaining 18 trials, 12 were followed by a signal word of true or false. 
Interruption occurred on the six emphasised propositions in Table 2: Gilbert and 
colleagues (1990) interrupted only four of the propositions. The reason for this change 
was to balance the number of interrupted and uninterrupted propositions that would be 
used in the test phase. 
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Table 2. Three orders of stimulus item presentation during the learning phase of the 
Uncertain Hopi Experiment. 
Trial Proposition Order Trial Proposition Order 
  1 2 3   1 2 3 
1 A volike is a puddle T B F 16 A suffa is a cloud T B F 
2 A ghoren is a jug T B F 17 A walive is a bear B F T 
3 A monishna is a star F T B 18 A tecrill is a mouse F T B 
4 A cirell is a tree B F T 19 A basol is a fisherman F T B 
5 A tarka is a wolf T F B 20 A casin is a rope B F T 
6 A dinca is a flame B T F 21 A nasli is a snake T B F 
7 A polay is a stream B F T 22 A twyrin is a doctor T F B 
8 A tica is a fox T B F 23 A bandi is a raccoon B T F 
9 A bilicar is a spear F T B 24 A dalith is a root F B T 
10 A korrom is a mountain F T  B 25 A tiloom is a cup F B T 
11 A curira is a necklace B T F 26 A gafin is a pinecone F T B 
12 A waihas is a fish F B T 27 A hib is a canoe B F T 
13 A rotan is a hunter T B F 28 A trica is a weasel T B F 
14 A wika is a deer F T B 29 A neseti is a bee T F B 
15 A rirg is a valley F B T 30 An eprata is a berry B F T 
Note. T = true, F = false, B = blank screen. Four of the bold italicised items were 
interrupted on one run of the experiment. 
 
 
Test phase. The first and last six items from the learning phase were removed to 
counter potential primacy and recency memory effects. This left 18 trials, of which 12 
were followed by either a true or false signal word. Half of these 12 word-definition 
pairs were followed by a 2 s gap before the presentation of the signal word, whilst the 
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remaining pairs were followed by a 10 s gap. A further nine foil items that were not 
presented during learning were added to the test phase, resulting in a total of 21 test 
items. Item order was randomised. 
A written instruction was presented before each test phase, at which point the 
experimenter re-entered the room to paraphrase the instruction. Those in the false-true 
(FT, n = 43) response condition were given three response options: they could either 
indicate the proposition was false, true, or that the proposition had not been presented 
during learning. Participants in the false-true-unsure (FTU, n = 36) condition were 
given these three responses in addition to a fourth ‘unsure’ response. Importantly, it 
was stressed to participants in all conditions that they should only use the ‘not seen’ 
response if they believe it was a new proposition: if they recalled seeing the 
proposition but could not recall whether it was true or false, they should not use the 
‘not seen’ response and to use one of the remaining two or three response options 
available (depending on whether the participant was in the FT or FTU experimental 
condition). 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Proportion of true judgments. The nine foil items in the test phase were 
removed from analysis, leaving 12 critical stimuli for analysis. Of these, half were 
interrupted during the presentation of the signal word in the learning phase, meaning 
they had only a short space of time in which to encode the relevant veracity 
information. Not-seen and unsure responses were removed from analyses. 
A 2 (veracity: true or false, within subjects) x 2 (interruption: interrupted or 
uninterrupted during learning, within subjects) x 2 (response condition: FT or FTU, 
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between subjects) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the PTJ. A main effect of 
veracity was found, F (1, 73) = 4.87, p = .030, η2 = 0.066, with a greater PTJ for true 
(M = .70, SD = .29) than false (M = .58, SD = .32) statements. No other main effects 
were significant, all ps > .380. 
A Veracity x Interruption interaction is predicted by the Spinozan mind 
hypothesis: false items should be mistaken as true only if interrupted during learning. 
A significant interaction was found, F (1, 73) = 14.48, p < .001, η2 = 0.17. When 
interrupted during learning, participants were equally likely to judge false statements 
as true (M = .65, SD = .38) as they were to (correctly) judge true statements as true (M 
= .65, SD = .40), t (74) = -0.02, p = .979, d < .001. When uninterrupted during 
learning, raters were more likely to judge true statements as being true (M = .75, SD = 
.27) than they were false statements (M = .51, SD = .35), t (74) = -4.45, p < .001, d = 
0.77. This provides initial support for a Spinozan view, although it is unclear whether 
raters were becoming more accurate when they were not interrupted during the 
learning phase. 
More pressing for the current research is whether interruption affected the 
degree of truth responding in the FT and FTU response conditions. An Interruption x 
Response Condition interaction was observed, F (1, 73) = 8.14, p = .006, η2 = 0.10, as 
shown in Figure 13. The means suggest a crossover effect as predicted by the adaptive 
decision-maker account. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests found interruption during 
encoding resulted in significantly more truth judgments than when uninterrupted in 
                                                
6 Some participants had missing cells for some of the analyses presented in this section. For example, 
some participants either indicated they were unsure or that they had not seen the items, which would 
result in blank cells when calculating the proportion of true responses out of all the false and true 
responses made. 
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the FT condition, t (43) = 2.66, p = .010, d = 0.42, as predicted by the Spinozan mind 
account. In the FTU condition, however, whilst the means suggest a reversal of the 
effect, the difference in the PTJ between interrupted and uninterrupted items was not 
significant, t (31) = -1.46, p = .144, d = -0.27. In addition, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the FT and FTU conditions on those items interrupted 
during learning, t (74) = 0.77, p = .446, d = 0.18, but the FTU condition showed a 
greater truth bias on uninterrupted items, t (74) = -2.27, p = .025, d = -0.54. Whether 
interrupted or uninterrupted during learning, FTU raters exhibited a marked truth bias 
of around 60% to 70%, whilst the FT raters exhibited the expected Spinozan mind 
effect. 
 
 
Figure 13. The effect of interruption on the proportion of truth judgments as a 
function of the response options available: either a forced choice (FT) or unforced 
choice (FTU). Whiskers denote standard error. 
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Signal detection measures. The above analyses are presented using the raw 
proportion of true judgments. These analyses allow for a more ready comparison with 
those of Gilbert and colleagues (1990, Study 1). However, response bias and accuracy 
are confounded in these raw measures. Here I will consider the effect of the 
manipulations on accuracy (A’) and bias (B”D) independently. 
A 2 (interruption) x 2 (response condition) ANOVA was conducted on the A’ 
accuracy scores. There was a main effect of interruption, F (1, 73) = 11.76, p = .001, 
η2 = 0.14: raters were significantly more likely to make an accurate response when 
uninterrupted during learning (M = .64, SD = .28) than when interrupted during 
learning (M = .51, SD = .36). Thus the act of interruption during encoding was liable 
to cause inaccuracies. 
Conducting the same ANOVA on the B”D response bias scores reflects the 
Interruption x Response Condition interaction found using the PTJ scores, F (1, 73) = 
5.79, p = .019, η2 = 0.07. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests reflect the Spinozan effect in the 
FT condition and the sustained truth bias in the FTU condition as exhibited in the 
ANOVA conducted on the PTJ and as illustrated in Figure 13. A series of four one-
sample t-tests on the B”D scores determined the FT condition showed a significant 
truth bias on interrupted items (M = .46, SD = .69), t (42) = 4.36, p < .001, d = 0.67, 
and on uninterrupted items, albeit smaller (M = .22, SD = .61), t (42) = 2.38, p = .022, 
d = 0.36. The unforced FTU condition showed a truth bias on both interrupted (M = 
.34, SD = .69), t (31) = 2.79, p = .009, d = 0.49, and uninterrupted items (M = .48, SD 
= .64), t (31) = 4.47, p < .001, d = 0.75. 
Thus the FT condition exhibited the Spinozan effect of a truth bias on 
interrupted items and a reduced (albeit present) truth bias on uninterrupted items. In 
contrast, the FTU unforced condition did not show the Spinozan effect. The means 
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suggested a reversal of the effect, as predicted, however this failed to achieve 
statistical significance. Both interrupted and uninterrupted items showed a truth bias, 
with the two showing no statistically significant difference. 
 
Further exploration. To attempt to understand the sustained truth bias in the 
FTU unforced choice condition, further analyses were conducted. 
Forgetting effect. As alluded to above, interruption resulted in lower accuracy 
rates. It may be that interruption caused people to forget. Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1) 
rejected the forgetting-effect explanation and showed no difference in the tendency to 
misremember interrupted (9%) versus uninterrupted (8%) items as new items that had 
not been presented during learning. A 2 (veracity) x 2 (interruption) x 2 (FT/FTU 
response condition) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of not seen responses. 
This proportion was calculated as the sum of the not seen responses divided by the 
sum of the true, false and not seen responses. A main effect of interruption was found, 
F (1, 77) = 11.77, p = .001, η2 = 0.13. Participants were significantly more likely to 
indicate they had not seen an item if encoding of the veracity information had been 
interrupted (M = .15, SD = .21) than if there was no interruption during learning (M = 
.07, SD = .11). There was a non-significant effect of veracity, F (1, 77) = 3.41, p = 
.069, η2 = 0.04. Thus the act of interrupting led to forgetting, in contrast to the 
findings of Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1). However, those authors did not explore how 
interruption interacted with veracity of the proposition. 
The interruption main effect was qualified by a three-way interaction between 
veracity, interruption, and response condition, F (1, 77) = 6.64, p = .012, η2 = 0.08. 
Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected t-tests were conducted. In the FT condition, interrupted 
false propositions (M = .22, SD = .27) were significantly more likely to be considered 
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as new items compared to interrupted true propositions (M = .09, SD = .24), t (42) = 
3.57, p = .001, d = 0.51. For uninterrupted propositions, there was no significant 
difference in the proportion of not seen responses between true (M = .06, SD = .13) 
and false items (M = .09, SD = .15), t (42) = 0.17, p = .869, d = 0.21. Thus in the FT 
condition, where the replication of the Spinozan truth-bias effect was anticipated, it 
appears as though there was greater forgetting for false items when interrupted than 
any other items, shown in Figure 14a. 
Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1) present the proportion of true and false responses 
for each of the true and false statements in their Figure 2. Although the exact mean 
values are not reported, the figure indicates approximately 35% of the false statements 
were accurately judged as false when interrupted, and approximately 35% of the false 
statements were incorrectly classified as true when interrupted. This leaves 
approximately 30% of the responses unaccounted for. Given that the only other 
response available to raters was ‘not seen’, it seems reasonable to suggest the missing 
values in the figure represent the not-seen responses. However, caution must be taken 
in making this assumption. Nonetheless, approximations of the missing values from 
the Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1) figure are plotted in Figure 14b. 
As can be seen in Figure 14, there is a resemblance between the not seen 
responses in the current experiment and the unaccounted-for responses in Gilbert et 
al. (1990, Study 1). Of course whether the differences shown in Figure 14b are 
statistically significant is not known. What can be said from the findings of the 
current study is that participants were more likely to judge interrupted false (versus 
true) propositions as having not been seen during learning. Thus the Spinozan truth-
bias effect may be an artefact of increased forgetting of interrupted false statements 
that leads to a guessing bias, as Gilbert and colleagues (1990) had considered, but 
  196 
rejected. Without an explicit analysis of the raw data from their research, it is unclear 
whether the Spinozan effect found in their research can also be accounted for as a 
greater forgetting of interrupted false propositions, but it would be worth exploring. 
The researchers no longer have the data available to explore this possibility (D. 
Gilbert, personal communication, 30 August, 2013; D. Krull, personal 
communication, 30 August, 2013; P. S. Malone, personal communication, 30 August, 
2013). 
 
 
Figure 14. (a) The proportion of not-seen responses in the FT condition of the current 
study. Raters were more likely to forget interrupted false propositions than any other 
proposition type, suggesting the Spinozan effect reflects forgetting of false statements 
when interrupted (left). Whiskers denote standard error. (b) The approximate 
proportion of responses unaccounted for in Figure 2 of Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1), 
assumed to reflect the not-seen responses of participants in that study. The pattern of 
responses unaccounted for in that study resemble those presented in the current 
research. However, without examination of the data it is unclear whether the 
supposition holds. Whiskers denote standard error. 
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There is a subtle but important difference between the Spinozan mind 
hypothesis and the forgetting effect suggested here. The Spinozan mind hypothesis 
predicts there is a tendency towards believing information is true in the early 
moments of comprehension. By contrast, the forgetting effect shows how the 
increased truth bias when rating interrupted propositions may reflect a tendency to 
forget false statements, thereby resulting in fewer false judgments and giving the 
appearance of a greater proportion of true judgments compared to false judgments.  
Why might participants forget interrupted false statements more often than 
forgetting interrupted true statements? One possibility has been considered by a 
number of authors: true statements are more informative than false statements 
(Anderson et al., 2009, 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999; Hasson et al., 2005). Consider the 
proposition ‘a twyrin is a doctor’. When the statement is true there is a single clear 
meaning associated to the word twyrin: it is a doctor. But what if it were false – how 
might we interpret and encode the nonsense word twyrin when all that is known about 
it is that it does not mean ‘doctor’? The number of alternatives is vast. That the non-
definitions of nonsense words, with little time given for encoding, may be forgotten is 
perhaps unsurprising. 
Strategic ‘not-seen’ responding. There is another explanation aside from 
forgetting. Raters in the FT condition may not be forgetting, but rather using the not-
seen response to indicate their uncertainty. That is, raters may not have truly forgotten 
the propositions, but only forgotten whether they were true or false definitions of the 
word. Instructions explicitly informed participants not to do so, but this by no means 
prevents participants from responding in this strategic fashion. 
In discussing the three-way interaction above, focus has been cast upon the 
responses made in the forced choice FT condition. The three-way interaction also 
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sheds light on the pattern of responding in the unforced FTU condition, and on the 
strategic use of the not-seen response. Judgments of interrupted true (M = .14, SD = 
.26) and false propositions (M = .14, SD = .26) were equally likely to result in 
relatively high level of not-seen responses, t (35) < 0.01, p > .999, d < 0.01. That is, 
interrupted propositions overall were likely to receive a high proportion of not-seen 
responses. Uninterrupted true (M = .04, SD = .15) and false (M = .08, SD = .13) 
propositions were also not significantly different from one another, t (35) = -1.14, p = 
.203, d = -0.29. Thus interrupted true and false items were no more likely to be 
remembered, and uninterrupted true and false items were no more likely to be 
remembered. 
 
 
Figure 15. Not-seen responses when judging true and false propositions that were 
interrupted during learning. Whiskers denote standard error. 
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Consider the pattern of not-seen responding to interrupted true and false 
statements in both the FT and the FTU conditions (Figure 15). In the FT condition 
interrupted false statements received a higher proportion of not-seen responses than 
interrupted true statements. In the FTU unforced condition there was no significant 
difference in their pattern of not-seen responses to interrupted true and false 
statements. At first glance it could seem to suggest that the additional use of the not-
seen response to false statements in the FT condition compared to the FTU condition 
is a strategic use of the response where those in the FTU condition would instead 
explicitly indicate their uncertainty. However, the non-significant difference in the use 
of the not-seen responses in the FTU condition is not evidence in support of the 
contention that there was truly no difference in how the FTU condition used the not-
seen response. A Bayes factor was calculated in order to examine whether there truly 
was no difference, using a Cauchy prior with a scaling parameter r = 0.5, comparing a 
model with the Response Condition x Veracity interaction to a model without the 
interaction, and full-specified random effects on participants and stimulus proposition. 
Bayes factors near 1.0 indicate an inability of the data to speak to either the null or the 
alternative hypothesis due to a lack of significant power. A Bayes factor of 0.9 was 
calculated, failing to allow inferences regarding the interaction to be drawn. 
In summary, a further analysis of the design of the experiment is not well 
positioned to test the Spinozan effect or the adaptive decision-maker account because 
the truth bias may reflect forgetting. The three-way interaction also hints at the 
possibility of a strategic use of the not-seen response, although statistical analyses 
determined there was a lack of sufficient power to determine whether this account 
could be supported. 
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Failure to Find a Reversed Spinozan Effect. The major prediction of this 
experiment was that in the forced choice condition a Spinozan effect would be 
observed: a truth bias should be seen when judging interrupted but not uninterrupted 
propositions. In the unforced choice condition it was predicted that the effect would 
reverse: external uncertainty due to interruption would result in uncertainty and, 
because they were not forced to judge, would indicate that uncertainty and show a 
reduced truth bias. However, internal uncertainty for uninterrupted propositions was 
expected to result in a truth bias: where uncertainty in this situation would, in forced 
choice conditions, be used as a heuristic towards believing the proposition false (see 
the discussion of Experiment 7 and the introduction to the current experiment), in 
unforced choice conditions they would no longer rely on this heuristic and so reduce 
their false responses, generating an artefactual truth bias. Whilst this latter prediction 
was upheld – raters were truth biased when rating uninterrupted propositions – there 
was also a truth bias when judging previously interrupted statements, contrary to 
predictions. 
That there are differences in truth responding between the forced and unforced 
choice conditions leads to the natural question of how judgments of uncertainty were 
cast. This may shed light on the failure to support the predictions. A 2 (veracity) x 2 
(interruption) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of unsure responses in the 
FTU condition. That is, the sum of the unsure responses divided by sum of the unsure, 
true, false and not-seen responses. Surprisingly, all main effects and interactions were 
non-significant (all ps > .310), suggesting the use of the unsure response was not able 
to account for the differences between these conditions. 
A second possibility is that participants in the FTU condition were forgetting 
interrupted statements less often than participants in the forced FT condition, and so 
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do not experience the external uncertainty we predicted to be associated with a lack of 
bias. However, the data do not support this account. An independent samples t-test 
found no significant effect, t (77) = 0.38, p = .706, d = 0.09. A Bayes factor was 
calculated using a Cauchy prior with a scaling factor of r = 0.5, comparing a full 
model with fully specified random effects on participants and stimulus item to a 
simpler model without the response condition main effect. The data supported the null 
hypothesis of no difference: in order to accept the alternative hypothesis, prior odds 
favouring it of greater than 6 would be needed. 
Finally, given that interruption appeared to result in similar degrees of 
forgetting for both the FT and FTU conditions, it may be the case that raters were 
more likely to forget interrupted false items than interrupted true items, regardless of 
response condition. As such, the unexpected truth bias in the FTU condition when 
rating interrupted statements may simply reflect a forgetting of interrupted false 
statements. The ‘Strategic not-seen responding’ subsection above explored the 
interaction between interrupted true and false statements with the response condition, 
and a Bayesian analysis determined there was not sufficient power to test this 
hypothesis. Here we are solely interested in whether interruption resulted in a higher 
degree of forgetting for interrupted false versus true statements, regardless of FT or 
FTU response condition. A paired-samples t-test confirmed raters were significantly 
more likely to forget false interrupted statements (M = .18, SD = .27) than true 
interrupted statements (M = .11, SD = .24), t (78) = 2.17, p = .033. This post-hoc 
exploratory analysis may suggest the truth bias observed in the FTU unforced 
response condition was found for interrupted statements because they were more 
likely to forget false items than true items. 
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However, given that the structure of this task is not suitable for testing the 
Spinozan effect, because the effects can be better explained in terms of forgetting than 
in terms of automatic believing, coupled with the exploratory and post-hoc nature of 
this examination, this explanation can not yet be accepted. Nonetheless, it offers some 
promise for an adaptive decision-maker account. Future research should return to a 
simpler design where the forgetting of items is less likely, such as the design used in 
Experiments 5 and 7. 
 
Summary. A replication of Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1) was carried out in the 
FT forced choice condition. The Spinozan effect was replicated: there was a truth bias 
for those statements previously interrupted, but a reduced biased for uninterrupted 
statements. However, on further exploration it was seen that forgetting could account 
for these differences: participants were more likely claim they had not seen 
interrupted false statements compared to true statements. As such, the structure of this 
task is unsuitable to test whether raters are Spinozan or whether, as claimed here, they 
are adaptive decision-makers. 
It is possible that raters were not truly forgetting in the FT forced choice 
condition, but were using the not-seen response strategically to indicate their 
uncertainty. However, the lack of power did not permit an examination of this 
possibility. 
 It was surprising to note the unforced choice condition showed a biased pattern 
of responding when interrupted, counter to predictions. The pattern of uncertainty 
responses was unable to provide any insight into this bias. Whilst it was not possible 
to test the interaction between the response conditions and the true and false 
statements that were interrupted during learning, due to a lack of sufficient power, a 
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post-hoc t-test found raters overall, regardless of response condition, were more likely 
to forget false statements that were interrupted during learning than they were true 
statements that were previously interrupted. As such, the truth bias for interrupted 
items, regardless of FT or FTU response condition, may be seen to reflect a greater 
forgetting of false items than true items and thus result in an artefactual truth bias. 
 
 
General Discussion: Chapter 5 
 
The HAM dual-process account received little support in Chapter 4. Although it 
has been claimed that the time scale of minutes may be reflect a shift from heuristic to 
analytical processing (Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010), the timings 
may be too coarse to capture the two processes in operation. The Spinozan mind 
theory (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993) proposes a default-
interventionist model that operates during the act of comprehension. It claims that 
belief is a default state that is attributed to all incoming information: it is a necessary 
component of comprehension. It is only afterwards that a revision can take place. The 
account has had an impact across a range of research areas (Burge, 1993; Fitzsimons 
& Shiv, 2001; Hasson et al., 2005; Millar & Millar, 1997; Pennycook et al., 2012). 
An alternative account, an informed Cartesian account, can also explain these 
findings, if one allows for the possibility that contextual knowledge can be brought to 
bear on the decision. As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of studies have begun 
challenging the experimental data supporting the Spinozan view, showing how 
processing times for false statements may be an artefact of the meaningfulness of the 
true and false propositions used in prior research (Anderson et al., 2009; Fraundorf et 
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al., 2013; Glenberg et al., 1999; Hasson et al., 2005; Mayo et al., 2004). Here it is 
claimed that the Spinozan effect is actually an adaptive response to the unfortunate 
position of being forced into judgment before a decision has been reached. When 
pushed to respond in the absence of evidence, we can rely on prior knowledge. 
Experiment 5 showed how the act of forcing participants into making a judgment 
resulted in an early bias towards believing, whereas those not forced to make a 
judgment showed no such early bias. 
  205 
 
 
Chapter 6: Social Orientation Theory 
 
 
The truth bias extends across various domains of research, from findings in 
psycholinguistics showing a processing advantage for affirmed over negated 
sentences (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Clark & Clark, 1977; Mayo 
et al., 2004; Trabasso et al., 1971; Zwaan et al., 2002) to research in belief formation 
showing an increased tendency to believe information when it is coupled with related 
but uninformative additional details (Fenn, Newman, Pezdek & Garry, 2013; 
Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kanter & Lindsay, 2012). That the truth bias holds such 
range has led this thesis to begin from a bottom-up approach, examining first whether 
cues in the environment can account for the truth bias (Experiment 1) and from there 
to the cognitive processes underlying the judgment process (Experiments 2-8). 
Yet our subject has been one that at its base is a social task, one that requires 
inferences of others’ intent. The intent of this thesis is to explore decision-making 
processes in uncertain socially situated environments. This chapter takes an initial 
exploration of the social influences that guide the belief formation process. 
Although the truth bias places limits on accuracy rates, it may serve a useful and 
adaptive social purpose (DePaulo et al., 1996; Lewis, 1993; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag 
& Porter, 2010). Placing trust and our belief in others is important for maintaining 
relationships: holding a sceptic’s viewpoint and challenging each point that raises 
suspicion is soon to lead to difficulties (Bell & DePaulo, 1996; Clark & Lemay, 2010; 
Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013; Miller et al., 1986). 
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What is more, in actively seeking out the truth we may come to discover unpleasant 
facts: that the thoughtful birthday gift you sent was perhaps not as well received as 
you would have hoped it to be: sometimes we wish not to know the truth and do not 
seek it out, known as the Ostrich effect (DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992; Vrij, 
2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). 
For these reasons we may bring a degree of willing naïveté to the lie detection 
table. Avoiding the socially aggressive act of accusation and the potentially 
aggressive response to the challenge of their honesty may outweigh the benefits of 
discovering the truth. The accusatory reluctance account (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 
1979; Ekman, 1992; Miller et al., 1986; O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; 
Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010) makes just such a claim, and suggests the 
truth bias results from an unwillingness to challenge others because of the implicit 
social rules that govern interaction. 
In support of a role for social information in the truth bias, it has been shown 
people are less likely to give negative feedback to those with whom they are in close 
relationships with compared to more distant relational partners (DePaulo & Bell, 
1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Lemay & Clark, 2008; Uysal & Oner-Ozkan, 2007; 
see also Boon & McLeod, 2001), and when it is given it is often subtle (Clark & 
Lemay, 2010; Metts, 1989; Swann et al., 1992). As the relationship becomes closer 
and the length of the relationship increases, there is an increased tendency toward 
believing (Argyle & Henderson, 1984; McCornack & Levine, 1990; McCornack & 
Parks, 1986; Stiff et al., 1992; Stiff et al., 1989; van Swol et al., 2012; see also Boyes 
& Fletcher, 2007) and trusting them (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Voci, 2006). 
Whilst there is research consistent with an accusatory reluctance account, there 
has been as yet no direct empirical test of its fundamental claim: whether the truth 
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bias stems from the perception of another person as a social being, one that can feel 
aggressed upon and in turn be aggressive. Mere implied social presence, as is the case 
in videotaped statements used in most lie detection experiments, must be sufficient to 
invoke an accusatory reluctance if it is to explain the truth bias that is so often 
observed in response to videotaped interviews. 
This chapter opens with a consideration of the minimal conditions under which 
a truth bias may be expected, given a social context effect. Experiment 9 empirically 
tests the minimal conditions for an accusatory reluctance account of the truth bias. 
Because at its core the account requires that mere social presence is sufficient to 
invoke a truth bias, other accounts of the truth bias as a willing sacrifice of accuracy 
to conform to social rules and norms are implicitly tested. If the truth bias reflects 
socialisation practices, other social-based accounts must also meet these minimal 
conditions. This experiment finds that implied social presence is not a sufficient 
condition to invoke a truth bias, failing to support a social account. 
 
 
Experiment 9: Socialisation Practices 
 
This experiment seeks to address the question of whether mere implied social 
context is sufficient to invoke a truth bias. Because this study seeks out the minimal 
conditions, all other potentially relevant information in the behaviour that may also 
guide biased responding is removed. Participants were given stick-figure models built 
from body motion capture recordings with no verbal or paraverbal information 
presented. They were led to believe these recordings were either recordings of human 
speakers (social context condition) or computer-generated animations (non-social 
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context condition). A lack of bias was expected when they believed the speakers were 
actually computer animations, but that the truth bias would be observed under 
conditions of an implied social context, i.e. when the speakers were believed to be 
human. 
 
Method 
Materials. In order to test the influence of social presence, a new stimulus set 
had to be generated. Twelve speakers (7 female, age M = 29.58, SD = 8.85, range 20 
to 47 years) signed up to take part in an ‘eyewitness’ study supposedly exploring the 
links between eyewitness testimony and distracting clothing. Participants were 
sampled from a paid participant pool and were paid £5 for participation. In all studies 
reported participant signed informed consent and were given the option to withdraw 
retrospectively. Participants donned a sports top, baseball cap and loose fitting 
tracksuit bottoms, supposedly in order to remove any effects the style of clothing may 
have on our officers’ lie-truth judgments. The clothing had sewn into it reflective 
markers that allowed us to capture bodily motion. The sports top had 15 reflective 
markers sewn into it, the hat 5 markers and the tracksuit bottoms had no markers 
attached. In addition, one reflective marker was added to the back of each of the 
hands of the participant, resulting in a total of 22 reflective markers (see Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. A scene taken from a stimulus item presented to participants in 
Experiments 9 and 10. There was no audio accompanying these videos. 
 
 
Four stacks of three envelopes were offered to participants, supposedly to 
randomise which mock crime video they would see (in fact there was only one video). 
The first envelope told them they were about to watch a mock crime and were asked 
to remember as much as they could. The video presented two pieces of video footage 
recorded from a high angle with an imprint of the street address and time stamp (but 
in colour and presented at 30 frames per second) to imitate CCTV footage (Figure 
17). The two pieces of footage were presented side-by-side, as might be the case of 
security footage from two cameras viewing the same scene from different angles. 
 
  210 
 
 
Figure 17. Scene taken from the CCTV footage shown to participants who made up 
the stimulus set. 
 
 
The victim in the mock crime was seen to hug a girl before walking onto the 
street corner with a suitcase whilst talking on a mobile phone. The perpetrator was 
seen talking with another person. As the victim approached the street corner the 
perpetrator tried to steal the phone but failed. A fight broke out between the two, and 
the perpetrator threw the victim’s suitcase at the victim. The victim’s friend then 
returned and attempted to pull the perpetrator off the victim, but was pushed away, at 
which point she, the friend, left the scene. The perpetrator’s friend joined the fight and 
eventually they succeeded in stealing the phone. The victim never showed any 
aggression nor used violence. 
After watching the video, participants were given the second envelope from 
their freely chosen stack that told them they were the sole witness to this crime and 
that they should act as though the video footage did not exist. It further said they were 
to be interviewed by a Metropolitan police officer who had not seen the crime footage 
or the contents of the envelopes, and that he would be attempting to determine 
MOTION CUES TO REHEARSED AND SPONTANOUS DECEPTION 
 16 
 
  
 
  
  
  
Figure 2. Screen shots from the CCTV footage. 
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whether the participant was lying or telling the truth. The envelope either instructed 
them to lie and protect the perpetrator or to tell the truth and defend the victim. They 
were told if they were successful in persuading the police officer they were being 
honest they would receive an additional cash bonus at the end of the experiment. 
After three minutes of solitary preparation time, participants were introduced to 
and interviewed by the posing police officer. They answered six questions pertaining 
to the details of the crime (e.g. “what happened with the suitcase?”) and then were 
asked to give a full recall of the set of events from the moment the people entered the 
crime scene until everyone present had left. This was then repeated so that the third 
envelope encouraged lying or truth telling, depending on whether they had told the 
truth or lied in the previous interview, respectively. They were then introduced to and 
interviewed by a second posing officer, also male. 
At the end of the experiment all participants were informed of the true aim of 
the experiment and given the opportunity to withdraw retrospectively, of which none 
chose to do so. 
Body motion data was recorded during the interviews by six Vicon MX-F40 
cameras connected to a Vicon MX Giganet core unit via Gigabit Ethernet. Data was 
captured at 200 frames per second with a 4-megapixel resolution (2352H x 1728V) by 
Vicon Nexus software, capable of recording with an accuracy of 0.1mm. The body 
motion data was extracted offline resulting in a wire model shown in Figure 16. The 
first 30 s of each speaker’s deceptive and honest full recall statements was taken to 
provide a total of 24 statements (12 honest, 12 deceptive) of equal length, forming our 
video stimuli. These were split into two video sets consisting of 6 truthful and 6 
deceptive statements, such that participants who rated the stimulus set saw each 
speaker only once, viewing either that person’s lie or their truth. The body motion 
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capture did not collect audio information, thus the only information available to the 
raters was a video of the wire frame model. 
 
Participants. Ninety-one undergraduate students took part in a lie detection 
study either voluntarily for no reimbursement or as part of their course fulfilment. 
Two participants were removed because their response times were larger than three 
standard deviations from the mean, suggesting they were not paying attention to the 
task. This left 89 participants, 74 of which were female (age M = 19.51, SD = 1.31, 
range 18 to 24 years).  
 
Procedure. After signing consent, an instruction screen informed participants 
they were to view videos of wire frame models. In the human belief condition, 
participants were led to believe the wire frames were captured from people 
undergoing an interview, as was indeed true. In the simulation belief condition, 
participants were led to believe the wire frames were computer generated and thus 
were not videos of real people. Specifically, participants in the human belief condition 
were told, ‘The clips you will watch in a moment are movements of people giving 
true and false testimony’, whilst those in the simulation belief condition were told, 
‘This study aims to test a developed simulation model. The clips you will watch in a 
moment are generated by a computer that imitates the movements of people giving 
true and false testimony.’ They were further told videos were sampled randomly and 
so they could see more lies than truths, more truths than lies or an equal split. They 
would need to judge whether the video was thought to be (a simulation of) a lie or (a 
simulation of) a truth. 
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After two practices, the instructions were presented again on screen before the 
12 experimental trials began. One of the two video sets was selected randomly and 
presented in a randomised order. 
 
Design. Raters were assigned randomly to either the human belief condition (n 
= 42) or the simulation belief condition (n = 47). The veracity of the speaker’s 
statement (lying or telling the truth, within subjects) and the belief condition (human 
or simulation belief, between subjects) served as the independent variables, and the 
PTJ, accuracy scores, and signal detection measures served as the dependent 
variables. 
 
Results 
The accusatory reluctance account would predict a higher proportion of ‘truth’ 
judgments when participants believed they were rating real people than when they 
thought they were rating computer simulations. We did not find support for this 
account. A Bayes factor indicated the data shift the relative plausibility of the model 
that included the experimental manipulation towards the model that did not, providing 
evidence in favour of the null effect of the human belief manipulation. 
A 2 (veracity: lie, truth, within subjects) x 2 (belief condition: human, 
simulation, between subjects) mixed ANOVA was conducted first on the PTJ. A PTJ 
above 0.50 indicates a bias towards judging videos as truths. The human belief 
condition appeared to show little bias when rating lies (M = .52, SD = .19) or truths 
(M = .51, SD = .23). The simulation belief condition showed some tendency towards a 
truth bias when watching lies (M = .55, SD = .19) and less so when watching truthful 
statements (M = .52, SD = .23), with the means appearing to show little difference 
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between the human and simulation belief conditions. Indeed, and contrary to the 
predictions of the accusatory reluctance account, the ANOVA confirmed there was no 
statistically significant effect of belief condition, F (1, 87) = 0.68, p = .413, η2 = 0.01, 
nor any interaction with veracity, F (1, 87) = 0.08, p = .778, η2 < 0.01. In addition, 
there was no main effect of veracity, F (1, 87) = 0.39, p = .537, η2 < 0.01. 
 
 
Figure 18. (a) Signal detection measure of accuracy (left) and (b) response bias (right) 
when the speakers were portrayed as either computer generated or human speakers. 
Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
The same ANOVA conducted on accuracy scores found no main effect of 
veracity, F (1, 87) = 3.25, p = .075, η2 = 0.04, belief condition, F (1, 87) = 0.01, p = 
.778, η2 < 0.01, or Veracity x Belief Condition interaction, F (1, 87) = 0.68, p = .413, 
η2 = 0.01. 
To explore the independent effects of accuracy and response bias, signal 
detection measures of A’ and B”D were calculated. An independent samples t-tests 
compared the human and simulation belief conditions on their A’ (M = .49 and .48, 
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SD = .26 and .20, respectively) and B”D scores (M = .04 and .01, SD = .59 and .47, 
respectively). Both A’, t (87) = -0.19, p = .854, d = 0.04, and B”D scores, t (87) = -
0.26, p = .794, d = 0.06, did not show a statistically significant difference between the 
human and simulation belief conditions. 
It was also considered whether raters exhibited accuracy above chance as well 
as a significant response bias in each condition independently. The accusatory 
reluctance claim as outlined here would predict no response bias observed in response 
to the (believed) computer-simulated movements but would exhibit a truth bias in 
response to the wire frames when they were believed to be portraying humans. 
However, neither the human condition, t (41) = 0.47, p = .639, d = 0.07, nor the 
simulation belief condition, t (46) = 0.20, p = .841, d = 0.02, showed a statistically 
significant response bias. In addition, both the human and simulation belief groups 
showed accuracy rates not significantly different from chance, t (41) = -0.27, p = .787, 
d = -0.04, and t (46) = -0.69, p = .496, d = -0.10, respectively. 
A Bayes factor was calculated to gain more information about the null effect 
found above. A Cauchy prior distribution with r = 0.5 was specified on the effect size, 
where r is a scaling parameter (Jeffreys, 1961; Zellner & Siow, 1980). A complex 
model entered the belief condition and the veracity of the speaker as fixed effects, 
with the PTJ acting as the outcome variable. Fully specified random effects were 
included for rating participants and for speakers. This complex model was compared 
to a simpler model with the belief condition main effect removed. A Bayes factor 
indicated that in order to prefer the more complex model, we would need prior odds 
favouring it of greater than 12. This was taken as strong support for the null 
hypothesis of no predictive effect of belief condition. 
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Discussion 
Calling someone a liar is an aggressive social act. A reluctance to break with 
social rules and accuse others of lying (O'Sullivan, 2003; see also DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1979) may account for the fact that we tend to believe what others are 
saying more often than their actual rate of honesty warrants (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
No truth bias was observed when the social elements of the stimuli were removed, 
consistent with the accusatory reluctance account. There are many differences 
between the wire frame stimuli in our simulation belief condition that found no truth 
bias and the full audio-visual recordings used in prior studies that show a truth bias 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Zuckerman et al., 1979; Zuckerman, Kernis, Driver & 
Koestner, 1984). For instance, information about emotion and cognitive load may be 
observable in the face, and verbal cues may lend more credence to the speaker’s tale. 
By itself this finding is consistent with the accusatory reluctance position, but it could 
also be accounted for by the relative paucity of information in the stimuli compared to 
typical lie detection tasks. Thus to test the accusatory reluctance account it is 
necessary to compare ratings of the same stimuli when raters believe they are social 
compared with non-social beings. It is claimed the social rules and practices 
governing interpersonal relationships cause the truth bias, and as such merely 
perceiving the stimuli as social beings should be sufficient to invoke a truth bias. 
However, no support was found for this claim: raters were equally unbiased when 
they believed the stimuli were humans as when they believed the stimuli were 
computer generated simulations. Also, raters who believed they were rating computer 
animations did not show greater accuracy rates, contrary to what may have been 
predicted (O'Sullivan, 2003). 
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This result was surprising; in prior research reducing the psychological distance 
between the rater and the speaker appears to influence the degree of truth bias such 
that those perceived closer benefit from an exaggerated truth bias whilst those who 
are being judged for their criminal intent suffer at the hands of a lie or investigator 
bias (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Stiff et al., 1989). Also, 
people report feeling more uncomfortable when lying to those to whom they feel 
closer (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). 
If the truth bias is not based in our understanding of the social world, it seems 
surprising that changes in the social relations between people influences the degree of 
truth bias. One possibility is that the use of social information is used in a more 
cognitive fashion, as another piece of evidence that contributes to the decision making 
process. We may not be adapting our behaviour to match the social expectations of 
our interacting partners and willingly sacrificing accurate decision-making. Instead, 
the information about how psychologically close others are to us can be taken as a cue 
to how much we ought trust others, for example (see O'Sullivan, 2003; Stiff et al., 
1992; Wickham, 2013). Experiment 10 takes an initial step towards testing this claim. 
 
 
Experiment 10: Social Relatedness as a Heuristic 
 
To show social contextual information can be used in the decision-making 
process, it is important to account for other factors that tend to covary with 
relatedness. For instance, those who are close with one another are likely to share 
similar preferences (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Diehl, 1989; Tajfel et al., 1971) and an 
understanding of social rules built between them (Vrij, 2008). The minimal group 
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paradigm allows for a separation between perceived relatedness and these other 
factors that, in prior research on lie detection, have been confounded (e.g., 
McCornack & Levine, 1990; McCornack & Parks, 1986). 
The minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971) randomly 
assigns participants into arbitrary groups that have no meaningful relationship with 
the task set them. Because assignment to groups is random, the only link between 
participants within a given group and the only difference between the ingroup and the 
outgroup is that they have been randomly grouped. 
The current experiment makes use of a classic paradigm in this area Tajfel et al. 
(1971, Study 2). Participants were supposedly grouped based on their preference for 
one of two artists, but were actually assigned randomly to one or other group. Studies 
such as this one show that despite there being no cost to rewarding both ingroup and 
outgroup members equally, ingroup members are favoured (see also Brewer & Silver, 
1978). The same effect is found even when participants were aware they were 
randomly grouped (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). 
Intergroup biases reliably surface using the minimal social grouping paradigm, 
which continues to be a practical research tool decades after its conception (e.g., Chen 
& Li, 2009; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Postmes, Spears & Lea, 2002; Richardson 
et al., 2012; Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart & Butemeyer, 1998). In three reviews of 
intergroup biases in minimal social groups, Brewer (1979, 1999) and Otten and 
Mummendey (2000) concluded there was an asymmetry between ingroup preference 
and outgroup derogation. Group members more often favour the ingroup rather than 
discriminate against the outgroup. 
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In line with these reviews, a truth bias was predicted to be found when rating 
ingroup members, but not when rating outgroup members, who could potentially 
succumb to derogation and thus a lie bias. 
The weaker version of the accusatory reluctance account was also tested, as per 
Experiment 9, using accuracy rates. In line with the accusatory reluctance account and 
the findings of O’Sullivan (2003), lower accuracy was expected when rating those 
who are psychologically closer to the rater because the reluctance to publicly make 
(accurate) lie judgments should be increased. This is considered a weaker test of the 
account because increased accuracy is mediated via a reduced truth bias. A direct 
examination of the truth bias allows for a stronger test of the account. 
 
Methods 
Materials. Twelve digital reproductions of abstract paintings by the artists 
Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky that were judged by the experimenter to be not too 
dissimilar from each other were used for collecting participants’ art preferences. The 
wire frame video stimulus set from Experiment 9 was used here also. 
 
Participants. Sixty undergraduate students participated in part fulfilment of 
their studies, 46 of which were female (age M = 20.02, SD = 2.90, range 18 to 40 
years). 
 
Procedure. Participants were first told they would see a range of artwork 
produced by modern artists, and that they should select the piece they most preferred. 
They were told to go with what they felt instinctively was the correct choice. After 
reading this instruction, a pair of images was shown side-by-side and the participant 
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clicked on the image they preferred. After 12 such trials, the computer randomly 
determined whether they were in the stars or moons group supposedly based on their 
preferences. The text ‘You are in the stars/moons group’ was displayed for 3 s above 
an image of either a red star or a blue moon, accompanied with a purple circle in the 
background. 
The rating instructions were then presented, this time with their group icon 
placed in the top-left corner of the instruction screen. Participants in all groups saw 
the same instruction as given to the human belief condition in Experiment 9. They 
were additionally told the speakers in the stimulus set had completed the same art 
preference-rating task and had also been assigned to a group in the same manner the 
participant had just been assigned. 
Prior to trial onset, participants were shown two icons on screen: their own 
group icon on the left, and the group icon of the speaker they were about to view on 
the right. Below this read ‘You are in the Stars/Moons group. The next person is in 
the Stars/Moons group.’ Above the left icon the word ‘You’ was displayed, and above 
the right icon the words ‘Next Person’ were displayed. This remained on screen for 3 
s before the trial began. Otherwise a trial proceeded as in Experiment 9, with a lie-
truth rating collected at the end of each video. After two practice trials, the 
instructions were presented again and the remaining 12 experimental trials followed. 
 
Design. Participants were assigned to the ‘moons’ (n = 31) or the ‘stars’ (n = 
29) group at random. The grouping is unimportant for this study; what is important is 
whether the speaker was depicted as an ingroup member, i.e. as also a member of the 
moons/stars group, or as an outgroup member. Group membership (ingroup, 
outgroup) was a within-subjects independent variable. Six of the statements (three 
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honest, three deceptive) were randomly presented as ingroup members whilst the 
remaining six statements (three honest, three deceptive) were presented as outgroup 
members. The dependent variables were the PTJ, accuracy, and the A’ and B”D 
scores. 
 
Results 
In accord with the hypothesis, an ingroup preference was observed. Ratings of 
ingroup members were truth-biased whilst ratings of outgroup members were not 
significantly biased. There were no significant differences in accuracy when rating in 
and outgroup members, but ingroup members were detected at above chance rates. 
A 2 (veracity: lie, truth) x 2 (intergroup relationship: ingroup, outgroup) within-
subjects ANOVA was conducted on the PTJ. A marginally significant main effect of 
veracity was found, F (1, 59) = 3.60, p = .063, η2 = 0.06. Ratings of truthful 
statements were more often rated as truths (M = .58, SD = .21) than were deceptive 
statements (M = .49, SD = .26). There was also a marginally significant main effect of 
intergroup relationship, F (1, 50) = 3.68, p = .060, η2 = 0.06. Speakers in the same 
group as the rater received a higher PTJ (M = .57, SD = .19) than speakers in the 
outgroup (M = .51, SD = .21). 
The same ANOVA conducted on the accuracy scores found a marginally 
significant main effect for veracity, F (1, 59) = 2.80, p = .056, n = 0.06. Truthful 
behaviours (M = .58, SD = .21) were more accurately judged than deceptive 
behaviours (M = .51, SD = .21). There was also a marginally significant interaction 
between intergroup relationship and veracity, F (1, 59) = 3.68, p = .060, n = 0.06. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests found ingroup truths (M = .64, SD = .32) were 
detected more accurately than lies (M = .50, SD = .32), t (59) = -2.90, p = .006, d = 
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0.44, whilst accuracy in detecting outgroup members was not significantly different 
when judging truths (M = .52, SD = .33) or lies (M = .53, SD = .26), t (59) = -0.03, p = 
.819, d < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. (a) Signal detection measures of accuracy (left), and (b) response bias 
when the speakers were portrayed as either ingroup or outgroup members (right). 
Whiskers denote standard error. 
 
 
A paired samples t-tests on the B”D response bias scores showed a significant 
effect, t (59) = -2.01, p = .049, d = -0.36. Raters were truth biased when judging 
ingroup members (M = -0.23, SD = 0.68) whilst, if anything, somewhat more inclined 
to be lie biased when rating outgroup members (M = 0.03, SD = 0.77). One-sample t-
tests confirmed ratings of ingroup members were significantly truth biased, t (59) = -
2.64, p = .011, d = -0.34, but were not significantly biased when rating outgroup 
members, t (59) = 0.33, p = .744, d = 0.04. 
The A’ accuracy scores when rating ingroup (M = .59, SD = .31) and outgroup 
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A’ and B”D for Dissim Soc
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
A’
Grouping condition
-0.50
-0.25
0
0.25
0.50
B”
D
Grouping condition
Ingroup Outgroup
  223 
0.20. In addition to being truth biased, raters achieved above chance accuracy when 
rating ingroup members, t (59) = 2.18, p = .033, d = 0.29, but were no more accurate 
than chance when rating outgroup members, t (59) = 0.77, p = .445, d = 0.10. 
 
Discussion 
The most minimal form of group membership leads to greater trusting of 
ingroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Voci, 2006). More realistic but still 
random and arbitrary groupings can even lead to threats of violence with long-term 
consequences for the interactions of individuals (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & 
Sherif, 1954/1961). It was anticipated raters would consider ingroup members to be 
more likely to tell the truth compared to outgroup members. The findings supported 
the prediction. Further analysis showed ratings of ingroup members were truth biased, 
whilst ratings of outgroup members showed no statistically significant bias in their 
judgments. That is, there were ingroup benefits (from the speakers’ perspective) 
insofar as there was a truth bias but not outgroup derogation, consistent with previous 
intergroup relations research (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). 
No significant difference in accuracy was observed when rating ingroup versus 
outgroup members. However, and in direct contrast to an accusatory reluctance 
account, whilst accuracy in judging outgroup members was at chance rate, accuracy in 
judging ingroup members exceeded chance. It is important to note the analyses 
conducted on the accuracy and the PTJ scores confound bias with accuracy. It is not 
clear whether accuracy in judging ingroup members’ truths was greater than in 
judging their lies because they were more biased towards saying truth or because they 
more readily noticed cues to honesty. Although signal detection measures can 
separate out the effects of bias and accuracy, they do not, by necessity, allow for a 
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distinction in the accuracy in judging truthful and deceptive behaviours. As such, is it 
not possible to conclude raters were necessarily more accurate in judging truthful than 
deceptive ingroup behaviours as exhibited in the raw accuracy scores because this 
difference may be accounted for by differences in bias. Nonetheless, it is interesting 
that ingroup members’ behaviours were overall accurately judged above chance rates 
whilst outgroup members’ behaviours were not. Recall an accusatory reluctance 
account suggests outgroup members should be more accurately judged than ingroup 
members because of the reduced reliance on biased judgments that maintain harmony. 
One possible explanation of this effect stems from social identity theory (Tajfel, 
1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Self-identity is tied up in group belonging. Individuals 
may form their self-image based around characteristics of their group (Otten & 
Epstude, 2006; Smith & Henry, 1996), which may account for the preferential 
treatment ingroup members are given (Allport, 1954; Brown, 2000; Grant & Brown, 
1995). There may be a greater motivation to detect ingroup members’ truthful 
behaviours in order to reaffirm the moral constitution of the group and, by extension, 
of the self. Overall accuracy rates may be driven by accuracy in detecting truths more 
than lies, in line with prior research (Levine et al., 1999). An alternative cognitive 
account rests on findings that show information provided by ingroup members is 
processed more deeply, better remembered, and remembered in greater detail than 
information provided by outgroup members (Sporer, 2001; van Bavel, Packer & 
Cunningham, 2008). Additional processing effort may account for the above-chance 
accuracy rates when judging ingroup members. 
There are limitations in interpreting the accuracy findings. Consideration should 
be given to the lack of a statistically significant difference in the current experiment 
between the accuracy in judging ingroup compared to outgroup members. Further 
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empirical exploration should be carried out to replicate the accuracy findings reported 
here with consideration giving to these self-identity and cognitive accounts. 
There are further limitations to interpreting the current findings. The artificiality 
of the current task (see Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980), using body motion capture 
recordings, was used in order to closely replicate the setup of Experiment 9, an 
experiment that required minimal information available to the rater. In addition, the 
minimal context served to reduce other factors that are confounded with relatedness, 
such as familiarity with the speaker. However, it should be noted that ingroup biases 
have a greater magnitude in more consequential group relations (Mullen, Brown & 
Smith, 1992; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 
2006). Under more realistic settings stronger ingroup preferences may be expected. 
Nonetheless, this speculation remains to be tested. 
It is also unclear whether the raters used the ingroup-outgroup information as a 
simple heuristic or whether raters felt closer to those with whom they were paired. In 
the latter case, participants may have made inferences beyond the presented 
information. For example, in two diary studies, DePaulo and Kashy (1998) found 
people told fewer lies to people they felt close to than to strangers and acquaintances, 
although it is worth noting that 92% of respondents in one study admitted lying to an 
intimate partner (Cole, 2001) and in another study people lied in nearly one in 10 
interactions with an intimate partner (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Because the 
participants and the speakers had supposedly been grouped on their preferences, raters 
may have felt closer to the individuals and believed they were less likely to lie. 
Whilst this proves to be a serious drawback for the current study, it is important 
to consider that the effects of the minimal group paradigm have been shown to hold 
even when raters know they have been randomly assigned to groups (Billig & Tajfel, 
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1973). Unfortunately, members of our ingroup are ascribed qualities that we perceive 
as true of ourselves (Otten & Epstude, 2006; Smith & Henry, 1996), regardless of the 
initial dimensions on which grouping took place (Allport, 1954; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; 
Tajfel et al., 1971). Thus merely being aware of the random grouping factor may not 
be sufficient to avoid this potential confound. 
Although these drawbacks place limitations on what can be drawn from this 
study, this is the first attempt to empirically assess how the degree of relatedness 
influences decision making independent of other potentially confounding factors such 
as greater experience with those who we are closer to. Whether beliefs about social 
relatedness lead to an attribution of a range of positive characteristics we attribute to 
ourselves or whether it is used as a more simplified social heuristic (‘people like me 
tell the truth’) remains to be seen. However, it is clear that social relatedness does 
influence the degree to which we believe others, independent of familiarity with the 
speaker, prior experiences with that individual, and so on. 
 
 
General Discussion: Chapter 6 
 
According to the accusatory reluctance account (O'Sullivan, 2003; see also 
DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979), labelling another person a liar is a socially aggressive 
act that can have negative, potentially aggressive repercussions. Thus rather than 
challenge the implied social rules, a willing naïveté may be preferable (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Ekman, 1992; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). After all, a relentless 
distrust in others is liable to damage our relationships with them (Clark & Lemay, 
2010; Miller et al., 1986). Fundamental to the accusatory reluctance account is the 
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tendency to believe others ‘merely’ because they are social agents, and as such binds 
raters to the social rules of politeness in judging others. Whilst this account is cited as 
one potential explanation of the truth bias, it has never been directly tested. 
Experiment 9 represents the first examination. By manipulating whether the 
behaviours presented were believed to be of another (human) social agent or of a 
computer-generated animation, it was possible to test whether the implied social 
contract between rater and speaker was sufficient to result in a truth bias. No support 
was found for this account: there was similarly unbiased responding when the 
behaviour depicted was believed to be either human or computer generated. In two 
experiments there was no evidence for the position that accuracy increases when 
speakers are seen as more psychologically distant from oneself, as has been 
previously suggested (O'Sullivan, 2003). 
That raters report being uncomfortable when viewing deceptive behaviour 
(Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 1997; Toris & DePaulo, 1985) was considered 
as suggestive evidence in favour of the accusatory reluctance account. Discomfort 
may be associated with the consideration of violating the implied trust social contract 
of trust and aggressively challenging the speaker. This discomfort, the present 
findings would suggest, is not caused by an apprehension. One alternative is that the 
sorts of behaviours liars display cause raters to feel uncomfortable; perhaps raters are 
empathising with the discomfort liars may be experiencing. Whatever the explanation, 
it is concluded only that accusatory reluctance appears not to account for the truth bias 
and so discomfort may be caused by other factors. 
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Making Use of Social Information 
On the face of it, Experiment 9 appears to contradict previous findings. 
Consider that the greater the length of an intimate relationship, the greater the 
tendency to believe the speaker (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Stiff et al., 1989; see 
also Boyes & Fletcher, 2007). Similarly, the psychologically more distant relationship 
between a police investigator and an interviewee exhibits a complimentary bias 
towards disbelieving the speaker (Kassin et al., 2005; Masip et al., 2005; Meissner & 
Kassin, 2002). That social presence is not sufficient to cause a truth bias led to the 
consideration that information about the nature of the relationship may be used to 
guide the decision. 
Again, utilising a minimal social context, Experiment 10 manipulated the 
perception of the relationship between rater and speaker independent of other 
potentials cues, such that raters believed they were making intragroup (ingroup) or 
intergroup (outgroup) judgments. Previous research has shown greater trust is placed 
in ingroup compared with outgroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Voci, 
2006). We found when rating outgroup behaviour there was no bias towards either 
believing or disbelieving the speaker, similar to ratings made of perceived computer-
generated and human-generated behaviours in Experiment 9. In line with previous 
research on intergroup perception (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Otten & Mummendey, 2000), 
even under the most minimal of social contexts there was an observable truth bias 
when judging ingroup members. That is, ingroup speakers were judged preferentially 
with no outgroup derogation. 
Early findings stemming from the minimal group paradigm led to the formation 
of social identity theory (Diehl, 1990). Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) proposes one’s identity is defined by the characteristics that form the 
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basis of one’s ingroup. As such, members of the ingroup are ascribed qualities that 
individuals perceive as true of themselves (Otten & Epstude, 2006; Smith & Henry, 
1996), regardless of the initial dimensions on which grouping took place (Allport, 
1954; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971). By exhibiting belief in ingroup 
members, raters may also be reaffirming their own identity as an honest person 
(Allport, 1954; Brown, 2000; Grant & Brown, 1995). Extending what is known about 
the self, a vast array of characteristics, to others based on relatively sparse information 
(grouping information alone) may typically prove to be an effective policy. However, 
what is not clear from these initial studies is whether people are using such a social 
heuristic (Fan et al., 1995; Fiedler & Walka, 1993; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; 
Zuckerman, Koestner, et al., 1984) or whether there are more complex processes of 
representing others in a functionally equivalent way to the ways in which we 
represent ourselves (see Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006; Sebanz, Knoblich & 
Prinz, 2003), and ascribing properties of ourselves to others (Otten & Epstude, 2006; 
Smith & Henry, 1996). 
Consistent with a heuristic account (but importantly not inconsistent with a 
social attribution account), the truth bias is an objectively valid belief in the world 
outside of the controlled laboratory. Relational partners lie on average approximately 
two to three times per week (Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013). Diary studies suggest lying 
behaviour in everyday life is more frequent than this, occurring twice per day 
(DePaulo et al., 1996). One study found people lie less often to those who they felt 
closer (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Thus the base rates of lying behaviour outside of the 
laboratory may differ between those we consider psychologically closer to us and 
those we consider more distant. An ingroup bias may be adaptive where the base rates 
of honesty are naturally more frequent when interacting with ingroup rather than 
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outgroup members. Thus expectations about others may be influencing the direction 
of judgment about others (see for example Allport, 1954; Asch, 1946; Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Snyder & Swann, 
1978). Future research will need to determine what sorts of information is being 
inferred from mere grouping and how that comes to guide our lie-truth judgments.  
One possible criticism that could be levied against the current studies is that 
individuals may anticipate reciprocity from ingroup members in future interactions, or 
perhaps fear outgroup discrimination of the ingroup (Moy & Ng, 2006): thus it was 
not mere relatedness that drove the findings but rather expectations about future 
interactions (Diehl, 1990; Tajfel et al., 1971). Whilst this may explain the presented 
findings, that the speakers in the videos were unidentifiable and that there was no 
obvious way in which the recorded speakers could reciprocate towards the participant 
or discriminate against ingroup members limits the utility of this explanation, 
although it cannot be ruled out.  
Consider also raters believed they were grouped based on their artistic 
preference. They may have perceived similarities with ingroup members and 
dissimilarities with outgroup members based on artistic preferences and treated them 
differently on this basis (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Diehl, 1990). Note however prior 
studies have shown when the grouping procedure is random and that individuals are 
aware of the random arbitrary nature of the grouping, ingroup preferences remain 
(Billig & Tajfel, 1973). Thus it appears mere grouping is sufficient for an ingroup bias 
even when it is evident to participants that there is no basis for assuming similarity 
between ingroup members. 
The bias toward believing ingroup members may be thought problematic for the 
group. Individuals sometimes choose to act in the interest of the self but to the 
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detriment of their group by selfishly using up resources (Hardin, 1968). At the same 
time, they wish to remain part of the group whether for social or economic reasons. 
Free riders could exploit the truth bias of their ingroup peers without fear of group 
exclusion. The findings presented suggest raters can somewhat accurately classify 
behaviours of ingroup members, as indicated by the signal detection measures shown 
in Experiment 10. This suggests whilst individuals give their peers the benefit of the 
doubt, they are not naïve to the possibility of deception. This interplay between truth 
bias and classification accuracy might allow groups to strike a balance between 
maintaining social cohesion and reducing the risks of ingroup exploitation. 
In conclusion, this chapter began asking how social information is used in the 
decision making process. Experiment 9 set out to test whether the socialisation 
practices we engage in mean we are more likely to judge others as truth-tellers, a 
claim that runs through the Ostrich effect (Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010) 
and the accusatory reluctance account (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ekman, 1992; 
Miller et al., 1986; O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, 
Granhag & Porter, 2010). The findings suggest mere implied social presence is not 
sufficient to bring about a willing sacrifice of accuracy in favour of giving people 
benefit of the doubt. However, Experiment 10 shows that whilst mere presence is not 
sufficient, the nature of the relationship can mediate the presence or absence of the 
truth bias, independent of demeanour cues, speech cues, and so on. To what degree 
the ingroup truth bias is dependent on intragroup cohesive motivations, real-world 
base rates of honesty or social heuristics is yet to be elucidated, but these studies offer 
the initial steps towards exploring these accounts. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion: Dual Process Theories 
 
 
How do we make decisions in socially situated environments when there is little 
diagnostic information available to us? From research on language comprehension 
(Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Clark & Clark, 1977; Gilbert, 1991; 
Mayo et al., 2004; Trabasso et al., 1971; Zwaan et al., 2002) to judgment and decision 
making (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes & Cohen, 2006; Bröder, 2003; Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Fox, 1957; Gilovich et al., 2002; Hall, 2002; Newman et al., 2012; Plott 
& Smith, 2008; Richter et al., 2009), it has been shown we make systematic decisions 
despite ambiguity in the environment. In a variety of research areas there is a bias 
towards accepting information to be true, known variously as the truthiness effect 
(Newman et al., 2012), the truthfulness bias (Zuckerman et al., 1979), the truthfulness 
heuristic (Burgoon, Blair & Strom, 2008), the truth effect (Koch & Forgas, 2012), and 
the truth bias (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This thesis set out to explore the cognitive 
processes involved in decision-making in naturalistic uncertain environments.  
Lie detection is an inherently social task, and one we have both an extensive 
history with (see DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; Park, Levine, 
McCornack, Morrison & Ferrara, 2002) and a wide range of beliefs about (see 
Hartwig & Bond, 2011; The Global Deception Team, 2006; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag 
& Porter, 2010). And yet despite our prior knowledge and beliefs we make for poor 
lie detectors (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Kraut, 1980), at least in part because as liars we 
give off very few behavioural indicators of deceit, if any (Levine, 2010; Vrij, 2008; 
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Vrij, Granhag & Mann, 2010; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). For these reasons, lie 
detection offers a unique environment where raters bring with them prior knowledge 
and experience of the situation, along with an understanding of the social rules 
surrounding it, but nonetheless is a decision where uncertainty reigns. The mix of a 
complex set of information sources coupled with high uncertainty provides a 
relatively naturalistic environment in which to study decision-making under 
uncertainty. The core contribution of this thesis has been to explore precisely this. 
In addition, lie detection research has rarely attempted to understand how the 
decision is formed and why raters so often go wrong (Miller & Stiff, 1993; Reinhard 
& Sporer, 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2012). From this perspective, my thesis has 
contributed to the lie detection literature by showing how the current albeit limited 
view in favour of HAMs (Gilbert, 1991; Hawkins, Hoch & Meyers Levy, 2001; 
Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010; Reinhard & 
Sporer, 2008, 2010; Ulatowska, 2013; c.f. Roggeveen & Johar, 2002) is not 
warranted. I have introduced into this area of research a theoretical perspective 
borrowed from cognitive psychology: the adaptive decision-maker account (Payne et 
al., 1993; Simon, 1990). I believe this new perspective offers promise for future 
research into lie detection. From my research it appears raters make use of small 
amounts of readily available information in the environment; where such information 
is lacking, raters can draw on their prior knowledge of the world and of similar 
situations. 
As well as these meta-theoretical contributions to decision-making and lie-
detection research, my thesis offers four novel contributions to our understanding of 
socially situated decision-making under uncertainty. First, perhaps most importantly, I 
have shown that there is a cognitive component to the truth bias independent of the 
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behaviour being rated, an assumption that has been made in prior research but not 
formally tested. In Experiment 1 I showed the initial truth bias and the subsequent 
decline in biased responding results at least in part from the rater independently of the 
behaviours of the speaker. 
Second, in contrast to the current direction process-oriented lie detection is 
taking, I show a dual process model is not an adequate explanation of the phenomena. 
It failed to meet any of a set of challenges that I issued against them (Experiments 1, 
2, 3 and 5). No support was found for the role of heuristic processing, but the use of 
heuristic rules of thumb built up from prior experience appear to be key to 
understanding how decision makers form their beliefs under uncertainty.  
Third, the truth bias is characterised not as a flaw in an otherwise able decision-
making system (Gilbert, 1991), but rather as a useful means of making informed 
decisions under uncertainty. I take an adaptive decision-maker position (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999; Payne et al., 1993; Simon, 1990), claiming the truth bias is situation-
specific and arises from an interaction between information available in the 
environment and that which we bring to the task. This is considered in detail in 
Chapter 8. 
Finally, although the starting point of this thesis was to determine the cause of 
the truth bias, I conclude that the truth bias has no simple, single cause, but rather is 
an emergent property of the interaction between mind and world. That is to say that 
the truth bias is an outcome of this interaction, and that modifying either component 
can lead to a lie bias or no bias, demonstrating flexibility to the demands of the task 
and one’s prior knowledge. 
In this chapter I will summarise my research. First, a brief recount of the 
narrative will be given in the Summary of Research section. I will then discuss in 
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more detail how my research contributes to our understanding of the truth bias. I will 
argue for a cognitive contribution to the truth bias that the rater brings to the task, 
independent of the behaviours being rated. Although there is a cognitive element to 
the truth bias, I will discuss how my research shows the HAM is not the causal factor. 
 
 
Summary of Research 
 
Rather than beginning from the assumption that the truth bias is a cognitive 
phenomenon, Experiment 1 (The Behavioural Account) asked whether the tendency 
towards believing others could be considered a bias or whether it was an accurate 
judgment of the apparently honest behaviours that truth-tellers exhibit and that liars 
attempt to display. It used the established phenomenon of the truth bias declining 
across successive ratings (Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009). It was 
shown that, independent of the behaviour being judged, there was an effect of the 
decision-making process that the rater brought to the task independent of the 
behaviours being rated. That is, regardless of the viewing order of behaviours, the 
reduced truth bias was observed across each new rating. 
Experiment 1 was also tested the heuristic-analytic model (HAM), a dual-
process theory that proposes a quick but error-prone heuristic processing route and a 
second more effortful but more deliberative analytical process (see Chapter 2 for a 
fuller description). While I have replicated the declining truth bias phenomenon 
across successive ratings, little support was gained for any of the class of HAMs 
identified by Evans (2007). The amount of viewing time was not able to predict the 
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declining truth judgments, whereas the number of decisions made was (Experiments 
1-3), in contrast to both default-interventionist and parallel-competition models. 
Experiment 2 (Channel Effects) more directly examined the predictions of the 
pre-emptive competition model. This model predicts that the type of processing is 
either chosen early on due to particular preferences or is determined by the nature of 
the information available: behaviour requiring greater attention and deliberative 
interpretation such as speech cues require analytical processing (Chaiken, 1980; 
Evans, 2007; Evans et al., 1993; Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; 
Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, Study 2; Stiff et al., 1989), whilst more stereotyped 
behaviours typical of visual behaviours (Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Reinhard & 
Sporer, 2008, Study 3; Stiff et al., 1989) are thought to be processed heuristically. 
However, the findings of Experiment 2 did not support this model, showing that 
regardless of the types of information available there was a decline in the PTJ. 
Experiment 4 (The Consistency Heuristic) explored an alternative account of 
the decline. That the number of judgments made could predict the decline in the PTJ 
but that viewing time could not led to the consideration that raters could be making 
relatively simple consistency judgments between the responses presented. The 
findings supported this prediction: across the data collected in Experiments 1 (The 
Behavioural Account) and 3 (Thin-Slicing) as well as in previous research carried out 
by Masip et al. (2009), consistency was a reliable predictor of the decline in the PTJ, 
and indeed turned out to have diagnostic validity. Thus raters successfully made use 
of a relatively simple but informative cue. However, although raters made use of 
consistency, shown to be diagnostic, accuracy did not improve over time, possibly 
suggesting the integration of other cues in the decision-making process. Chapter 4 
concluded that a dual-process theory was not supported by the data and suggested 
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instead that in an uncertain world we may make use of few but reliable pieces of 
information as they become available. 
The data so far do not entirely dismiss HAMs: the switch from heuristic to 
analytical processing may occur at a finer time scale than had been examined in my 
research to this point. Experiments 5-8 set out to test a prominent theory that has had 
an impact across a range of different research areas: the Spinozan mind hypothesis 
(Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). It claims in order to be able 
to comprehend it is necessary to first accept the information as though it were true, at 
least in the first instance. Afterwards the rater can decide whether or not to continue 
believing the information, making this a dual process theory (Gilbert, 1991). This 
account of the truth bias assumes raters fail to update adequately from the initial 
automatic belief, which acts as an anchor (see Elaad, 2003; Fan et al., 1995; 
Zuckerman et al., 1987; Zuckerman, Koestner, et al., 1984). 
Although the Spinozan account is consistent with prior findings (e.g. Carpenter 
& Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972), I argued the data could equally be explained by a 
modified Cartesian account. This account claims there is no need to assign belief 
during comprehension: only after the information has been understood need a 
judgment of it be made. As such, it is a single process account (Gilbert, 1991). 
Provided we allow for the possibility that the Cartesian mind can use its experience 
with the world, the Spinozan effect of an early truth bias can be equally explained as a 
Cartesian guessing bias under uncertainty, making use of their prior knowledge to 
guide the judgment. By removing the necessity to respond, a Cartesian mind would no 
longer need to rely on its prior knowledge to make an informed guess and could 
instead simply indicate that it is unsure. Experiment 5 (The Cartesian Mind – Online 
Comprehension) found support for the modified Cartesian view, a single-process 
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account, showing that removing the necessity for a judgment reduced the truth bias, 
particularly during the early moments of the decision process.  
The prior knowledge relied upon may be base rate information: how often 
people usually tell lies and truths. People tell the truth far more often than lie (Caspi 
& Gorsky, 2006; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; George & Robb, 
2008; Hancock et al., 2004; see also Cole, 2001; van Swol et al., 2012), which could 
explain why raters are biased towards believing when forced into a judgment. 
Experiment 6 (Most People Tell the Truth – The Availability Heuristic) found that, 
when forced to judge early on, raters made use of base-rate information. This was 
taken as support for the contention that, when forced into judgment, raters rely on 
relevant situational knowledge. This study was the first investigation into the effects 
of perceived base rates on the truth bias. 
The truth bias is found not only during the act of making a decision, but at the 
point of making a final lie-truth response (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Zuckerman et al., 
1979). Experiment 7 (The Cartesian Mind – Post Comprehension) sought to extend 
these findings to the point at which participants provided a response. 
Surprisingly, and in contrast to what was predicted, raters showed a greater 
truth bias when they were not forced into judgment. Exploration of the data provided 
an explanation of this effect: raters were less likely to make lie judgments when able 
to indicate their uncertainty but showed no change in truth judgments, resulting in a 
greater proportion of truth compared to lie judgments. This artefactual truth bias may 
have been expected: prior research indicates raters are more uncertain when making 
lie than when making truth judgments (Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 1997; 
Anderson, 1999, cited by DePaulo & Morris, 2004; see also Levine et al., 1999), and 
that raters are more unsure when they are actually listening to a lie than when 
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listening to a truth (Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 1997; Hurd & Noller, 
1988). That is, internal uncertainty is diagnostic of deception. 
Although the following explanation results from an exploration of the data, and 
so caution must be taken, it is nonetheless promising to note that, when forced into 
making a judgment after information from the environment has been obtained, raters 
can make use of their uncertainty in an adaptive way. If the available information fails 
to lead to a truth judgment, the behaviour is likely indicative of a lie. Given that truths 
are easier to detect, this situation-specific knowledge can be used to suggest a 
statement is deceptive when confidence is low. This adaptive use of uncertainty can 
be seen in the comparison between the forced and unforced choice condition: raters 
who were forced to judge were more likely to judge statements to be deceptive but no 
more or less likely to judge statements to be truthful. Adaptive decision-making is the 
theme of Chapter 8 and is discussed further there. 
Exploring the data of Experiment 7 showed how uncertainty can be used as a 
diagnostic indicator of deception: when raters were uncertain but forced to make a 
decision, they opted to make a lie judgment. But Experiment 5 found what seems at 
first to be a contradictory result: when raters were unsure, they were more likely to 
make a truth judgment. I claimed the reason for these differences rests on a distinction 
between what I have called internal versus external uncertainty. 
Internal uncertainty results when it is difficult to make a decision in light of the 
evidence. The uncertainty arises because the evidence does not allow the rater to 
make a clear judgment, and so in this sense the source of uncertainty can be attributed 
internally to the rater’s inability. Because lies are more difficult to detect than truths 
(Levine et al., 1999), internal uncertainty is more likely when listening to a lie, and 
can be used to make an informed guess that the statement is a lie. 
  240 
External uncertainty arises from a lack of information in the environment. It is 
not due to indecision on part of the rater, but rather the sheer absence of any 
information on which to make a judgment. It is not a difficulty in weighing up the 
evidence, but rather simply a lack of evidence to be weighed. In short, internal 
uncertainty can be thought of as ‘I cannot decide with this information’, whereas 
external uncertainty can be thought of as ‘I do not have enough information to 
decide’. 
I argue that where uncertainty results from a lack of information in the 
environment (i.e. external uncertainty), raters rely on prior knowledge of similar 
situations. If a decision is to be made in the absence of information, raters do not 
simply guess randomly but try to make an informed guess from prior knowledge, such 
as base rate knowledge. This, it is suggested, leads to a truth bias, although if base rate 
knowledge suggested people usually lie, then a lie bias would be observed. In fact, 
this is what I demonstrated in Experiment 6. 
 However, when the information has been gathered about the statement but that 
information still leaves the decision-maker uncertain, this internal uncertainty can be 
used in an adaptive way to suggest the speaker is deceptive. That is because 
uncertainty at the point of the final judgment turns out to be diagnostic of deception: 
we tend to be more uncertain when listening to lies (Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo, 
1992; DePaulo et al., 1997; DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Hurd & 
Noller, 1988). 
Common to both internal and external uncertainty is that situation-specific 
knowledge, whether in the form of base-rates or meta-cognitive awareness of the 
difficulty in spotting lies versus truths, can be used to guide the final judgment under 
uncertainty. The distinction between them is important because it shows that raters 
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make use of different strategies dependent on the information available to them. Such 
flexible decision-making strategies illustrate the adaptive nature of making lie-truth 
judgments, a claim I pursue further in Chapter 8. 
To carry out a confirmatory test of the distinction between internal and external 
uncertainty, and to more directly test the claims of the Spinozan mind account, 
Experiment 8 (The Cartesian Hopi Word Experiment) replicated Gilbert et al.’s 
(1990) first experiment with an added manipulation: participants in one condition 
were forced into a judgment (as per the original study) while those in the other 
condition were not. An interesting prediction arises from the adaptive decision-maker 
account. Whereas the forced choice condition should replicate the original findings of 
Gilbert et al. (1990, Study 1: a truth bias when judging previously interrupted 
statements and a reduced biased for uninterrupted statements), the unforced choice 
condition should show a reversal of the effect: a reduced bias when judging 
previously interrupted statements (external uncertainty cannot be used as a diagnostic 
indicator of deception) whereas uninterrupted statements ought to be truth biased 
(internal uncertainty can be used as a diagnostic indicator of the falsity of the 
statement because the available information failed to result in believing the 
statement). The Spinozan bias was replicated. However, there was no crossover 
effect: participants not forced into making a choice were truth biased whether they 
had been interrupted or not during learning. 
On further examination, it became clear the task was not well situated for 
testing the Spinozan mind or the adaptive decision-maker accounts. The Spinozan 
effect could be better explained as a tendency towards forgetting interrupted false 
statements. Others have also noted the differences in ease of encoding, showing the 
encoding of false statements (‘a twyrin is not a doctor’) is difficult because the 
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various possible interpretations of the true definition of the word (a twyrin may be 
anything other than a doctor) need to be processed in a limited time period (Anderson 
et al., 2009, 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999). As it stands, this thesis offers a novel 
account of the truth bias resulting from an interaction between the information in the 
environment and one’s knowledge of similar contexts. 
Experiment 9 (Socialisation Practices) considered whether the artefactual truth 
bias found at the point of the final judgment, as in Experiment 7, results not from an 
adaptive use of internal uncertainty but rather from social practices. It is socially 
aggressive to confront someone and to call them a liar, and may result in an equally 
aggressive response (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ekman, 1992; Miller et al., 1986; 
O'Sullivan, 2003; O'Sullivan et al., 1988; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). 
In addition, there are social benefits to choosing not to confront a lie: challenging the 
claims of others can cause relationships to break down (Bell & DePaulo, 1996; Clark 
& Lemay, 2010; Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013; Miller 
et al., 1986), and often people lie to us out of politeness, wanting not to hurt our 
feelings (DePaulo et al., 1996; Lewis, 1993; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 
2010), and so we may choose to actively avoid spotting lies (Vrij, 2008; see also 
DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992; Vrij et al., 2010). 
I examined whether there was a social basis to the truth bias. Accounts of this 
nature claim at their core that mere implied social presence is sufficient to result in a 
truth bias, and in turn a sacrifice of accuracy. I found no support for this claim: 
regardless of whether the speaker was believed to be a social or non-social agent, 
there was no truth bias. It is not possible to determine the cause of the lack of truth 
bias. Minimal information was presented with the intention of discovering the 
necessary conditions for the truth bias. Thus the lack of bias may reflect the lack of 
  243 
video or audio behaviours, a lack of familiarity with the stimuli presented, and so on. 
For the current purpose it is important to note that the implied social presence of 
another was not sufficient to invoke a truth bias, as has been suggested previously. 
Previous research has shown how social information influences truth 
responding: we are more inclined to believe those to who we feel close rather than 
strangers (Argyle & Henderson, 1984; McCornack & Levine, 1990; McCornack & 
Parks, 1986; Stiff et al., 1992; Stiff et al., 1989; van Swol et al., 2012; see also Boyes 
& Fletcher, 2007; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Voci, 2006). It was suggested this 
situation-relevant social context information could be used in order to aid the 
decision-maker. It is the case that we tend to tell the truth more often to ingroup 
compared to outgroup members (Cole, 2001; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998)7, so this would 
prove to be a useful, adaptive strategy. A minimal grouping paradigm was employed 
in Experiment 10 (Social Relatedness as a Heuristic) to examine the effects of 
relatedness. A minimal paradigm was used because previous studies have confounded 
social relatedness with familiarity with the speaker. A truth bias was observed when 
rating ingroup members, but there was no evidence of a bias when judging outgroup 
members. 
In summary, little support was found for any of the three classes of HAMs 
identified by Evans (2007). Instead, this thesis suggests that in forming beliefs we 
make use of a relatively diagnostic heuristics in the form of prior knowledge, an 
adaptive use of internal uncertainty, consistency information or social information. 
The use of these heuristics was seen to be dependent on the structure of the task. I 
                                                
7 Although the types of lies that people tell to close relations may be more serious in nature than those 
they tell to acquaintances or strangers (L. J. Speed, personal communication, August 12, 2013; 
DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol & Boden, 2004) 
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adopt Simon’s (1990) view of rationality in this thesis as a scissors with two blades, 
one representing the structure of the environment and the other our limited 
computational ability. Belief formation cannot be understood as either one or the 
other: both blades of the scissor are necessary, discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 
 
Belief Formation as a Dual Process 
 
Having given a recount of the findings of my research, I will now focus on 
whether they evidence a single or dual process account. To do so, I will first consider 
whether my research can be reinterpreted as showing that the truth bias is actually 
nothing more than a reflection of the apparently truthful behaviours the speakers give 
off. I will argue that it is not possible to ignore the independent cognitive component 
of the truth bias that the rater brings to the task. Having established this, I will move 
on to integrate my studies with prior research to arrive at the conclusion that a dual-
process model fails to meet empirical challenges and is conceptually flawed. 
 
The Truth Bias: A Cognitive Phenomenon 
Experiment 1 sought to determine whether the truth bias could be explained 
simply as a reflection of the behaviours that are displayed by truth-tellers and that 
liars attempt to convey in their self-presentation. It was shown that regardless of 
whether a speaker’s initial response or final response was rated first, there was a truth 
bias. Across multiple judgments the bias was seen to decline. This was taken as 
support for an independent cognitive component to the truth bias. 
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Yet Experiment 4 found that consistency in the speaker’s response, a diagnostic 
indicator of their dishonesty, was able to account for the decline in the bias over time. 
Thus the phenomenon could be explained with recourse to the consistent or 
inconsistent behaviours displayed across the course of their statement. Consider also 
that Experiment 2 found an increase in accuracy with longer first responses of the 
speaker when given only audio information. One possible account of the finding 
suggested in the discussion of Experiment 2 was that the serial nature of speech, 
necessarily a temporally-extended cue, may account for the increasing accuracy: over 
time, more information became available to the rater. Similarly, in Experiment 3 
accuracy increased for short clips between viewing 8 and 16 s, suggested to be due to 
the short amount of information available after 8 s. Again, there appears to be an 
exogenous influence on the judgment outcome. 
An important question is whether there is any evidence of an endogenous role in 
accounting for the truth bias. Experiments 5 and 7 provided evidence that, despite 
judging the same behaviour, the degree of belief in the statement was dependent on 
whether raters were able to explicitly indicate their uncertainty. This was particularly 
true during the earliest moments of comprehension in Experiment 5. Perhaps most 
convincingly in favour of a cognitive component to the truth bias, Experiment 6 found 
that beliefs about the likelihood with which a person was lying resulted in raters 
showing a truth or lie bias as the statement was being delivered. Similarly, 
Experiment 10 found that mere grouping of speakers as in- or out-group members 
determined whether raters showed a truth bias or not. Thus there is clear evidence in 
favour of endogenous forces on the truth bias. What form these forces take is 
considered next. 
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Dual or Single Process?  
Process-oriented lie detection research has begun to take a dual-process 
approach (e.g., Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Reinhard & Sporer, 
2008, 2010). In one line of research, belief formation is seen as a default-
interventionist system that initially (and automatically) believes but is later interrupted 
by a more effortful evaluation (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993; 
Masip et al., 2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010). A second pre-
emptive approach is considered later. Given the prominence of default-interventionist 
models, this thesis carried out a number of studies examining their predictions, but 
found them wanting (Experiments 1-3, 5, 6-8). 
This is not the first time the default-interventionist HAM has been challenged. 
Deutsch et al. (2006) note that with sufficient practice, the processing of negated 
statements, expected to take longer because of a necessity to update from automatic 
believing, can be as quick as processing affirmed statements. Although this can be 
incorporated into dual-process theories, assuming that more effortful processing can 
become sufficiently learnt to be automatized and make use of a more heuristic mode 
of thought (Deutsch et al., 2006), it is difficult to align with the stronger position that 
proposes disbelieving necessarily requires an additional tagging after the mental 
construction of the statement as true (Gilbert, 1991). More difficult for the more 
general class of default-interventionist models, mere priming of a negation (rather 
than long-term training) is sufficient to result in unintentional (and thereby automatic: 
Bargh, 1989), fast and effortless processing of negated statements (Deutsch et al., 
2009; Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Schul et al., 2004). Rigorous practice is not required 
for apparent automaticity in the processing of negated statements, suggesting 
analytical processes can be as fast as heuristic processes. 
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If negated statements can be processed as quickly as affirmed statements, why 
has research so often found an affirmed-statement advantage (Carpenter & Just, 1975; 
Clark & Chase, 1972; Clark & Clark, 1977; Donders, 1969; Gilbert et al., 1990; Mayo 
et al., 2004; Trabasso et al., 1971; Zwaan et al., 2002)? It has been suggested that 
negated sentences take longer to process because they are typically underspecified, 
and so it is a quirk of the task structure that gives the misleading impression of a delay 
in processing false statements (Anderson et al., 2010; Glenberg & Robertson, 1999). 
That ‘the eagle is not in the sky’ leaves open a large array of possible places that the 
eagle may be: in its nest, on the ground, and so on. ‘The eagle is in the sky’, the 
affirmative, rules out these alternatives. Theories of language comprehension have 
proposed understanding entails an online mental simulation of the state of affairs 
depicted in the statement (Glenberg et al., 1999; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan 
et al., 2002). As such, the underspecified (negated) statements are liable to take longer 
in order to process the various alternatives, i.e. with the eagle on the ground, in its 
nest, and so on (Anderson et al., 2009, 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999). 
This fits well with the view that comprehension, necessarily an online task, 
requires a constant evaluation and verification of the sentence details (Richter et al., 
2009; Schroeder et al., 2008), which Richter et al. (2009) have called epistemic 
monitoring. Consider for example the processing of the locally ambiguous sentence 
“The detective called the suspect the officer caught a liar”. If difficulty is incurred 
part way through the sentence, readers can re-evaluate by scanning backwards 
through the message (Altmann, Garnham & Dennis, 1992; Frazier & Rayner, 1982; 
Rayner, 1998; although see Mitchell, Shen, Green & Hodgson, 2008). Comprehension 
appears to be effortful and corrective. There is also a body of research demonstrating 
the online effects of competition when processing sentences and even words with 
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multiple meanings (see Harley, 2008; Spivey, 2007; Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard & 
Sedivy, 2002), again suggesting that comprehension is an online evaluative process, 
not an automatic acceptance of all information. Evaluation is not a property of the 
faster heuristic processing stream, but rather of the slower analytical stream. Thus the 
evidence suggests a routine use of analytical processing that operates extremely 
quickly, at the level of phonemes (Spivey et al., 2005), in order to constantly monitor 
the comprehension process. This, along with other downfalls of the strong default-
interventionist position of the Spinozan mind (Gilbert, 1991), is considered in more 
detail in the next section. 
A second dual-process approach to understanding lie-truth judgments has 
applied pre-emptive conflict resolution models, albeit with a focus on accuracy rather 
than judgmental bias (Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010). The findings 
of this thesis did not show support for a role of this class of models in explaining the 
truth bias. The amount of processing time available should be a useful guide as 
whether to select the faster heuristic processing route or the slower analytical route, 
but this was not supported (Experiment 3). More conclusively, when the environment 
is structured such that analytical or heuristic processing is necessarily required, the 
selection of the relevant processing stream should be made from the outset, but again 
this was not found (Experiment 2). These findings are consistent with research 
showing that people do not give more time to processing conclusions that are 
relatively difficult to believe (Ball et al., 2006; Evans, 2007; Thompson et al., 2003), 
as would be predicted by pre-emptive conflict resolution models: again, believability 
should be a readily accessible cue as to whether to select heuristic or analytical 
processing (Evans, 2007). 
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So far the evidence does not appear to support particular instantiations of the 
dual-process heuristic-analytic model. Dual process models more generally have also 
come under criticism. A number of studies that have shown how different information 
types, assumed to engage heuristic or analytical processing, have been confounded 
with task demands: message content cues, thought to encourage analytical processing, 
are also lengthier, more complex, and are delivered later in the information stream 
compared to more readily accessible and shorter visual cues (Chun & Kruglanski, 
2006; Erb et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 
1999b; Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel & Kruglanski, 2005). The difference in 
judgment outcomes when making use of these cues may reflect shifts between 
heuristic and analytical processing, but could equally be accounted for as a change in 
the degree of cognitive load placed on the individual. The judgmental outcome 
differences disappear when these confounds are removed (for a review, see 
Kruglanski et al., 2006), suggesting cognitive load is an important predictor of the 
final judgment, more so than the distinction between heuristic and analytical 
processing. 
These empirical findings are difficult to explain under a dual process account. 
Dual process accounts also encounter difficulties on a conceptual level. Kruglanski et 
al. (2007; see also Gawronski et al., in press) note the various conceptualisations of 
heuristic processing made by different theories (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) do not readily 
map onto one another because they make quite different claims as to what and how 
information is processed by the heuristic or analytical processing stream (Gigerenzer 
& Regier, 1996; Newstead, 2000; Osman, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). If each of 
these alternative views of the heuristic process are supported by research, there must 
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be a vast array of processing methods available to us, from the ‘peripheral’ (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and ‘associative’ (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), to the ‘impulsive’ 
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and ‘heuristic’ (Chaiken et al., 1989), see Evans (2008). 
It is not only difficult to find the overlap in the different conceptualisations of 
heuristic processing across dual-process models, but also within any given model the 
boundaries between heuristic and analytical processing are difficult to find. For 
example, heuristic processes are said to be effortless and fast while analytical 
processes are effortful and slow. These two variables, of effort and speed, are 
continuous in nature. It is not clear where the line should be drawn to separate 
effortless from effortful processing, fast from slow. A distinction of two separate 
processing modes must show non-overlap between the processes if they are to offer 
an explanatory advantage over single process models (Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 
2009; Osman, 2004), but this is both difficult to test empirically (Keren & Schul, 
2009; Schacter & Tulving, 1994) and leads to the unlikely logical outcome (according 
to Keren & Schul, 2009) that each processing route can form a complete judgment in 
isolation of the operations that are solely within the remit of the other processing route 
(Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; although see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). That is, 
the two modes of processing, if they are to be considered conceptually distinct, must 
be shown to be functionally distinct and mutually independent. 
 However, Kruglanski and colleagues (2006; 2007) review research showing 
how phenomena classically considered as resulting from heuristic processing has now 
been recognised to be evaluative, logical rule-based, and therefore analytical. They 
also show that some analytical rule-based decision-making can become automatized, 
a property of heuristic processing (see also Deutsch et al., 2006). The overlap between 
the two processes may be thought of as an unfortunate and somewhat unsurprising 
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result of dichotomising a continuous variable. Consider, for example, that the 
heuristic processing stream has been considered the fast and effortless process and 
analytical processing the slow and effortful process. These variables, of speed and 
effort, are evidently continuous in nature. Whether it makes sense to attempt to draw a 
line at a particular speed, at which everything below is considered slow and 
everything above is considered fast, is at best debatable (Osman, 2004). The findings 
of a number of reviews argue this position (Gawronski et al., in press; Keren & Schul, 
2009; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2007) and suggest that a binary 
distinction between two modes of processing is not a valid one. 
The findings reviewed above along with those presented in the current thesis 
suggest an alternative approach is needed. The data better align with a single process 
model, such as the unimodel of decision making (Kruglanski et al., 2006; Kruglanski 
et al., 2007). The unimodel claims decisions result from a single processing stream 
that is part determined by both the (internal) available cognitive resources and 
(external) task demands, echoing the bounded rationality claim of an interaction 
between the mind and the environment (Chase et al., 1998; Payne et al., 1993; Simon, 
1990; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2005).  
That different information types (i.e., external task constraints) or degrees of 
cognitive load (i.e., internal cognitive resources) influence the trajectory of the final 
decision is thought not to reflect distinct and separate cognitive structures (as per a 
dual process account), but rather to how parameters within the model are tuned 
depending on context and the availability of cognitive resources. A number of belief 
formation models have taken the single-process view and have similarly 
conceptualised the process as one that varies along a continuum, with parameters that 
can be tuned to the task (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kahneman, 2003; Kruglanski et al., 
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2007; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Sherman, 2006). For instance, cognitive load can 
make it more difficult to remember the relevant information (see Experiment 8), 
which in turn leads to different judgment outcomes despite arising from the same 
processing system. The adaptive decision-maker account takes a similar perspective, 
arguing that decision outcomes are the result of the interaction between situational 
context and the limited internal cognitive resources (Experiments 5-7). 
Although a single process account can also explain the findings, should a single 
process model be favoured over dual process models when it comes to belief 
formation? The current thesis argues so. Phenomena purportedly supporting a dual 
process position could not only be equally explained by a single process model 
making use of adaptive rules (Experiments 4-6), but it was also shown that an 
adaptive decision-making account is able to avoid the conceptual difficulties 
associated with dichotomising continuous variables and is able to make novel 
predictions based on the context-sensitivity of the decision process. Partial support 
was found for the context-dependency of decision-making under uncertainty (in 
particular, see Experiments 5 through 8). Full support could not be attained because of 
the unexpected flaw in the design of the extended replication of Gilbert et al. (1990, 
Study 1), a flaw originating from the initial experiment, namely that participants were 
more likely to forget the less informative false items under time pressure (see Hasson 
et al., 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2007). Nonetheless, those predictions that were made 
were substantiated (Experiments 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10): simple context-dependent rules are 
used to guide decisions under uncertainty. There was one apparent exception: 
Experiment 7 produced a result that was in the opposite direction of the prediction. 
Raters became more truth biased if they were not forced into judgment. In light of 
prior research, such an effect may have been anticipated. Given that raters are more 
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confident in making truth judgments and are more confident when rating truths 
(Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 1997; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Anderson, 1999, cited by DePaulo & Morris, 2004; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; see also 
Levine et al., 1999), it is perhaps not surprising that, if forced into judgment, 
uncertainty itself can be taken as an indication of deception. However, this is a post-
hoc account of the findings and requires a confirmatory test in future research. 
Nonetheless, a single process account of belief formation offers substantial promise. 
Although there has been no support shown here for a dual process theory of the 
truth bias, it may be argued that it offers researchers a means of making and testing 
predictions. As discussed, recent research has found the pre-emptive conflict 
resolution model a fruitful theory for making predictions about lie detection accuracy 
(Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010), although it should be noted that 
Reinhard and Sporer (2008) state their findings are not in contradiction to a single-
process models. Thus the evidence seems to strongly point towards the absence of a 
dichotomising of mental processes and towards a single mental system. 
For now, this thesis takes the single-process position of Kruglanski and 
colleagues (2007, p. 296):  
 
‘[It is the] parametric differences between the… degree of task demands 
or of subjective relevance of information… rather than other possible 
distinctions (e.g., in the type of contents of the information processed, 
awareness, or swiftness of processing) that account for the empirical 
results on which numerous dual-mode formulations were based.’ 
(Emphasis added). 
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Reinterpreting Evidence Supporting a Dual Process Position: The Spinozan 
Mind 
I have argued that HAMs fail to meet empirical tests, as shown in my research, 
as well as suffering from conceptual flaws that are the source of on-going debate 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 
2007; Osman, 2004; Thompson, 2013). One default-interventionist HAM has been 
particularly prominent in lie detection research: the Spinozan mind. In contrast to the 
above discussion, it has been claimed that the Spinozan mind is supported from a 
variety of different research areas and exhibited in a range of phenomena (Gilbert, 
1991). In this section I will reconsider the evidence that has been shown to support the 
Spinozan mind account and illustrate how it may be accounted for under a single 
processing view. 
The main form of evidence in support of a Spinozan position is that 
comprehension of affirmed statements (e.g. ‘star [symbol] is above plus [symbol]’) is 
faster than comprehension of negated statements (e.g. ‘star is not above plus’: Clark 
& Chase, 1972; see also Donders, 1969; Zwaan et al., 2002). In Chapter 2 and in the 
above section I showed how this evidence is compromised by the fact that negated 
statements in these studies have a greater number of possible interpretations: e.g. the 
star may be below the plus, behind it, and so on (Anderson et al., 2009, 2010; 
Glenberg et al., 1999; Hasson et al., 2005). That is, this finding was the result of the 
structure of the task environment: when negated statements have a similar number of 
possible interpretations (e.g. ‘this coin does/does not show heads to be face up’), 
participants were equally fast to respond to negated and affirmed statements 
(Anderson et al., 2009, 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999). This evidence has been used to 
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argue for a single-process model that is slower in processing statements that require 
greater consideration (Anderson et al., 2009, 2010; Glenberg et al., 1999). 
A second stream of research, the confirmation bias (covered in Chapter 2), has 
also been taken as support of the Spinozan position (Gilbert, 1991) insofar as people 
show a bias towards seeking evidence in favour of believing over disbelieving. 
Despite being heavily documented (see Snyder & Campbell, 1980; Snyder & Swann, 
1978), evidence in favour of an ever-present confirmation bias is lacking (Higgins & 
Bargh, 1987; see also Trope & Bassok, 1982). In a review of the area, Higgins and 
Bargh (1987) concluded that participants only seek to confirm their hypotheses in 
situations where confirmatory questions can generate more information than can 
disconfirmatory questions (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed recount). Again, it seems 
we make use of contextual information in order to best guide our judgments. 
Having established belief in a statement, it continues to persevere despite being 
told the statement was false (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This has been considered a 
potential cause of the truth bias and as support for the Spinozan mind hypothesis, 
showing how early automatic assent of a statement continues to influence the 
judgment at later stages (see Elaad, 2003; Fan et al., 1995; Gilbert, 1991; Zuckerman, 
Koestner, et al., 1984). But belief perseverance does not reflect some miserliness or 
anchoring to an initial default position. When the opportunity for additional cognitive 
work is given, the initial belief is found to be stronger, not weaker (Fleming & 
Arrowood, 1979; Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield, 1949; Skurnik et al., 2005), 
suggesting that belief perseverance results from further evaluative processing, not 
from a lack of exertion to overcome an initial automatic belief. 
Perhaps most difficult to account for is the research Gilbert and colleagues 
(1990) muster to show that, despite being forewarned that they were about to hear a 
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false statement, participants continue to automatically believe statements early on. 
This would seem to be strong support for the automaticity of believing. Although the 
authors empirically confirm the claim (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 2), the prior 
research does not lend itself to this interpretation. Prior research (Allyn & Festinger, 
1961; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964; McGuire, 1964) and at least 
two meta-analyses (Benoit, 1998; Wood & Quinn, 2003) conclude that forewarning 
can in fact induce what Gilbert and colleagues (1990; Gilbert, 1991) refer to as a 
sceptic’s set, showing that forewarnings do in fact make it easier to discredit 
statements as false. When forewarned, there does not appear to be the same tendency 
towards believing information to be true, contradicting the Spinozan mind claims. 
Notably, potential moderators of the forewarning effect have been suggested: 
whether the warning was of an impending persuasion attempt or a more detailed 
warning about the contents of the message (Cialdini & Petty, 1981; see also Baron, 
Baron & Miller, 1973), and whether there are sufficient cognitive resources available 
(Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964; Wood & Quinn, 2003) affects the efficacy of the warning. 
Although these findings suggest a context- and cognitive resource-dependency, in line 
with an adaptive decision making account, that cognitive load influences the degree of 
believing could be taken to support the Spinozan position. According to this theory, if 
raters are not given sufficient time or have insufficient resources to move to the 
analytic evaluation of the comprehended statement, they will continue to believe. 
Gilbert and colleagues (1990, 1993) also show that cognitive load increases the 
propensity to believe a statement is true. That cognitive load increases the likelihood 
of believing was an argument that Gilbert (1991) used in support of the Spinozan 
position, because automatic processes (that cause an initial belief in the statement) 
should not be affected by cognitive load but more effortful processes (required to 
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update the initial automatic belief) should be, resulting in a greater influence of the 
initial automatic belief stage. 
As discussed in the preceding section, however, this cognitive load prediction is 
not unique to the dual-process Spinozan account. The single-process model of 
Kruglanski et al. (2007) also predicts task difficulty will influence the outcome of the 
decision process by influencing the degree to which relevant information can be 
encoded. As shown in Experiment 8 (see also Hasson et al., 2005), cognitive load 
interfered with the encoding of those statements that were under-specified, i.e. false 
statements. As such, the truth bias could be explained not as a tendency towards 
automatically believing, but rather as a difficulty in encoding those statements that 
required greater processing under time pressure. That cognitive load can result in a 
truth bias, resulting from a greater tendency to forget false items, both discredits the 
Spinozan view and can account for the findings presented by Gilbert and colleagues 
(1990, 1993) showing that cognitive load results in a bias.  
It would seem from the my discussion that evidence employed as support for a 
dual-process Spinozan hypothesis can also be explained under a single-process 
Cartesian account. Indeed, as the original authors note, ‘most of these results [from 
prior research] can be explained within the Cartesian as well as the Spinozan 
framework’ (Gilbert et al., 1993, p. 222). But more than this, the adaptive decision-
making account can also account for context-dependent and resource-dependent 
moderators, considered further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: General Discussion: Adaptive Decision Making 
 
 
I have argued that dual process theories cannot account for the truth bias and 
that they suffer from conceptual difficulties. Consideration is now given to whether 
the truth bias can be better thought of as an adaptive, successful strategy in an 
information-limited world, rather than as an unfortunate erroneous consequence of 
forming the difficult lie-truth judgment. I argue the presence of a truth bias is 
dependent on the types of information available in the environment: it is a flexible 
response to the types of cues available. 
 
 
Adaptive Decision Making: Interplay Between World and Mind 
 
This thesis opened with a distinction between heuristics and heuristic 
processing, which have previously been used interchangeably (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). However, I have shown that whereas people use relatively simple 
heuristic rules in making lie-truth judgments (Experiments 4, 6, 7 and 10), heuristic 
processing does not seem to be in play (Experiments 1-3). This distinction between 
simple heuristic rules and a heuristic processing mode is therefore an important one. 
The definition of the truth bias I have used is an operational one of rating 
statements as truths more often than they are present. Some have taken a different 
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definition, arguing the truth bias is a heuristic rule (Fiedler & Walka, 1993; Stiff et al., 
1989), reflecting a generalised tendency to believe others as the name implies. The 
findings of this thesis suggest both an operational and a heuristic definition are in part 
true. The truth bias, I argue, can be thought of as an emergent property of an adaptive 
system. In making simple but effective decisions in an information-limited world, 
where liars provide very little indication as to their true intentions, I suggest we make 
use of readily available information in whatever form that may take, whether it is our 
prior experience with the world in the form of base rates (Experiment 6 of this thesis; 
O'Sullivan et al., 1988), social information in the sense of psychological distance 
(Experiment 10 of this thesis; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010), our own uncertainty as 
resulting from an inability to decide (Experiments 7-8), or other salient cues available 
in the environment (Platzer & Bröder, 2012; Street & Richardson, in prep). Across the 
experiments reported herein, it was shown how such relevant contextual information 
could be used to guide the decision under uncertainty. That is, the source of the truth 
bias was dependent on the types of information available in the environment. 
Two important considerations arise from the adaptive decision making account 
offered. First, if the truth bias results from an adaptive use of contextual and 
environmental information, this suggests raters will not always demonstrate a truth 
bias. Rather, flexibility in the types of information used could also lead to a lie bias. 
Do raters show such flexibility? 
Second, if raters make satisfactory judgments using limited cognitive resources 
in a limited but information-rich world (Simon, 1990), do they employ compensatory 
or non-compensatory strategies? The former results when the additive effects of the 
cues used in the decision result in a net effect where cues can cancel each other. That 
is, a host of weaker cues suggesting deception could override the power of a single 
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stronger cue that suggests honesty. A non-compensatory strategy describes the 
situation where cues do not have a net effect, but rather the most informative single 
cue is used in the decision and all other information has no effect, such that a set of 
weaker cues could not come to overpower the effect of the selected cue. These two 
questions are considered below. 
 
Flexibility in the Truth Bias 
With regards to the first concern, the evidence suggests people do not always 
show a bias towards believing others. Meissner and Kassin (2002) documented an 
investigator bias in police interviewers, who show a reliable tendency towards ratings 
speakers as liars (see also Bond et al., 2005; Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Fong, 1999; 
Kassin et al., 2005; Masip et al., 2005). One may suspect their line of work requires a 
degree of suspicion. Indeed they report that they expect their interviewees to lie to 
them when asked in research interviews (Moston et al., 1992), so this cannot be said 
to be evidence of flexibility in their responding. Rather, they overgeneralise their 
suspicion (see Kassin et al., 2005; Masip et al., 2005). But even ‘naïve’ 
undergraduates, who typically show a truth bias (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine et 
al., 1999; Zuckerman et al., 1979), can in certain circumstances exhibit a lie bias. In 
the current thesis, it was shown how base-rate information is used early on in the 
judgment forming process (Experiment 6). When the base rates suggested 80% of the 
speakers were likely to lie, I found an initial bias towards disbelieving. By the point of 
their final judgment all respondents, regardless of their beliefs about the base rate, 
shifted more towards believing the speaker. That is, those who began with a lie bias at 
the start of the statement finished with no response bias by the end of the statement. 
Even across the course of a single statement raters show flexibility in their 
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responding. Undergraduates given bogus training on the cues to honesty versus the 
cues to deception show a bias towards believing and disbelieving, respectively 
(Masip, Alonso, et al., 2009; see also Blair, 2006, for similar findings with police 
officers). Making raters more aware of cues to honesty or deception may have made 
them more salient than other behaviours and resultantly had a greater impact on the 
decision process (Masip, Alonso, et al., 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2012). In two studies 
not reported in this thesis, we similarly found raters who attended to a cue known to 
suggest deception or honesty shifted the degree to which raters were prepared to 
believe the speaker (Street & Richardson, in prep). 
Finally, by leading participants acting as interviewers to expect their partner to 
be guilty, they choose more guilt-presumptive questions: even third-party independent 
raters considered the speaker to be guilty (Hill, Memon & McGeorge, 2008), showing 
a self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948). Thus our prior beliefs can come to influence 
how we interpret behaviour. There is no question that lay people are typically truth 
biased. But there are situations where it is adaptive to have a preference towards 
disbelieving others: whether that is because we have reason to suspect others or 
because the most salient cues in the environment are those that suggest deceit. 
It would appear then that the truth bias does not have a single cause, but rather 
emerges from an interaction between context-specific knowledge and information in 
the environment. I argue that the truth bias is an adaptive view of the world, reflecting 
the base-rate of honesty that laypeople typically encounter (i.e. that people tend to tell 
the truth: DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). When situation-specific 
knowledge or salient cues in the environment suggest otherwise, raters can adopt a 
preference towards disbelieving. 
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Compensatory Decision-Making 
It is unclear whether the adaptive decision-maker incorporates a set of cues into 
the decision-process, which can have additive or subtractive effects on the judgment 
outcome, or whether a single cue is selected from amongst the set of available cues 
and is the sole basis for judgment, such that other available cues do not have an 
additive or subtractive effect. The former, a compensatory strategy, has the benefit of 
being more informed insofar as it makes use of more of the available information. The 
latter, a non-compensatory strategy, has the benefit of simplifying the complex 
decision-making process. The findings of the current thesis do not readily side with 
one account or the other. However, I have advocated an adaptive decision-making 
perspective in understanding decision-making in uncertain but information-rich 
worlds. Brief discussion is given to the matter here because it is an important 
consideration for any adaptive decision-making account including my own (see 
Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Pohl, 
2006), and is a current source of debate (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Hilbig & 
Richter, 2011; Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell, Weston & Shanks, 2003; 
Oppenheimer, 2003; Pohl, 2011). For a review of the debate, see Pohl (2011). 
A number of studies have shown that, where non-compensatory strategies are 
used (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbölting, 1991), they are used when participants 
are not free to search for information in their own way (Bröder, 2003; Newell & 
Shanks, 2003), and while the majority seem to use the rule a large proportion of 
people do not (Bröder, 2000; Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell et al., 2003). For 
instance, it might be expected that the recognition heuristic would be used as a single 
noncompensatory cue: ‘choose the recognised item when unsure’. But some research 
shows it is used in conjunction with other information in a more compensatory way 
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(Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Pohl, 
2006; Richter & Späth, 2006) 
It seems that the use of a relatively simple heuristic such as the recognition 
heuristic is integrated with other relevant knowledge (Richter & Späth, 2006), so 
much so that people choose to buy more information than they strictly need, even in 
relatively simple decision making tasks (Newell & Shanks, 2003). However, the 
gathering of additional information is sensitive to the costs associated with obtaining 
more information (Bröder, 2000), and with practice those cues that are selected are 
those that have previously been useful in making a successful decision (Newell, 
Rakow, Weston & Shanks, 2004). That is, the costs and benefits of obtaining more 
information seems to be taken into account, suggesting cue selection is adaptive to the 
task constraints (Bröder, 2000). 
Thus there is a body of prior research suggesting cue selection is often 
compensatory and makes use of more than a single cue in coming to a decision. Does 
this extend to more real-world lie-truth judgments? My research suggests so. 
Experiment 4 showed that consistency was a diagnostic indicator of deception and 
was used by around 150 participants across three experiments. Yet it was found that, 
despite using a diagnostic cue, raters’ accuracy did not reflect this. I suggested raters 
might have been taking additional information into account besides consistency cues. 
If raters take into account a number of different cues, what might these be? A 
successful decision-maker should select cues that are informative. Yet until recently 
one of the major explanations of low lie detection accuracy was that participants have 
the wrong beliefs about which cues are diagnostic of deception (Ekman, 1992; Miller 
& Stiff, 1993; The Global Deception Team, 2006; Vrij, Granhag & Mann, 2010). Lie 
detection researchers argued raters were making use of information that was not just 
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non-diagnostic, but would actually suggest the incorrect judgment. More recently, 
four meta-analyses conducted by Hartwig and Bond (2011) showed that, despite self-
reporting use of the wrong cues, raters are not using them. Instead, they rely relatively 
little on erroneous cues such as eye contact and more on diagnostic indicators. The 
message from these meta-analyses and my own research is that raters seem to select 
context-appropriate information. I claim an adaptive decision maker account may 
prove to be a useful description of how raters are making use of these cues, and that it 
offers a promising new direction for lie detection research. 
There is some suggestive evidence in the lie detection literature indicating a 
compensatory decision strategy. A recent study by Bond and colleagues (Bond et al., 
2013) found raters made use of a cue that was 100% diagnostic, namely the incentive 
to lie. But when visual cues from the statement became available raters made use of 
those to their own detriment, suffering a marked drop in accuracy from 97% to 76%. 
Even when there is a clear ‘best’ raters do not always take it without regard for other 
cues (c.f. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Additional information can be taken into the 
lie-truth decision process, even when that information is counterproductive. 
This raises the issue of what cues are selected and whether all cues are treated 
equally. A compensatory strategy, as I am arguing is used in lie detection, requires 
weighting the available evidence so that its net effect can be determined. Research in 
decision making suggests salient cues are given heavier weighting in the decision 
process (Platzer & Bröder, 2012). Taking this to the lie-detection arena, our research 
paints a similar picture (Street & Richardson, in prep.). In the first experiment, 
participants rated a set of behaviours for how tense the speaker appeared (TE) and 
how hard they appeared to be thinking (TH), without any forewarning as to the 
deceptive nature of the stimuli. In a second experiment, a new set of participants were 
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shown one half of the stimulus set where the two cues that had been rated in the 
previous experiment, i.e. the TE and TH cues, were in greatest contrast to each other. 
That is, those statements in which speakers appeared relatively tense but not 
appearing to think hard, or vice versa, were selected, because these cues suggest 
competing interpretations of deception and honesty, respectively. Participants in the 
second study were asked to rate either whether the speaker appeared tense or not, or 
whether the speaker appeared to be thinking hard or not (within subjects) as the 
speaker delivered the statement. That is, throughout the course of the statement the 
rater gave a continuous judgment, as per the methodology employed in Experiment 5. 
At the end of each video the rater made a lie-truth judgment. 
It was found that when raters attended to a cue that suggested deceit (i.e. the 
speaker appeared to be thinking hard or tense), there was a significant decline in the 
truth ratings compared to when raters, viewing the exact same behaviour, were 
attending to a cue that suggested honesty. By making particular cues salient, they 
came to have a more forceful impact on the final decision outcome. I argue this 
evidences the greater impact of salient information in making lie-truth judgments, 
similar to the findings of research in less real-world tasks (Platzer & Bröder, 2012). 
To summarise, it seems a dual-process account of the truth bias has difficulties 
both on the empirical level, as demonstrated in this thesis, as well as on the 
conceptual level, as illustrated in the preceding chapter. I have suggested a single-
process model is both more parsimonious and is able to make (and survive the testing 
of) novel predictions. Although the data do not allow for any firm conclusions to be 
drawn about the compensatory or non-compensatory strategies employed, some of the 
presented evidence is at least consistent with a compensatory strategy, where salient 
cues have a greater impact on the judgment outcome. 
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Future Directions 
 
Conflict Between Prior Knowledge and Online Processing 
In this thesis I have focused on the cognitive processes underlying the decision 
process independently of the speakers’ behaviours. However, it is of course important 
to consider how the behaviour is interpreted in making the judgment. For example, if 
a speaker delivers an implausible story, the rater may be expected to become 
suspicious and to be more likely to consider the statement a lie. But what is unclear is 
how raters bring together potentially conflicting information from the speaker, which 
may suggest deception, and from their prior experience with the world, that people 
usually tell the truth. Understanding how the two come together and how this 
potential conflict is resolved is an interesting area for future exploration. 
Of the experiments conducted, Experiment 6 may be best set up to see the 
conflict, where the behaviours were held constant but the beliefs about the base rate 
were manipulated. Participants rating lies in the high-truth expectancy condition, for 
example, would have had to deal with deceptive behaviours conflicting with their 
prior belief about the high base rate of honesty. However, there was no evidence for a 
conflict between the speaker’s behaviour (i.e. whether they lied or told the truth) and 
base-rate beliefs during the presentation of the behaviour, i.e. as the belief judgment 
was forming. 
Although this could suggest the prior beliefs and the behaviour of the speaker 
have independent effects on the developing judgment, the lack of conflict between 
behaviour and prior beliefs may result from the fact that raters were not particularly 
accurate in detecting deception. The leaked deceptive behaviours may not have had a 
substantial influence on the developing judgment because they may not have been 
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highly diagnostic or may have been missed by the rater. Consider that both truth-
tellers and liars want or expect to be believed by the listener. Self-presentational 
behaviours may have given an impression of honesty regardless of the veracity of the 
speaker’s statement. Over time, more behaviour will become available from the 
speaker. This could potentially explain why, over time, raters show an increase in 
their truth belief regardless of veracity (Experiment 6). That is, while initially the 
raters’ expectations may guide the judgment, as more (self-presentational) behaviour 
becomes available it may become the basis for making the judgment. This is of course 
speculative, but is worth exploring in future research. 
In Experiment 6, after having viewed the full statement, raters were required to 
make a single judgment of the statement as either a truth or lie. By this point, after 
having heard the full statement and seen the full behavioural display, when raters 
expected mostly lies they showed no response bias whereas those expecting mostly 
truths showed a strong truth bias. This could have resulted from the interaction 
between the base rate information provided and the behaviour of the speaker. The lack 
of bias when expecting mostly lies, for example, may reflect the competing 
interpretations suggested by the speaker’s behaviours, which are self-presentational in 
an attempt to appear (rightly or wrongly) honest, and the rater’s base rate belief that 
suggested the speaker was likely to be lying. 
However, the finding is also consistent with an explanation of competition 
between the base rate beliefs given to participants in this study (given base rate) and 
their own base rate beliefs that they have learnt from their interactions outside of the 
laboratory (learnt base rate). Because people tell the truth more often than they lie 
(e.g., DePaulo et al., 1996), participants’ learnt base rate will suggest the speaker is 
likely to be telling the truth, regardless of the given base rate of honesty in this study. 
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To begin exploring the interaction between behaviour and cognition, it may be 
fruitful to move to a task where the cues in the environment can be selected and 
controlled, and where prior knowledge of the task is known or minimised. For 
example, a set of novel creatures could be invented that display three simple 
behaviours. Raters could be trained to learn whether the presence or absence of a 
particular combination of behaviours suggests truth telling or lying, with each 
combination having a defined probability of appearing given truth-telling/lying. The 
training would serve as a form of prior knowledge on a task where the past experience 
has been controlled. The behaviours could be easily manipulated in a later test phase. 
Lie detection has been the topic of interest here because it offers a somewhat 
naturalistic environment where uncertainty is high due to little reliability in the cues 
presented. There are a number of important questions one may ask moving to a 
similar but more controllable paradigm: under uncertainty, will raters give more 
weighting to cues that are environment-based or are drawn from their prior 
experiences? Will this depend on the diagnosticity of these cue-types, how difficult it 
is to make use of them, or how salient each is? An adaptive system may be expected 
to satisfice and make use of relatively easily accessible information that has some 
diagnostic validity to make a ‘good enough’ decision. It will be important to be able 
to quantify these variables in order to determine how these factors contribute to the 
judgment. 
 
Internal and External Uncertainty 
A distinction was made between internal and external uncertainty in the 
discussion of Experiment 7. The claim here was that internal uncertainty reflects 
indecision in light of the evidence, while external uncertainty reflects a lack of 
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information on which to attempt to make a judgment. The former, internal 
uncertainty, can be used as a heuristic in a given context: ‘an inability to decide 
results from a stimulus that is difficult to categorise’. In the current context, lies are 
more difficult to spot than truths (Levine et al., 1999), and so uncertainty can be used 
to make an informed ‘lie’ guess. The latter, external uncertainty, cannot be used in 
this way. The uncertainty is not a result of a difficulty in making the decision, but an 
absence of information on which to even begin making one. In the absence of 
evidence, context-relevant knowledge can be used, such as base rate information 
(Experiment 6). This was the first study to explore the effects of perceived base rates 
on the lie-truth judgment. 
An attempt to test the validity of this distinction was made in Experiment 8, 
replicating earlier work on the issue (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 1). The aim here was 
to show that the data supposedly supporting a dual-process Spinozan mind position 
was actually reflecting raters’ attempts to make the best guess under uncertainty, 
whether that uncertainty was internal or external. However, it became clear that the 
pattern of responding that appeared to support the Spinozan position resulted from a 
design flaw in the experiment. 
Support for the reliance of prior knowledge information under external 
uncertainty was shown in Experiment 6: given different contextual information (about 
the base rates), those who had to guess used this base rate information during the early 
moments of processing. Over time, there was less reliance on the base rate 
information, such that by the end of the trial when the full statement had been 
presented, those who expected four out of five speakers to lie nonetheless rated 
approximately half of them as truth-tellers. 
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The internal-external uncertainty claim leads to a somewhat unusual prediction. 
Before the speaker begins delivering their statement, i.e. in the absence of any 
information, raters should still be inclined to guess the speaker will tell the truth. 
Context-relevant information should be relied upon to make a guess, and can be made 
even before the speaker begins delivering their statement. By manipulating the 
context to one where raters should anticipate people to lie, such as manipulating base 
rate beliefs or leading participants to believe they are listening to sales people, the 
guessing strategy should reflect this. Importantly, the Spinozan mind position makes 
no predictions in this regard, so support for this prediction would not contradict the 
Spinozan position. 
Internal uncertainty is that which is present after having collected some 
information from the task. If, having evaluated the evidence, a clear decision is not 
made, this inability to decide can itself be used to guide the judgment. Once again, the 
key to how this uncertainty is used is context-dependent. In the context of lie 
detection, lies are harder to detect than truths (Levine et al., 1999), and so should be 
more likely to result in indecision. But if lies were easier to detect than truths, this 
effect should reverse: under internal uncertainty, raters should guess ‘true’ because 
truths would be more likely to result in indecision. 
One way to get at this would be to give participants a small list of behavioural 
cues written on screen. Each cue could have assigned with it a probability of being 
present given that the statement is a lie and a second probability of being present 
given that the statement is a truth. On each trial a subset of these cues could be 
produced as abstracted descriptions (e.g. ‘This person stuttered and told a plausible 
story’) and the rater would need to judge whether the speaker lied or told the truth. If 
the cues tend to have a high probability of being present if the speaker is lying (i.e. 
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they are highly diagnostic) but are almost equiprobable to be present if the speaker is 
telling the truth (i.e. they have relatively low diagnostic validity), it would be 
expected that raters would guess ‘truth’ when they are unsure. This could be tested by 
employing the response paradigm used in Experiments 5 and 7, such that half the 
participants are forced to judge and the other half are not. 
The task could be abstracted further, such that the context of deception is 
removed and participants would need to categorise arbitrary items (e.g. polygons) into 
one of two nonsense categories (e.g. squibbers or cringers) based on a set of cues, 
each of which has an associated probability of being present given that the item 
belongs to the squibbers or cringers category. This would reduce the influence of prior 
knowledge such as base rate information that may influence a lie-detection decision. 
Ultimately, how decisions are made under uncertainty is thought to be 
dependent on contextual information and prior knowledge. Manipulation of these 
should influence the form of guessing that respondents make. 
Finally, the social orientation experiments in Chapter 6 began to explore the role 
of social information in the decision-making task. I suggested the data show no 
evidence of a willingness to sacrifice accuracy for the sake of abiding by social rules, 
but rather that social information can be used as an additional cue to guide the 
decision. Whether this information comes in the form of a perceived social attachment 
with another, evoking feelings of intimacy, or whether it is used as a gauge of the 
probability with which ingroup members will lie, is unclear. One way to make this 
distinction would be to manipulate the base rate information, as per Experiment 6, and 
determine whether the ingroup bias persists. 
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In summary, future work may seek to discover how behaviour and cognition 
interplay in forming decisions under uncertainty. Perhaps the most interesting future 
direction is to explore the context-dependency of decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out to determine how and why raters make systematic decisions 
under uncertainty. To do so, I employed a real-life socially oriented decision made by 
most people, from suspicious spouses to cynical customs officials: lie detection. 
Despite strong prior beliefs and extensive experience (see DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; 
DePaulo et al., 1996; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Park et al., 2002; The Global Deception 
Team, 2006; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010), we are poor lie detectors (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Kraut, 1980). In this task, we bring information into the task from 
prior experience with making similar judgments, with similar people, and in similar 
situations. This ranges from probabilities with which people in general usually lie to a 
more fine-grained understanding of the social situation and inferences made about the 
individual speaker, such as whether they are an ingroup member. The rater does not 
rely on this information alone: they take into account the behaviours of the speaker as 
they unfold (see Burgoon & Buller, 1996). Yet in spite of this rich source of 
information raters are largely inaccurate and uncertain, making lie detection an 
interesting test case for decision-making under uncertainty. 
Dual process models are currently gaining popularity in the lie detection field. 
On the surface there are a number of phenomena that appear to show the effects of 
dual processes (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993; Masip et al., 
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2006; Masip, Garrido, et al., 2009; Masip et al., 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010; 
Reinhard, Sporer & Marksteiner, 2008). In a series of experiments the predictions 
made by these theories were tested. I found that the heuristic-analytic model failed to 
meet the challenges issued against it. 
Instead I have shown that the data are consistent with a context-dependent 
adaptive decision-maker, one that makes the best guess in an information-limited 
world. In support of this view, once the context was changed, raters adapted to it. 
When consistency information was available, for example, it was employed. The 
same was true of social relatedness information and base rate knowledge. This 
information was used to make an informed guess under uncertainty, as shown in 
Chapter 5. 
This thesis concludes that we are adaptive decision makers, balancing the 
demands of the task and the availability of information with the limited cognitive 
resources available (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et al., 1993; Simon, 1990; Stewart, 
Chater & Brown, 2006). To quote Fiske (1992, p. 879), ‘people are no fools; they use 
workable strategies with adequate outcomes’. 
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